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  Abstract 
Thanks to technological advances over the past two decades, media consumers now have 
an unprecedented number of content options. Along with an increase in news options has come 
an even greater expansion in the number of entertainment options available to media consumers. 
This is especially true when it comes to fictional entertainment television programming available 
via cable and services such as Netflix and Hulu. Much attention has been paid to how 
individuals’ political identities affect their selection of news. Although there is evidence that 
exposure to entertainment media is fractured along political lines, there remains an assumption 
that most viewers select entertainment media without any political considerations. The average 
individual consumes much more entertainment media than they consume news media. What if 
people’s political identities actually do influence what fictional entertainment media they 
choose? I contend that 1) individual-level differences such as political identity strength affect 
whether people evaluate media content as politically relevant, and 2) these evaluations affect 
whether people selectively expose themselves to fictional entertainment media.  
Rather than rely on researchers’ designations of media as politically relevant or not, I call 
for a viewer-centric approach to identifying politically relevant media. Any given media text 
may be of greater or lesser political relevance to any given media consumer. Unfortunately, 
asking viewers to identify what television shows are politically relevant isn’t a straightforward 
process due to the way people often use terms such as “political” and “politics.” To overcome 
limitations with existing approaches, this dissertation develops a new scale that I use to evaluate 
individuals’ perceptions of media as politically relevant. I propose a model predicting how the
 
 
xiv 
strength of a viewer’s political identities, together with a television show’s content, will affect 
the viewer’s evaluation of the show as politically relevant. In turn, the evaluation of the show as 
politically relevant will affect politically motivated selective exposure to that show. In Chapter 2, 
I develop the Politically Relevant Media (PRM) scale across two studies. In Chapter 3, I examine 
how attributes of media content and political identities affect evaluations of television programs 
as politically relevant, as indicated by PRM scale scores. In Chapter 4, I demonstrate the 
predictive and mediating abilities of the PRM scale. I find that political identity strength has a 
positive effect on evaluations of television programming as politically relevant, and such 
evaluations are associated with greater politically motivated selective exposure to fictional 
entertainment shows. This has implications for the study of politically motivated selective 
exposure more broadly, but particularly in the context of fictional entertainment media.  
 
 
1 
Chapter 1: A Viewer-Centric Approach to Identifying Politically Relevant Media 
Over the past two decades, technological advances have brought with them an explosion 
in the amount of media available to consumers, whether via cable and satellite television or via 
the Internet. Media consumers now have an unprecedented number of options to choose from for 
both news and entertainment. Particularly when it comes to entertainment television, the 
proliferation of both cable television and subscription services such as Netflix, Hulu, and 
Amazon Prime Video leaves viewers with a seemingly endless number of fictional entertainment 
television options. Political communication scholars have paid much attention to how news 
selection is affected by individuals’ political identities, defined in this project as partisanship, 
ideological identity, and issue public membership. Yet there is evidence that exposure to 
entertainment media is also fractured along political lines. Much has been made about the 
potential for news media to lead to “echo chambers” in which people only expose themselves to 
news that conforms to their existing political viewpoints; however, the average person consumes 
much more entertainment media than they consume news media (TiVo, 2019). Is it possible that 
people’s political identities affect their selection of fictional entertainment media? Perhaps the 
real “echo chambers” we should concern ourselves with are not with news media, but with 
fictional media. 
Studies of television viewing patterns have identified that conservatives and liberals 
watch different types of television entertainment content (Blakley et al., 2019). Although 
theories of moral foundations have been applied to the selection of entertainment media (Long & 
Eveland, 2018; Tamborini et al., 2013) and scholars have developed typologies of political 
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entertainment media (Eilders & Nitsch, 2015; Haas, Christensen, & Haas, 2015; Holbert, 2005),  
very little work (e.g., Settle, 2018; Vraga, Bode, Smithson, & Troller-Renfree, 2016) has 
explored the degree to which individuals perceive media content to be politically relevant, 
especially television entertainment programming. Likewise, there exists ambiguity around what 
counts as “political entertainment” and what media is politically relevant (Delli Carpini, 2014). I 
define the political relevance of media as the degree to which individuals think about media 
content as being related to politics and the political. These matters are complicated by the fact 
that media genres are defined by audiences, researchers, industry actors, and cultural practices 
alike, making classification difficult. Meanwhile, scholars still seem to delineate between 
explicitly political media and media whose political content is more implicit. 
Scholars of media effects and narrative effects and engagement have demonstrated that 
entertainment media can affect social reality judgments and political opinions. For example, 
exposure to entertainment media has been found to affect attitudes regarding crime (Donovan & 
Klahm, 2015; Holbert, Shah, & Kwak, 2004; Holbrook & Hill, 2006; Mutz & Nir, 2010; Slater, 
Rouner, & Long, 2006), women’s and reproductive rights (Brown & Cody, 1991; Holbert, Shah, 
& Kwak, 2003; Swigger, 2017), egalitarianism and racial policy attitudes (Ball-Rokeach, Grube, 
& Rokeach, 1981; Brigham & Giesbrecht, 1976; Gierzynski, 2018), and other sociopolitical 
attitudes (Gierzynski, 2018; Volgy & Schwarz, 1980). However, there remains an assumption 
that most viewers choose their entertainment media absent of political considerations. I contend 
that 1) individual-level differences such as political identity strength affect whether people 
evaluate media content as politically relevant, and 2) these individual-level differences will 
affect whether people selectively expose themselves to media that may be perceived as 
politically relevant. What objects (e.g., social issues, government agencies/agents, and 
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politicians/parties/polls) individuals perceive as political is shaped by individual forces; thus, we 
must take a viewer-centric approach to determining individuals’ evaluation of media as 
politically relevant and thus whether politically motivated selective exposure of entertainment 
media is occurring.  
I offer two general hypotheses in this dissertation. First, my evaluation hypothesis posits 
that evaluations of media as politically relevant are a function of the strength of viewers’ 
political identities, as moderated by the objects depicted in that media. That is, an individuals’ 
political identity strength will affect how politically relevant they evaluate media to be, but the 
influence of political identity strength on such evaluations will vary depending on media content.  
Second, my selection hypothesis predicts that individuals are more likely to engage in selective 
exposure for media they perceive to be more politically relevant, but less so when they evaluate 
media as less politically relevant. I further hypothesize that evaluations of media as politically 
relevant will act as a mediator between political identity strength and selective exposure. That is, 
stronger political identities will lead to evaluations of media as being more politically relevant, 
and these evaluations will lead to greater levels of selective exposure.  Although these concepts 
apply to all media, in this study I choose to focus on television content, fictional entertainment 
shows in particular.  
Asking viewers to evaluate what television shows are politically relevant is no small task. 
Political science literature investigating how individuals talk about politics and identify objects 
as political reveals the pitfalls of relying on directly asking individuals what objects are political 
(Fitzgerald, 2013; Guess, Munger, Nagler, & Tucker, 2019; Settle, 2018; Walsh, 2004). To 
overcome limitations with existing approaches, this dissertation develops a new scale that I use 
to evaluate individuals’ perception of media as politically relevant. Studies 1 and 2 of this 
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dissertation are used to develop and refine the new Politically Relevant Media (PRM) scale. 
Following them, Study 3 tests my evaluation hypothesis, and Study 4 tests my selection 
hypothesis. 
In the following section I offer a definition of the political that will be useful throughout 
this project, as well as define and discuss the significance of three classes of political objects: 
social issues, government agencies/agents, and politicians/parties/polls. Next I explicate the new 
PRM concept, then detail three conceptualizations of political identity relevant to this project: 
partisanship, ideological identification, and issue public membership. I conclude this chapter by 
laying out the design and plan for the four studies that comprise this dissertation. 
Defining the Political 
A primary task of this dissertation is to identify a clear definition of what the political 
comprises, along with a way to identify objects that might be relevant to politics. In this section, 
I first offer a definition for politics and the political that is specific yet flexible enough to cover a 
broad range of potentially political objects. I then offer a way to classify political objects into 
three categories: social issues, government agencies and agents, and politicians/parties/polls. 
Third, I discuss the relevance of perceptions of controversy and of persuasive intent to politics 
and to politically relevant media. Finally, I discuss why a scale assessing the political relevance 
of media is necessary rather than relying on simply asking people if a media text is political. 
Defining Politics: Collective Concerns, Decisions, and Consequences 
I adopt Hay’s (2007) definitions of politics and politicization. He defined politics as the 
response to the need for “collective and ultimately binding decision making” (p. 2). Hay (2007) 
identified four features of politics, each one encompassing the previous feature: choice, capacity 
for agency, deliberation, and social context. In order to define an object as political, individuals 
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must have choices regarding the object available to them. Likewise, individuals must be able to 
practice agency to make those choices, and those choices must actually have a material outcome. 
In other words, political objects involve the potential for human control. There is also the 
potential, at least hypothetically, for deliberation amongst people regarding those choices—
political objects are things people could talk about, if given the opportunity. Finally, the choices 
made regarding political objects must have the potential to be made collectively, or the effects of 
those choices must have collective consequences.  
Relatedly, Hay (2007) defined politicization as a process leading to the collective 
ownership-taking of social issues. He envisioned politicization as a continuum between which 
matters were left to fate (matters beyond human control, for which people could not make 
choices and had no agency), all the way to which matters were assigned to collective decision 
making through the organizing processes of government. The first step along this continuum was 
the elevation of issues from matters of fate to matters of personal freedom/responsibility: those 
issues that individuals could control for themselves. The second step was the further elevation of 
issues to matters of public concern: those issues that could be addressed collectively. Mirroring 
his four features of politics, this second step is the level of politicization at which the potential 
for collective decision making and collective consequences arises. Thus, an object becomes 
political once it becomes a matter of public concern and there is the potential for collective 
decision making and/or collective consequences. 
Classification of Political Objects 
With a suitable definition of politics and the political identified, I now turn to how one 
might classify politically relevant objects. Scholars have identified three classes of objects that 
comprise the political: 1) what social issues are of concern to the broader public as opposed to 
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the private matters of individuals, 2) how government agencies and agents function to address 
those concerns, and 3) who (politicians and parties) we elect (polls) to run the government. 
These classes exist along a continuum that Hay (2007) refers to as a process of politicization and 
depoliticization. He describes the first step of the politicization process as the recognition and 
ability of people to exert control over certain circumstances, rather than resigning their 
conditions to chance or to supernatural causes. Once this occurs, issues become a matter of 
individuals to address on their own; the first class of political objects proceeds from elevating 
issues beyond this point.  
It’s important to note the varying levels of consensus among people regarding what 
counts as political within each of these classes of political objects. As I note below, there is 
considerable variability among individuals regarding what matters are of public concern rather 
than private matters; however, people are closer to unanimity in considering matters related to 
politicians, political parties, and elections to be political. These varying degrees of consensus 
among the different classes of political objects are indicative of the consensus-as-political we 
might expect out of television programming depicting the objects found within these classes of 
political objects. 
Social issues: Public concerns (vs. private matters). The first class of political objects 
is social issues, where individuals collectively define what issues are of public concern, rather 
than private matters (personal freedoms and personal responsibilities; Eliasoph, 1997; 1998; 
Fitzgerald, 2013; Hay, 2013). Eliasoph (1998) noted that there is power in deciding what is 
political, what is allowed as part of “public-spirited” conversation. She asserted that through 
talking is how we both define what is political and also how we wield political power: “The 
public sphere is something that exists only between people, and comes into being when people 
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speak public-spiritedly. Speaking public-spiritedly creates the public sphere” (p. 16). Similarly, 
Hay (2013) stated that politicization is about taking ownership of social processes. Rather than 
matters being left to fate, and therefore social inequalities as personal problems for people to 
overcome by themselves, politicization for this class of objects is marked by the act of people 
acknowledging that something can be done collectively to address an issue. This politicization 
process is also similar to the power that Eliasoph (1998) described when she stated that to be 
able to define what is political is a form of power. Hay (2013) speaks of this as seizing power, or 
seizing the matter from being left up to fate alone: “Politicization is about reclaiming social 
processes and the always uneven outcomes they create from fate; it is about taking responsibility 
for our collective choices” (p. 109).  
Like Eliasoph (1997; 1998), Fitzgerald (2013) identified that what topics people consider 
“political” vary widely, with some people seeing many things as political and other seeing very 
few things as such. Referring to this mechanism as “personal salience,” she found that identity-
laden attributes (e.g., age, gender, political ideology and partisanship) affect how people 
construct the political.  
Given the intense variability in what issues people consider to be of public concern and 
whether government should address those issues, this class of political objects is characterized by 
a low level of consensus in terms of what the political means. Accordingly, whether a television 
show that depicts social issues or topics divorced from any notion of government involvement 
will be considered more or less political is likely to be most influenced by an individual’s 
political identities. The introduction of government involvement further politicizes an issue; this 
brings us to the second class of political objects. 
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Government agencies & agents. The second class of political objects concerns the 
activities of government agents and agencies. Hay (2007) identified government actions as a step 
in the politicization process, after the designation of issues as being of public concern. Fitzgerald 
(2013) also identified governmental functions as a way her participants conceptualized politics. 
Like individualized notions of what issues were of public concern, ideas of how government 
agents and agencies should act also varied widely; however, one common theme was that things 
were political if they were related to the government somehow: what it did and what it should do.  
Wyatt, Katz, and Kim (2000) identified two particular institutions that seemed to oscillate 
between personal and public consideration. They found that respondents divided topics of 
discussion between those that were within what they defined as the personal sphere and the 
political sphere; however, topics such as education and crime aligned with the personal in some 
social contexts and with the political in others—what they referred to as a “bridge facet” between 
political and personal facets of public deliberation. This context-dependent shifting of these 
topics between personal (private matter) and political (public matter/governmental) spheres 
echoes the differential treatment Eliasoph’s (1997; 1998) subjects gave to various topics 
depending on whether they were speaking privately versus publicly. It’s worth noting that the 
topics within this bridge facet are deeply rooted in governmental institutions: the criminal legal 
system and the education system. As Wyatt et al. (2000) and Soss and Weaver (2017) note, the 
criminal legal and education systems are deeply embedded into the everyday lives of citizens. 
Thus, the criminal legal and education systems lie at both, or between, the personal and political 
facets of public deliberation. These systems and related issues are indeed political, but only 
insofar as how we consider them at any given time. Thus, just how “political” we consider any 
specific governmental function to be may depend on individual perceptions and contexts 
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(Hansford, Intawan, & Nicholson, 2018). Additionally, Hansford et al. (2018) found that 
individuals think of different governmental institutions (e.g., the Supreme Court, NASA, traffic 
court) as being politicized to varying degrees. 
The fact that individuals differentially perceive various governmental institutions to be 
political depending on context and other factors, in addition to the fact that individuals hold 
different ideas of what government agencies do and should do, still evidences a lack of total 
consensus regarding what counts as political within this class of objects. Although there is 
clearly more consensus around what is political regarding government agents and agencies than 
there is consensus for social issues, the third class of political objects—concerning those who 
lead the government, the processes and institutions through which they’re chosen, and how they 
carry out their duties—possesses a much greater level of consensus, which is why I’ve chosen to 
separate it from government institutions overall. 
Politicians, parties, & polls. The third class of political objects is the contestation over 
what politicians and parties will run the government and the process through which that power is 
seized and wielded. As Hay (2007) detailed, one way to envision politics that goes back 
centuries is that of preservation of the “state”: “By this we mean the art of stabilizing, insulating, 
and crystallizing the political power and authority of a person or group…through the strategic 
deployment of access to, and control over, public institutions” (p. 8). In other words, the political 
is about politicians and parties seeking to control the government. In the U.S. and many other 
nations this happens primarily through elections, but also through procedural strategies within 
the branches of government. Walsh (2004) observed that her participants often defined the 
political as elections, debates between parties (Democrats and Republican) and the conduct of 
elected officials. Eliasoph (1998) noted that frustrations regarding elections, politicians, and 
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ballot measures were some of the political topics her subjects fumed about privately but avoided 
discussing publicly. Hansford et al. (2018) identified Congress, along with the president and 
lobbyists, as being a highly politicized governmental institution. All three of those entities are 
related to the execution of political power. Particularly for lobbyists, even though they are not 
elected, they are involved in the drafting and passage of new legislation. Fitzgerald (2013) also 
noted conflict among politicians as a description that respondents provided regarding what 
“political” means to them, especially in the context of controversy. 
This final class of political objects, concerning politicians and their means of seizing 
wielding power, is marked by a great deal of consensus regarding what the political comprises. It 
seems that few people would disagree that politicians, political parties, elections, and legislative 
bodies and activities are political objects. With that in mind, television shows depicting these 
political objects have a much greater likelihood of being evaluated as politically relevant by a 
broader swath of the population.  
In the above section, I identified the three classes of political objects: 1) what issues are 
of concern to the broader public as opposed to the private matters of individuals, 2) how 
government agencies and agents function to address those concerns, and 3) who (politicians and 
parties) we elect (polls) to run the government. Drawing on quantitative and qualitative studies, I 
noted the different ways individuals conceive of the political within each of these classes, 
particularly noting varying degrees of consensus regarding these definitions: the first class, 
concerning social issues, bearing a relatively low level of consensus between individuals; the 
second class, concerning government agencies and agents, carrying a greater level of consensus 
but still leaving room for individual variation; and the third and final class, concerning 
politicians, parties, and polls, being a place of near-unanimity among individuals. These classes, 
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given the objects they each comprise and the level of consensus around those objects as 
expressed in the literature, inform a new media typology. Rather than a new typology of how to 
classify media as politically relevant, this new typology allows us to make predictions about 
when viewers’ political identities will matter more or less in viewers’ evaluations of what media 
are politically relevant. 
Given the varying levels of consensus regarding the conceptualization of the political for 
each of the classes of political objects, I expect two things. First, political identities will matter 
most in determining what television shows people evaluate as politically relevant when those 
shows depict objects around which there is less consensus as political (i.e., social issues) than 
when those shows depict objects around which there is greater consensus as political (i.e., 
politicians/parties/polls). Second, television shows depicting objects around which there is more 
consensus as political (i.e., politicians/parties/polls) will be rated as more politically relevant 
than shows depicting content around which there is less consensus as political (i.e., social 
issues). I do not offer this typology as a set of hard-and-fast rules for classifying television 
content, but as a starting point from which to begin to understand how viewers may think of 
television content as politically relevant. 
We must also acknowledge two key attributes of all classes of political objects: 
persuasion and conflict. The final class of political objects, comprising politicians, parties, and 
elections, is where notions of persuasion and controversy are ubiquitous; however, as I explain in 
the next section, persuasion and conflict are attributes of all classes of political objects. These 
two qualities are central to how individuals should approach media that they consider more 
politically relevant differently from media that they consider less politically relevant. 
Controversy and Persuasive Intent 
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Although politicians, political parties, and elections are near synonymous with persuasion 
and conflict (Fitzgerald, 2013; Hay, 2007), persuasion and conflict are relevant to all classes of 
political objects. Individuals are divided on what issues are of public (rather than private) 
concern, and if so, how government agents and agencies should operate to address those issues 
(Eliasoph, 1998; Fitzgerald, 2013; Wyatt et al., 2000). This disagreement necessitates 
deliberation and persuasion in order to come to a consensus. People seem to have a dislike of 
things that are “political,” which Hay (2007) blamed on a dislike of the concepts associated with 
politicians and elections: intractable conflict between opposing political camps, deception, and 
self-interest—all things we attribute to elite political actors. Hay (2007) described this definition 
of politics as “a dirty word, a term that has come to acquire a whole array or almost entirely 
negative associations and connotations in contemporary discourse. Politics is synonymous with 
sleaze, corruptions and duplicity, greed, self-interest and self-importance, interference, 
inefficiency and intransigence” (p. 153). Recent public opinion polls show that members of 
Congress rank low in respondents’ evaluations of their honesty and ethical standards, with state 
and local officeholders faring better but far from revered (Brenan, 2017). Walsh (2004) also 
found that people conceive of politics as chiefly about controversy and conflict: “Specifically, 
talking about politics is ‘opinionated’ talk; unless a person holds controversial opinions (opinions 
that diverge from their own), the conversation is not political” (p. 38). Politics in the minds of 
many people has become a matter of politicians and their parties in conflict with one another to 
attempt to win elections at all costs, no matter how dishonest or unethical the methods. This 
conceptualization is a far cry from the more idealized one of citizens taking control of social 
issues to realize some greater good for society. This is also why there is less consensus that a 
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topic is political if it doesn’t overtly include mention or representation of politicians, parties, and 
the voting process.  
Regardless, envisioning an object to be political should evoke a sense that persuasion is 
afoot—in an environment in which others are not to be trusted. This is especially true when it 
comes to the third class of political objects, but also true for the first and second classes, around 
which individuals may be debating what issues are worthy of public attention and how the 
government should act accordingly. In fact, recent work by Simons and Green (2018) has 
demonstrated that perceiving a topic as controversial leads to a sense of threat. Importantly, they 
find that people don’t even need to perceive that they hold the minority position on the topic in 
order to feel threatened. With this in mind, the mere presentation of a divisive topic, which is 
inherent in the understanding of an object as political, should lead to a threat response. 
Importantly, this effect is likely to heighten viewers’ cognitive guards even in instances in which 
perceived persuasive intent is lower. For example, viewers might be more likely to perceive 
persuasive intent when watching an interview with a political candidate than when watching 
horse-race election news coverage about recent polling numbers. Although they may not feel that 
horse-race coverage is attempting to persuade them, the context of the news coverage—an 
election between two politicians—is still likely to evoke feelings of controversy. 
Rationale for a Scale 
Objects depicted within the media text are a fundamental cue regarding whether the 
media text is relevant to politics. Previous typologies of political media (Eilders & Nitsch, 2015; 
Haas et al., 2015; Holbert, 2005) have provided media communication researchers’ 
understanding of what media content is politically relevant. Still, as political science researchers 
have determined through qualitative and quantitative means, individuals’ understanding of what 
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counts as political varies widely. Fitzgerald (2013) offered one of the first quantitative 
examinations of what objects within the world are considered political. More recently, political 
communication scholars researching social media users’ behaviors online have identified the 
need to consider what social media content users deem to be political (Guess et al., 2019). 
Taking a cue from Fitzgerald (2013), Settle (2018) presented study participants with mock social 
media posts and asked them if they thought the posts were about politics. In doing so, 
unfortunately, Settle (2018) did not address the methodological shortcoming that this project 
attempts to tackle: how the vastly different ways in which people employ the words “politics” 
and “political” make it difficult to interpret responses to questionnaire items that use those 
words. 
So far, scholars have attempted to determine what issues (Fitzgerald, 2013), activities 
(Coffé & Campbell, 2019), and media (Settle, 2018; Vraga et al., 2016) are political by directly 
asking participants if they think the issue or media is political. Fitzgerald (2013) asked her 
participants to imagine they were editors of a political magazine and to choose what kinds of 
stories should appear in their publication: “In other words, choose the [topics] that are ‘political.’ 
This should be your only consideration.” In studying what activities respondents considered to be 
political, Coffé and Campbell (2019) asked “To what extent, if at all, do you consider each of the 
following activities to be political,” followed by a list of activities ranging from “tweeting about 
news stories” to “standing for election at national level.” In her study of whether Facebook users 
perceived posts to be political, Settle (2018) asked respondents “In your opinion, is this post 
about politics?” Vraga et al. (2018) asked respondents whether the purpose of various Facebook 
posts was for political information or opinion, among other options (nonpolitical news and 
current affairs, personal stories and updates, or other).  
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In each of the above, the word “political” or “politics” is within the question wording, 
leaving it up to respondents to draw on their own definition of the political. The problem with 
this approach is how broadly or narrowly any one person’s definition of “politics” or “political” 
is. For example, Walsh (2004) noted that people mainly defined the political in two ways: as 
anything related to politicians, political parties, and elections; or as any “opinionated” talk in 
which others took controversial positions opposite of one’s own. If we examine Settle’s (2018) 
wording as an example, one way that people could narrowly define whether a Facebook post is 
“about politics” is whether the post addresses politicians, parties, or elections; anything falling 
outside of this narrow definition would then be considered not to be about politics. Given the 
high level of consensus regarding the political relevance of politicians/parties/polls, media 
depicting these objects are more likely to be identified as politically relevant than other media. If 
researchers are only interested in such media, as were Vraga et al. (2016), then a single-item 
“political” measure may be perfectly fine; however, if a researcher is interested in examining a 
broader range of media such as fictional entertainment, then content that doesn’t depict these 
objects may remain unidentified. For another person, a Facebook post might be evaluated as 
about politics if the post expressed some viewpoint that was considered controversial and 
opposite of their own opinion, regardless of whether any politicians were mentioned or not. If a 
research participant relies on a controversy frame in evaluating media as politically relevant, they 
may evaluate media that convey positions congenial to their own as less “political” than media 
conveying positions uncongenial to their own. 
Fitzgerald (2013) further highlighted the problem with explicitly asking if objects were 
“political,” reporting that people sometimes didn’t label topics as political because they felt the 
government shouldn’t be involved in those issues. In these cases, individuals understood that the 
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issue was one that could be collectively addressed (and was likely controversial); however, 
framing the issue as apolitical was an expression of their desire to limit government involvement 
in the issue. This conforms to two of the components of the political she identified: what the 
government does (what she describes as government-institutional) and what the government 
should do (what she describes as government-normative). If people don’t think the government 
should do something, they may be inclined to identify that issue as not political even though 
they’re fully aware of the potential for government involvement and the desire of others to make 
that involvement a reality (see Fitzgerald, 2013, p. 461).  
For example, Fitzgerald (2013) found that conservatives don’t seem to think of energy 
and the environment as political issues, which she chalked up to a government-normative desire 
to keep the government out of such issues. This could also appear on other topics in which 
“personal freedom/responsibility” is prized: abortion, vaccination, etc. This is why we must 
gauge people’s understanding of the political without asking “is this object political?” As 
previously stated, this makes the political about what issues people think the government should 
be involved in and also about issues on which there is disagreement regarding whether the 
government should be involved, regardless of which side of that disagreement people fall on. Not 
only would such a definition account for individuals such as the conservatives described by 
Fitzgerald (2013), but it would also address individuals with other rather narrow understandings 
of politics (e.g., politics as solely about partisan infighting, politics as only stances with which 
they disagree; Walsh, 2004). 
In addition to determining which objects in media could be evaluated as politically 
relevant, a scale used to evaluate the political relevance of media must also tackle the other two 
aspects germane to perceiving media as politically relevant: perceptions of controversy, and 
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especially, perceptions of persuasive intent. Because media texts are created by individuals, the 
intent of the text’s creator(s), as perceived by the recipient, is relevant in terms of whether the 
reader believes the purpose of the text is meant to persuade them in some form. Not only does 
perception of persuasive intent hold implications for message processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1979) and disagreement surrounding political objects necessarily require persuasion in order for 
collective decisions to be made, but media texts might be perceived as particularly imbued with 
persuasive intent. This applies equally to Facebook posts (Settle, 2018) as it does to television 
programming. Thus, a scale used to evaluate the political relevance of media texts must capture 
all three of these concepts: Whether the objects depicted in the media text are relevant to politics, 
whether those objects are associated with controversy, and whether the media text itself was 
created with the intent to persuade. 
The Politically Relevant Media Scale 
The new Politically Relevant Media (PRM) scale comprises three dimensions that 
address viewer perceptions of how relevant to politics the objects presented within a media text 
are, whether those objects are associated with controversy, and whether the media text was 
created and disseminated with the intent to persuade. The first two dimensions are frequently 
identified in the existing literature regarding the definition of the political and of political media, 
whereas the last dimension, critical to the “media” aspect of politically relevant media, has 
received less explicit attention. 
Collective Concerns, Decisions, and Consequences 
The first dimension of the PRM scale is founded in Hay’s (2007) definition of politics, as 
detailed in the previous section: the degree to which the show depicts an object for which there is 
shared concern, for which collective decision-making could take place, and for which there could 
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be collective consequences. This definition of the political applies equally well to objects that 
Settle (2018) and others refer to as explicitly and implicitly political content. It is quite easy to 
see how an object widely understood to be political, for example, tax cuts (Fitzgerald, 2013), 
meets these criteria. Still, for other objects that many people would say are not political, for 
example, women in sports (Fitzgerald, 2013), these criteria also apply. Increasing the number of 
women in sports and the sports available for women to compete in is an issue that one might say 
is of public concern, for which we have choices that can be made, the capacity to make those 
choices, the ability to deliberate about those choices, and doing so can be done collectively and 
will have an effect on half of the population. Thus, it’s not that this dimension might simply pick 
up on how meaningful or relevant the depicted objects are to the viewer; rather, it assesses the 
degree to which the depicted objects are relevant to the domain of politics. Particularly, assessing 
the degree to which collective decisions could be made and collective consequences could be 
incurred is directly relevant to how governments function. Government is the organ through 
which collective decision-making could be achieved, and the execution of policy and 
enforcement of laws are how those decisions come to have collective consequences throughout a 
society.  
Using Hay’s (2007) definition of politics also allows us to distinguish between the 
possible interpretations of an example that Settle (2018) provided: a social media post regarding 
a Chick-fil-A sandwich, considering that organization’s public, financial support for anti-
LGBTQ groups. If a Facebook user sees a post by someone talking about going to Chick-fil-A 
for lunch, that user may not draw the connections between purchasing a chicken sandwich and 
supporting anti-LGBTQ groups. On the other hand, another Facebook user seeing the same post 
may recognize the issues surrounding Chick-fil-A, interpreting the post as related to an issue 
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meeting Hay’s (2007) definition. Most importantly, this is equally the case for someone who 
may say that the Chick-fil-A issue isn’t political because what private organizations do with their 
money—and also who people form romantic or sexual relationships with—are private matters. 
Such individuals should still recognize these issues as ones with far reaching effects, on which 
we can deliberate and make collective decisions that affect a multitude of people—regardless of 
the individual’s personally held beliefs on the matter.  
Controversy 
Almost everything written about politics includes talk of controversy as an important 
component. There are two potential sources of a viewer’s perception of controversy: 1) the way 
the objects are presented on-screen (e.g., are people literally arguing about something or is 
information being presented that indicates that the issue is controversial?), and 2) the viewer’s 
own knowledge of controversy surrounding the object (even if the object isn’t being presented as 
controversial on screen, the viewer already perceives controversy surrounding the object). The 
former is especially likely to be true when information is presented indicating that opinions are 
divided on an issue (Simons & Green, 2018). The latter is especially likely to be true for “easy” 
political issues such as abortion, immigration, and gun control (Carmines & Stimson, 1980). 
Indeed, my pre-test study found that the way differing positions (i.e., Democrat/liberal or 
Republican/conservative) were presented in the show affected perceptions of controversy in the 
show content. Likewise, shows depicting abortion, immigration, and gun control were perceived 
as more controversial than shows depicting health care and marijuana legalization, even 
controlling for how positions on the issues were presented within the show. When interviewing 
social media users about what they thought of political posts on Facebook, Vraga, Thorson, 
Kliger-Vilenchik, and Gee (2015) found that controversy was a common element of the 
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description. Often, interviewees described political posts as “rants” and associated them with 
being obnoxious and “[pissing] people off.” This is another example of the negative valence that 
accompanies attitudes regarding the political. Still, Vraga et al. (2015) reported that interviewees 
were less bothered by seeing civics-relevant posts such as reminding people to vote and 
supporting social causes. 
Perception of Persuasive Intent 
Persuasive intent is mentioned in the literature regarding the definition of politics less 
than the other two dimensions, and in a couple different ways. One way is as perception of 
persuasive intent, the other is as perception of bias (among politicians and among people 
behaving “politically”).  The second way is specifically in the context of media (Haas et al., 
2015). Because media texts are created by other people, figuring out why something is being 
communicated is important. Settle (2018) gave the example of the person making the post 
referencing Chick-fil-A: Is this person just posting about their lunch, or are they trying to make a 
statement about their support for a franchise engaging in certain political actions? 
The difference between perception of persuasive intent and perception of bias deserves 
careful consideration in terms of what’s actually being measured. Vraga et al. (2015) described 
respondents not liking Facebook posts that seem biased. Both perceptions may lead to the same 
effects in terms of processing (e.g., counter-arguing, reactance, etc.), but the difference may 
matter in terms of the intent of the sender/actor/producer of the media text. Bias is an attribute of 
a person or group (i.e., media content creators), whereas persuasive intent is an attribute of an 
action (i.e., why those individuals/groups created the media content). For one, individuals may be 
perceived as biased absent any perception of persuasive intent (e.g., in scenarios in which 
disagreement is already high). Likewise, individuals may be perceived as attempting to persuade 
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absent any perception of bias (e.g., in scenarios in which the message source stands no personal 
gain). For example, few people would accuse a doctor trying to persuade them to quit smoking to 
be biased against cancer or in favor of lung health. This is the case even if one agrees with the 
doctor. Additionally, a distinction must be made between bias/persuasive intent and controversy. 
The former addresses whether a source of information is conveying information that only 
supports one position on an issue or wants the receiver to think a certain way, whereas the latter 
addresses the degree to which people are strongly divided in their opinions on an issue. 
Perceptions of persuasive intent may also be affected by who creates and disseminates 
media content, known as a source cue (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Because this study attempts to 
address cues from within the media text itself, I control for source cues using stimulus sampling. 
Distinction from other scales.  
It’s important to establish how the PRM scale differs from other scales that attempt to 
evaluate politically relevant media in some way. Notably, previous research has found that 
individuals’ moral foundations affect their appeal for and selection of media entertainment (Long 
& Eveland, 2018; Tamborini, 2011; Tamborini et al., 2013). This line of research finds that 
individuals select media and find it more appealing if they perceive the content to conform to 
their moral sentiments; however, perceiving a media text to be politically relevant and perceiving 
media content to align with one’s moral sentiments are two separate matters. Although moral 
foundations may factor into whether a media text is perceived as being politically congenial, the 
PRM scale isn’t a measure of the political congeniality of media texts. Rather, it is a measure of 
whether a media text is relevant to the domain of politics, based on the dimensions outlined 
above.  
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This is not to say that moral foundations are completely irrelevant to the current inquiry. 
Moral foundations may be one of several factors relevant to political identities, given the 
differences between how liberals and conservatives rely on different moral intuitions (Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) and particularly how ideology informs the salience of moral domains 
(Ciuk, 2018; Hatemi, Crabtree, & Smith, 2019). If anything, to the extent that a viewer’s political 
identities influence their moral sentiments, the effect of political identity on PRM evaluations 
may run through moral foundations. In this way, the salience of moral domains would serve as a 
proxy for ideology a political identity, with moral domain salience mediating the effect of 
ideological strength on PRM evaluations. This is a testable hypothesis that lies outside of the 
scope of the current inquiry. 
Additionally, the PRM scale is agnostic to whether a media text is congenial to one’s 
political views. This is a fundamental rationale for developing a scale to measure the political 
relevance of media texts rather than relying on a single questionnaire item asking if a media text 
is political, as it circumvents the tendency that Fitzgerald (2013) identified, in which participants 
with certain political viewpoints seem to have labeled particular issues as not political because of 
a government-normative view on what makes an issue political. For this reason, I do not expect 
responses on the PRM scale to be influenced by either an individual’s moral sentiments or their 
political ideology or party membership, but rather by the strength of their political identities. 
Thus, neither liberals nor conservatives, Democrats nor Republicans, those with individualizing 
nor binding moral foundations (Long & Eveland, 2018), should be more likely to identify media 
texts as politically relevant. Instead, more extreme liberals and conservatives, people more 
strongly identified with their parties, individuals more strongly identified with an issue public, 
and individuals who hold stronger individualizing and binding moral foundations may be more 
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likely to identify media texts as politically relevant. Again, the relationship between the salience 
of moral foundations and the identification of media texts as politically relevant is a testable 
hypothesis to be considered at some other time. 
Next, I will detail three conceptualizations of political identity and explicate how it 
should work to influence the rating of shows as politically relevant and how it will matter the 
most when there is the least amount of consensus around the show’s content. 
Defining Political Identities 
Our identities, lived experiences, and social factors shape the perspectives through which 
we approach our understanding of the political (Fitzgerald, 2013; Walsh, 2004), and political 
communication scholars have acknowledged that individual lived experiences and social factors 
may influence what types of messages individuals perceive as political (Holbert & Young, 
2013). For the purpose of this inquiry, I will focus on political identities, which I define in three 
distinct ways: partisanship, political ideology, and membership in an issue public. These political 
identities, along with political interest, are likely to influence whether an individual identifies 
any particular work of media as more or less political by making more salient the various 
components of what people understand as being political. In this section, I define these three 
conceptualizations of political identity, then explain how they work to influence viewers’ 
evaluation of television programming as politically relevant and their selective exposure to that 
programming. Before doing so, I first define what I mean by political identity and why I focus on 
partisanship, ideology, and issue public membership as the three distinct conceptualizations of 
political identity relevant to this project. 
Although others (Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2002; Levendusky, 2009; Mason, 2013; 
2018) count political identities (by which they mean the three conceptualizations I identify here) 
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as social identities, there are distinct differences between the three dimensions I identify and 
other types of social identities, e.g., race, gender, religion, age, disability, etc. As Green et al. 
(2002) noted, these other types of social identity are difficult not to notice in our everyday lives, 
whereas one could easily walk through everyday life without knowing others’ political identities 
nor acknowledging our own. Although political identities are often developed and maintained as 
a result of other social identities (Mason, 2013), it’s also the case that, with few exceptions (e.g., 
Black Americans’ ties to the Democratic party), other social identities aren’t necessarily strong 
predictors of partisan identity or political ideology. (Another exception might be issue public 
membership, where issue publics may be constructed around social identities, such as disability.) 
Although other types of social identity are likely to influence political media identification and 
selection independently as well as through political identities, we must establish some 
boundaries for the current inquiry.  
My reasoning for isolating these conceptualizations of political identity are twofold. First, 
these conceptualizations are directly relevant to how people interact with the political process. 
Partisan membership affects whether you can vote in certain elections, and that membership or 
identification is directly tied to the candidates for which one can vote. Likewise, political elites 
frame their positions in terms of ideology: conservative versus liberal. As such, whether one 
identifies as a conservative or liberal is directly tied to how various issues are discussed. Issue 
public membership is important because politicians run on issue platforms, vote on legislation 
that addresses social issues, and execute policy that affects particular issues. Thus, one’s 
membership in an issue public also has an analogue within the political process. Second, to 
varying degrees, political identities can be more malleable than other social identities. People can 
hypothetically change partisan identification and membership. They may grow more or less 
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conservative as they age. They can opt in and out of issue publics if their own priorities change. 
This is not to say that other social identities are set in stone. Rather, because different identities 
are developed, enforced, and reinforced differently within the self and within society (for 
example, race is inherited through phenotypic indicators, yet neither gender nor partisanship are), 
political identities are uniquely suited for adaptation.  
Still, why do people identify with particular parties, ideologies, and issues? Mason (2013; 
2018) is particularly helpful for illuminating this identification. She highlighted how individuals’ 
affective or behavioral polarization (how strongly they identify with their in-party and derogate 
out-parties) has increased, whereas their issue polarization generally has not. In doing so, and 
with an eye toward the social identity literature (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), what becomes clear is a 
need to identify with a group. Surely, people choose parties partly because they feel those parties 
represent their interests and issue positions (Mason, 2013); however, if that were the sole reason, 
then a lack of issue polarization would be coupled with a lack of affective/behavioral 
polarization. The abundance of the latter in the absence of the former instead points to a more 
basic need to belong to social groups (Green et al., 2002; Mason, 2013; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Because of ideological sorting into political parties (Green et al., 2002; Levendusky, 2009; 
Mason, 2013) and partisan issue ownership cues (Petrocik, 1996), all three conceptualizations of 
political identity I specify in this project are likely to be affected by our human desire to belong 
to social groups and uplift our own, generally at the expense of other groups (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986). 
In much the way that social identity theory predicts that group members will engage in 
actions to protect the ingroup when faced with external threats (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), Slater’s 
(2007; 2015) reinforcing spirals model predicts that individuals will seek out media that protect 
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their group identity when that identity is under threat. I seek to offer evidence of this claim even 
within the realm of fictional entertainment media: That individuals will seek out media content 
they perceive as congenial and may avoid certain types of media content they perceive as 
uncongenial in order to maintain equilibrium within their political identities. This selective 
approach and potential avoidance of media content for the purposes of identity maintenance will 
also likely be affected by viewers’ motivations for media selection (Winter, Metzger, & 
Flanagin, 2016). Furthermore, their political identities contribute to the initial evaluation of 
media as politically relevant, as well as whether that media contains congenial or uncongenial 
messages. From there, viewers can use (or avoid) that media in order to reinforce their political 
identities. In short, all else flows from political identity: It is responsible for how we evaluate 
media as politically relevant, and the reason for which we in turn consume media: in furtherance 
of its own maintenance and reinforcement. With this in mind, I detail the three distinct 
conceptualizations of political identity below. I then explain specifically how these political 
identities work across various types of media in the evaluation of media as politically relevant. 
Political Partisanship 
Mason (2018) detailed how strong of a political identity partisanship is. Partisanship 
applies to actual party membership as well as those who “lean” toward any particular party 
(Green et al., 2002). Additionally, the strengthening of partisan identity has been coupled with 
both real and perceived demographic sorting that also leaves party identification more closely 
aligned with social identity related demographic factors such as race (Ahler & Sood, 2018; 
Edsall & Edsall, 1991; Green et al., 2002) and political ideology (Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017; 
Levendusky, 2009). Green et al. (2002) noted that party identification seems to be linked to 
whether people feel close to particular social groups that one associates with particular parties, 
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e.g., minorities and Democrats. Taken together, we should consider that social and political 
identities are not necessarily separable and that one’s partisan identity may affect attraction to 
television shows with different content such as a different racial balance amongst the cast. 
Likewise, there is reason to believe that partisanship will alter perceptions of media bias (Stroud, 
Muddiman, & Lee, 2014). Scholars have recognized this in the context of news, but it’s also 
possible that political ideology leads viewers to mark entertainment media as biased as well—
especially because most Americans perceive Hollywood to be a liberal institution (Piacenza, 
2018). This bias perception may not occur only among Republicans and conservatives, since it’s 
possible that Democrats and liberals also perceive that media is (justly) biased in their favor. 
Likewise, a number of Democrats and liberals could just as likely perceive that the media is 
biased against them, as explained by the hostile media phenomenon (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 
1985). The perception of media bias is important because it could cue viewers that they should 
expect a message that is both political and either hostile or sympathetic to their views, depending 
on their party identification and political ideology. 
Political Ideology 
Although political ideology and partisanship aren’t the same and the majority of people 
are ideologically incoherent (Kalmoe, 2020), there is much ideological sorting into the parties 
based on the parties’ platforms and priorities (Green et al., 2002; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017; 
Levendusky, 2009; Mason, 2013). Political ideology also constitutes an identity in its own right, 
with people identifying in ideological terms in ways that lead to ingroup solidarity and outgroup 
derogation (Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017; Mason, 2018). Additionally, despite the complexities of 
defining and applying political ideology (Kalmoe, 2020), one might also expect individuals’ self-
reported ideology to align with their positions on various issues to some degree (Levendusky, 
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2009). Like partisanship, political ideology may also affect perceptions of media bias (Stroud et 
al., 2014). 
Issue Public Membership 
Relevance of and interest in a particular political issue is another component that may 
affect which media viewers perceive to be political. Considering that individual-level factors 
influence which issues people consider to be political (Fitzgerald, 2013), individuals invested in 
certain issues should be more likely to consider shows featuring those issues to be political. Issue 
public membership (Boninger, Krosnick, & Berent, 1995; Iyengar, Hahn, Krosnick, & Walker, 
2008; Krosnick, 1990) is similar to partisan and ideological identity in terms of how people 
identify around a particular issue. Specifically, individuals on oppositional sides of an issue (e.g., 
reproductive rights supporters vs. anti-abortion supporters) often adopt an identity and the 
identity reinforcement practices that come along with it in a similar fashion that partisans and 
ideologues identify with in-party members and people who share their ideological identity. In the 
same way that Democrats or liberals might consider Republicans or conservatives to be outgroup 
members, respectively, individuals advocating for one side of an issue, gun control advocates for 
example, might consider people advocating for an oppositional position, such as gun rights, to be 
outgroup members. In all three conceptualizations of political identity (partisanship, ideology, 
and issue public membership), it is less clear how much individuals with stronger political 
identities (strong partisans, strong ideologues, and issue public members) derogate people with 
weaker political identities (nonpartisans, moderates, and issue public non-members). Individuals 
with weaker political identities may not be considered ingroup members by people with stronger 
political identities, but they are less likely to receive the same scorn as individuals with 
oppositional identities. 
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Issue public membership may also override partisan identification when it comes to how 
important a particular social issue is to an individual, meaning that issue public membership 
deserves careful consideration and should not be dismissed in lieu of partisanship as a proxy 
(Levendusky, 2009; Mason, 2013). For example, a strong partisan could be ambivalent about a 
particular issue on their party’s platform, or a non-partisan could have very strong feelings 
regarding a particular issue. Concurrently, issue ownership may lead individuals to more closely 
associate an issue with a given party, making them feel as if one party or another is better 
equipped or more determined to take action on a particular issue (Petrocik, 1996). Issue public 
membership has been shown to predict selective exposure to information about political 
campaigns (Iyengar et al., 2008); therefore, it may prove useful in the identification of and 
selective exposure to politically relevant entertainment media. This is another area where the 
alignment of social and political identities should be considered. For example, a member of a 
community more frequently and deeply affected by a certain issue (e.g., Latinxs and immigration 
policy) may be more likely to find that issue to be political than a member of a community less 
frequently and deeply affected (Boninger et al., 1995; Krosnick, 1990). Thus, we would be wise 
to consider these interactions of social and political identity in future examinations of 
consumers’ considerations of political media. Issue public members are also likely to have 
strong, immovable prior attitudes regarding their respective issue, which should have 
consequences for potential persuasion upon exposure to counter-attitudinal information 
(Boninger et al., 1995; Krosnick, 1990).  
All three of these conceptualizations of political identity are likely to be associated with 
an individual’s political interest. Individuals with strong partisan and ideological identification or 
who are deeply invested in an issue are likely to be more politically interested than their 
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counterparts, which might itself lead them to be more cognizant of potentially political cues 
within and surrounding media texts. Thus, although political interest may not be a political 
identity on its own, it’s likely a factor related to partisanship, ideology, and membership in issue 
publics as conceptualizations of political identity. A certain level of political knowledge may 
also be necessary for politically relevant cues to be salient to a viewer. For example, in order for 
a viewer to selectively expose themselves to a television program depicting a politician from the 
political party of which the viewer is also a member, the viewer must know to which party the 
depicted politician belongs. In an ideal world, I would account for both political interest and 
knowledge in evaluations of the political relevance of media; however, political interest appears 
to be a unidimensional construct (Prior, 2019), whereas political knowledge is much more 
domain specific (e.g., Cohen and Luttig, 2019). Therefore, I account for the effect of political 
interest throughout the studies that follow, leaving exploration of how political knowledge 
affects PRM evaluations for future studies that can address very specific domains and political 
objects. 
I should also note how political identities as I define them are different from social 
identities. Although our social identities may be influencers of our political identities, our 
political identity are those aspects of identity that are more directly tied to the political structure 
of our society. Our party identification is reliant on the political parties available to a person to 
join. Our membership in various issue publics depends on the issues we identify and their 
relevance to us—which, yes, may be shaped by our social identities. However, one’s race is not 
dependent on which candidates are on the ballot this year. One’s gender isn’t determined by an 
issue we feel strongly about organizing around. If anything, political identities are more 
influenced by social identities than vice versa. It’s conceivable that one’s class identity might 
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have some influence on whether we identify as more liberal or more conservative, but our 
political ideology is much less unlikely to shift our social class. We can use media, though, as a 
tool to shape and maintain them all. 
Political Identities and the Evaluation of Media as Politically Relevant 
These conceptualizations of political identity are important to the identification of 
politically relevant media because they should influence what media content individuals perceive 
as politically relevant. The mechanism for this identification is the amplification of the salience 
of political issues and cues surrounding media content. This amplification comes as a result of 
the strength of a person’s political identities, regardless of their particular attitudes toward a 
given object and whether the media content in question is congenial to their views. For example, 
an individual who identifies strongly with the Democratic or Republican party will likely find 
political cues more salient than an individual who identifies with neither party on account of how 
strongly they associate with their political party. Political identities, along with political interest, 
serve this function for all media, making political identities central to how viewers understand 
any type of media to be politically relevant, whether it be a news report about Congressional 
hearings or a sitcom. That being said, due to the varying levels of consensus regarding what 
counts as political among the three classes of political objects as outlined above, I do expect 
political identities to be most influential to the evaluation of media as politically relevant when 
that media depicts social issues, followed by media depicting government agents and agencies, 
followed by media depicting politicians/parties/polls. 
For programming depicting politicians/parties/polls, I expect political identities to play a 
much smaller role in audience evaluation of such programming as politically relevant. This is 
because there seems to be little disagreement between people that politicians, political parties, 
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and the like are political objects. Still, individuals may choose to expose themselves to media 
depicting politicians or parties that align with their party identification and political ideology, or 
who have taken what the viewer deems to be favorable action regarding an issue the viewer 
holds dear (Iyengar et al., 2008). When it comes to fictional television shows depicting 
politicians/parties/polls, political identities may influence selective exposure depending on how 
the fictional politicians and political parties are depicted. For example, Democrats may not care 
for a fictional entertainment show that depicts Democratic politicians in a negative light, whereas 
conservative viewers may be drawn to programs that depict conservative politicians more 
positively. 
For programming depicting government agencies and agents, individuals’ political 
identities may influence to a greater degree how they evaluate the program as politically 
relevant, as compared to programming depicting politicians/parties/polls. This may also be 
influenced by whether the viewer believes the government even should be involved in whatever 
issue the viewer cares about. For example, a viewer who feels that what school children eat for 
lunch is none of the government’s business might have a strong negative reaction to a news 
report regarding the Department of Agriculture. Likewise, partisans may be sensitive to 
depictions of particular government functions regarding issues they see as being owned by their 
own party or the opposing party, e.g., Democrats and environmentalism or Republicans and 
national defense (Petrocik, 1996). This carries over into fictional television shows as well. For 
example, individuals negatively affected by police misconduct may avoid programming that 
depicts police officers and departments positively. 
Programming depicting social issues is where political identities have the most room to 
affect evaluation and selection of television content. This is particularly the case because people 
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have very different ideas of what issues are of public concern (Fitzgerald, 2013), which leads 
them to differential membership in various issue publics. For example, if a sitcom features a 
storyline on immigration, the political relevance of that sitcom will be greater for an individual 
belonging to the issue public regarding immigration (Wojcieszak & Garrett, 2018). Such an 
effect may occur for immigration supporters as well as opponents. Relatedly, a fictional storyline 
regarding immigration may cause potential viewers to call to mind which political party “owns” 
immigration as an issue (Petrocik, 1996). That viewer may then use that sitcom or one with a 
competing narrative on immigration to reinforce their own political identities, which may later 
reinforce their media selections (Slater, 2007; 2015).  
An ever-expanding entertainment media landscape calls for political communication 
scholars to more fully understand the potential for political identities and entertainment media to 
collide to produce politically meaningful outcomes. In this project, I explore the possibility that 
media consumers engage in politically motivated selective exposure to fictional entertainment 
media, much like what has been shown to occur for news media. By centering viewers’ identities 
and experiences in the classification of media, I acknowledge how their political identities affect 
how they evaluate a particular television show as more or less politically relevant, meaning that 
we can examine the political effects of a show that we may have otherwise excluded from the 
genre of political entertainment. Because of the particular ways that the words “politics” and 
“political” are often used and how people’s identities and experiences affect what they consider 
to be political, existing methods of evaluating media as being “political” or “about politics” are 
insufficient for gauging how media consumers evaluate the political relevance of media outside 
of a narrow range of media focused on politicians, parties, and elections. A study of viewers’ 
evaluations of the political relevance of fictional entertainment media—and media more 
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broadly—demands a novel way of measuring the political relevance of media. Using the PRM 
scale, we are able to get a much better sense of what media people think of as politically 
relevant, how the strength of their political identities affect such evaluations, and how those 
evaluations lead to politically motivated selective exposure. This work underlines the need to 
greatly expand the way politically motivated selective exposure is studied in terms of both 
content and method, and it potentially implicates entertainment media as a driver of political 
polarization. 
Design of Dissertation Studies 
 In this dissertation, I propose a model predicting how the strength of a viewer’s political 
identities will interact with a television show’s content to affect the viewer’s evaluation of the 
show as politically relevant, and in turn how the evaluation of the show as politically relevant 
will affect selective exposure to that show; see Figure 1.1. I offer the following two general 
hypotheses.  
First, the evaluation hypothesis predicts that television show content will moderate the 
effect of political identity strength on evaluation of the show as politically relevant, such that the 
effect of political identity strength will be weakest when the show depicts 
politicians/parties/polls and strongest when the show depicts social issues. Using Holbert and 
Park’s (2019) typology of moderation, I believe the pattern will be convergent-positive and 
contingent: 1) PRM will be higher for shows depicting politicians/parties/polls than for shows 
depicting social issues, 2) the effect of political identity strength on PRM will be nonsignificant 
for shows depicting politicians/parties/polls, and 3) the effect of political identity strength on 
PRM will be statistically significant for shows depicting social issues. 
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Secondly, the selection hypothesis posits that evaluation of a show as politically relevant 
will positively predict selective exposure to a show. I further hypothesize that evaluation of a 
show as politically relevant will act as a mediator between political identity strength and 
selective exposure: individuals with stronger political identities will evaluate shows as more 
politically relevant, and in turn, evaluations of shows as more politically relevant will be 
associated with greater levels of selective exposure. In other words, PRM evaluations will 
explain how viewers with stronger political identities come to engage in selective exposure to 
fictional entertainment media. 
Four studies comprise the core of the dissertation. In Chapter 2, I develop the Politically 
Relevant Media scale across two studies. The PRM scale, then, becomes the primary dependent 
variable and mediator variable in the subsequent chapters and studies. The third study, reported 
in Chapter 3, tests the evaluation hypothesis, examining what attributes of media content and 
political identities affect evaluations of television programs as politically relevant, as indicated 
by PRM scale scores. The fourth study, reported in Chapter 4, tests the selection hypothesis, 
which demonstrates the predictive and mediating abilities of the PRM scale. I close this 
dissertation with a chapter detailing the conclusions drawn from these studies, along with their 
limitations and areas for future research. 
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Figure 1.1. Model depicting the relationship between critical variables of interest and plan for studies. 
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Chapter 2: Developing the PRM Scale 
In this chapter, I develop the PRM scale across two studies. In Study 1, I field the initial 
26-item PRM scale to a sample drawn from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), then use 
multilevel exploratory factor analysis techniques to discern the factor structure and reduce the 
number of items. In Study 2, I field the reduced 11-item scale to another MTurk sample, then use 
confirmatory factor analysis to confirm the factor structure. I then subject the refined scale to a 
series of tests for internal consistency and validity. My end state is a validated PRM scale that 
can be used in studies 3 and 4 to test the identification and selection hypotheses, respectively. 
Study 1 Overview 
The purpose of Study 1 is to test and refine the initial PRM scale. I conduct scree plot 
analysis and exploratory factor analysis to aid in determining the number of factors, to reduce the 
number of items, and to revise items as necessary. Reliability is assessed by computing 
Cronbach’s α for the individual factors and for the scale as a whole. The end state was to have a 
refined scale with a reduced and refined set of items whose validity can be further tested in Study 
2.  
In this study, participants were presented with descriptions of four existing television 
shows depicting either social issues (the cost of healthcare, marijuana as a public safety issue) or 
politicians/parties/polls (e.g., discussion of elections, legislative voting) and were asked to 
provide their evaluations of the shows using the PRM scale. Two of the shows were news 
programming (ABC World News Tonight or CBS Evening News), and the other half were 
fictional entertainment programming. I also varied the genre within fictional entertainment 
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programming between sitcoms (e.g., Friends) and dramas (e.g., Scandal), such that participants 
were presented with one of each. Thus, a respondent might have seen a description of a news 
show depicting healthcare, either a sitcom or drama depicting marijuana, a news show depicting 
an election, and a sitcom or drama depicting legislative voting. Participants were randomly 
assigned to see four show descriptions, of which there are a total of 32 possible variations. Table 
2.1 provides a breakdown of the potential descriptions. 
Table 2.1. Study 1 factorial design. 
   Objects 
   Social Issues PPP* 
Genre 
News 
Healthcare PPP 1 
Marijuana PPP 2 
Entertainment 
Sitcom 
Healthcare PPP 1 
Marijuana PPP 2 
OR 
Drama 
Healthcare PPP 1 
Marijuana PPP 2 
Note: *Politicians, Parties, and Polls 
 
Method 
Participants 
A convenience sample of U.S. adults (N = 321) was recruited via MTurk to participate in 
an online study from Feb. 27–March 3, 2020. Slightly more than half (n = 188) of the sample 
identified as men, 130 identified as women, and two participants identified as agender or non-
binary. The mean age was 38.31 (SD = 11.02). Most (63.24%) of the sample reported their race 
as White, non-Hispanic; 10.90% as Black, non-Hispanic; 16.51% as Hispanic/Latino; 6.23% as 
Asian; and 3.12% as multiracial or some other race. The sample comprised a mix of self-
identified Democrats (n = 138), Republicans (n = 97), and Independents or members of some 
other political party (n = 86). The mean reporting for political conservatism on a 1-to-7 scale was 
3.61 (SD = 1.82). 
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Stimuli 
Each show description included an overview describing the show, followed by a synopsis 
of a single episode. I wrote the show descriptions and episode synopses to be similar to what 
television viewers might find on websites such as IMDB or Wikipedia. Show descriptions were 
derived from information on the show’s website, IMDB, Wikipedia, and my own knowledge of 
the show from prior exposure. All descriptions are detailed in Appendix A. Textual descriptions 
of television shows and movies have been successfully employed as stimuli in previous research 
regarding selective exposure and media selection (e.g. Tamborini et al., 2013; Weaver, 2011).  
I chose to focus on social issues in comparison to politicians/parties/polls and to omit 
government agencies/agents because we would expect to find the starkest differences between 
these two classes of political objects and to achieve the cleanest manipulation. Marijuana and 
healthcare costs were chosen as the social issues to depict because they are issues commonly 
asked about in public opinion polls, without being one of the three classic “easy” issues 
(Carmines & Stimson, 1980) for which people might have very strong prior opinions: abortion, 
immigration, and gun control. I chose ABC World News Tonight and CBS Evening News as the 
news shows because network television news programs are perceived to be more trustworthy 
than cable news networks such as CNN, MSNBC, or Fox News (Brenan, 2019). I chose the 
fictional entertainment shows based on the ability to summarize the show while focusing on the 
presence of the political object in question without referencing other political objects that might 
cause a confound. I pre-tested all descriptions to ensure the successful manipulation of the genre 
and objects depicted, as detailed in Appendix B. 
Procedure 
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Participants were told they were participating in a study on television preferences and 
given instructions that they would be asked to evaluate four television shows. Each show 
description was randomly presented, followed by the PRM scale and the prior exposure and 
familiarity items. Finally, participants completed a standard battery of demographic questions. 
Measures 
PRM scale. The PRM scale was developed based on the dimensions (collective concerns, 
decisions, and consequences; perception of persuasive intent; and controversy) identified in 
Chapter 1. The scale, including item response options and scoring for all 26 original items across 
the three dimensions, is detailed in Appendix C. A single item asking respondents how political 
they think the television show in question is, is also included. There are no definitive rules on 
how large an initial pool of scale items should be, with suggestions ranging from 50% larger than 
the desired final scale (DeVellis, 2017) to several hundred items for multi-factor scales 
(Netemeyer, Bearden, & Sharma, 2003). The main concern for the size of the initial item pool is 
the size of the final scale, which should comprise no less than three (Carpenter, 2018) or four 
(Netemeyer et al., 2003) items per factor. Thus, the initial item pool includes at least six items 
per factor, so that up to half of the items can be eliminated in the item reduction process. I 
developed or adapted scale items to correspond with each dimension as detailed below. 
Collective concerns, decisions, and consequences (CDC). In line with Hay’s (2007) 
definition of politics, I created eight items to assess the degree to which respondents identified 
matters of collective concern (e.g., “When it comes to the topics presented on [show 
name], those topics affect: [proportion of the population]”) for which decisions can be made 
collectively (e.g., “Thinking of the topics presented on [show name], how possible do you think 
it is for our society to do things that affect those topics?”) that have collective consequences 
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(e.g., “Thinking of the topics presented on [show name], when our society makes decisions about 
those topics, those decisions affect: [proportion of the population]”) within a media text. Thus, 
each aspect of Hay’s (2007) definition of politics is represented by at least two items. Collective 
concerns are represented by four items: Two addressing the degree to which the objects depicted 
affect people collectively (e.g., “When it comes to the topics presented on [show name], the 
average person is: [degree of being affected]”), and two addressing the degree to which people 
are concerned with the depicted objects (e.g., “Thinking of the topics presented on [show name], 
how much do you think people in general care about those topics?”). Again, none of these items 
assess how meaningful or relevant the objects depicted are to the individual respondent. Rather, 
they assess the degree to which the objects depicted represent concerns shared by members of a 
society, who could potentially come together to make decisions regarding those objects that 
would affect members of that society. Thus, the items tap into how Hay (2007) defined politics. 
Controversy (CON). To assess perceptions of controversy, I developed six items 
assessing the degree to which respondents perceived that the media text depicted objects that 
people argue about at greater frequency (e.g., “How often do you think people argue about the 
topics presented on [show name]?”), on which people hold strong opinions (e.g., “Please indicate 
how much you agree with the following statement: People hold strong opinions about the 
topics presented on [show name].”), on which people seem divided (e.g., “Thinking of the topics 
presented on [show name], how divided do you think people in general are on those topics?”), 
and that were explicitly controversial (e.g., “How controversial do you think the 
topics presented on [show name] are?”). 
Perception of persuasive intent (PPI). Scale items for perception of persuasive intent 
were adapted from three existing measures. Previous work on perception of persuasive intent in 
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political satire (Holbert, Tchernev, Walther, Esralew, & Benski, 2013) employed the items “The 
author was serious about advancing his/her views in the message” and “The editorialist was 
trying to influence my attitude about the [issue].” In consumer and advertising research, 
perception of persuasive intent has been measured using items such as “The salesperson had a 
strong interest in changing my attitude toward [the product]” (Reinhard, Messner, & Sporer, 
2006). In both of these examples, the items home in on the degree to which the respondent 
perceives that the message sender is attempting to influence the respondent’s attitude about a 
particular object or attempting to propagate the sender’s position more broadly. 
Items were also adapted from the four-item message discounting scale (Nabi, Moyer-
Gusé, & Byrne, 2007). Message discounting has been conceptualized in the previous literature as 
the degree to which a message recipient perceives that a message isn’t actually meant to be taken 
seriously with regard to important issues. Unfortunately, most of the message discounting scale 
items are either written specifically within the context of humor (“The author of the message was 
just joking,” “It would be easy to dismiss this message as simply a joke”) or are double-barreled 
(“The message was intended more to entertain than to persuade”). Therefore, I either split 
double-barreled items into two separate questions (“The purpose of [show name] is to persuade 
people”, “The purpose of [show name] is to entertain”) or put them in an entertainment context 
that wasn’t specifically humorous (“How easy would it be to dismiss [show name] as simply a 
form of entertainment?”). In particular, this last change means the question is sensible to be 
asked regarding any type of show, whether it be a comedy show, a drama, or even a political 
commentary show that some might perceive to be for entertainment purposes, but not necessarily 
intended as humorous. 
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I draw on items previously used to measure both perception of persuasive intent and 
message discounting because it’s unclear how distinct a concept the latter is. Both apply to the 
degree to which a message recipient perceives that a message is meant to get them to think a 
certain way; however, message discounting also introduces two additional elements that address 
why a message may not be germane to decision making. The first element unique to message 
discounting is whether the message is meant as entertainment as opposed to an attempt to 
persuade. The second element is whether the message can be dismissed as a persuasion attempt 
specifically because it was a joke. As indicated in the previous paragraph, these specificities 
render the message discounting scale in its current form less than ideal for application to a broad 
range of media. My modifications to the items make them a better fit for the widest range of 
media possible. Whether message discounting is itself distinct from perception of persuasive 
intent remains unaddressed; however, that question is beyond the purview of this project. 
Prior exposure and familiarity. To assess familiarity with and prior exposure to a show, 
respondents were asked, “How familiar would you say that you are with [show name]?” from 1 
(not familiar at all) to 5 (extremely familiar) and “Have you ever watched [show name]?” 
(yes/no). If a participant indicated that they have ever watched the show, they were also asked, 
“Have you seen this particular episode of [show name]?” (yes/no) and “How often would you 
say you watch [show name]?” from 1 (less than once a month) to 5 (most days). 
Analysis Plan 
With each participant providing four observations, 321 participants yielded 
approximately 1,284 observations. Between the 32 possible combinations of the stimuli, this 
works out to 40 observations per possible combination. 
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Before conducting exploratory factor analysis, I must first account for the hierarchical 
nature of my data. Because each participant evaluated four television shows, observations are 
clustered within individual respondent rather than independent. Repeated-measures designs such 
as this pose additional considerations for conducting factor analyses, since the factor structure 
may be different at level one (the show evaluation level) than at level two (the respondent level) 
(Reise, Ventura, Nuechterlein, & Kim, 2005). I first follow steps to determine whether multilevel 
exploratory factor analysis is necessary, then proceed to perform whichever type of factor 
analysis is called for given the factor structure.  
The first step in determining whether a multilevel factor analysis is needed is to conduct 
an exploratory factor analysis as normal to determine the factor structure ignoring the 
hierarchical nature of the data (Reise et al., 2005). Next, intraclass correlations (ICCs; Shrout & 
Fleiss, 1979) are estimated for each item on the scale. The ICC is an indicator of how much of an 
item’s total variance is due to variation within groups (in our case, individual respondents) rather 
than between groups. The ICC is estimated as the item’s between-group variance divided by the 
item’s total variance (Reise et al., 2005). An ICC closer to 0 indicates that a greater share of the 
item’s variance is due to within-group factors—in this case, variance due to the different show 
descriptions the respondents evaluate. An ICC closer to 1 indicates that a greater share of the 
item’s variance is due to differences between groups—in this case, variance due to differences in 
how respondents evaluate the shows. Thus, the items having ICCs closer to 1 would mean that 
the PRM scale is capturing some attribute of the respondent rather than the content, meaning that 
the factor structure may be different at the respondent level than at the show 
observation/evaluation level. If the scale items have ICCs that are closer to zero, then the 
observations can be treated as independent and the results of the initial exploratory factor 
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analysis can stand; if not, additional steps must be taken to account for the confounding nature of 
the between-groups variance (Reise et al., 2005). 
I also assess reliability by computing Cronbach’s α for the individual factors and for the 
scale as a whole. I use the exploratory factor analysis to reduce the number of items. Potential 
considerations for item reduction are low factor loading (e.g., less than .50; Netemeyer et al., 
2003), cross-loading on multiple factors, and items that don’t contribute to either greater 
reliability or content validity.  
Results 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
I first produced a scree plot to determine the number of factors to extract (DeVellis, 
2017); see Figure 2.1. Two components lie above the “elbow” on the scree plot, indicating the 
presence of two factors underlying the scale rather than the three factors initially hypothesized. I 
also examined the eigenvalues of the components. The first component had an eigenvalue of 
14.72, followed by 3.70 for the second component and 2.93 for the third component. There was  
 
Figure 2.1. Scree plot for original data, not accounting for the hierarchical structure of the data. 
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only a minor difference of 0.77 between the eigenvalues of the second and third components, 
indicating that a distinct “leveling off” of the components had indeed occurred after the second 
component. This finding further solidified my decision to explore a two-factor solution rather 
than a three-factor solution. Next I ran an exploratory factor analysis extracting two factors using 
oblimin rotation, which allows the factors to be correlated rather than orthogonal. Table 2.2 
displays the factor loadings and eigenvalues for each factor. The CDC items generally load high 
on factor 1 and the PPI items on factor 2; however, the CON items that do have factor loadings 
above .50 also load on factor 1.  
Table 2.2. ICCs and factor loadings for PRM scale, not accounting for the hierarchical data. 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 ICC 
pe_propcare .75 .03 .28 
pe_topaff .87 -.07 .25 
pe_topavg .83 -.01 .21 
pe_docare .75 .01 .23 
pe_affectnum .82 -.06 .29 
pe_affectavg .84 -.04 .26 
pe_influence .58 .01 .43 
pe_possible .64 .02 .34 
pe_persuade .00 .81 .33 
pe_entertain -.30 .07 .00 
pe_change .00 .83 .26 
pe_dismiss -.33 .06 .08 
pe_serious .30 .57 .17 
pe_think -.05 .86 .38 
pe_point -.03 .84 .24 
pe_message .13 .71 .17 
pe_attention .35 .47 .11 
pe_stand -.01 .83 .32 
pe_reflect .35 .35 .18 
pe_express -.07 .84 .28 
pe_controversy .29 .41 .41 
pe_argue .62 .13 .22 
pe_minds .30 .24 .47 
pe_opinions .62 .19 .12 
pe_divided .55 .16 .25 
pe_agree .10 .15 .45 
Eigenvalue 14.72 3.70  
Note: Items with high factor loadings in bold. 
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As an additional check on my decision to explore a two-factor solution rather than a 
three-factor solution, I compared the above results to those for a three-factor solution. Only two 
items loaded on the third factor: pe_entertain and pe_dismiss. Both of these items, taken from the 
message discounting scale (Nabi et al., 2007), were intended to measure perception of persuasive 
intent, but instead loaded on a separate factor. These items are both reverse-coded, with higher 
scores indicating weaker perception of persuasive intent, and they both refer to entertainment in 
their question word. Additionally, the third factor only explained a very small proportion of 
variance in the factor analysis: .07, compared to .26 and .24 for the first two factors. Thus, I 
concluded that a third factor would be of little added value. These results indicate the presence of 
two factors, despite my finding three distinct factors across four rounds of pre-testing of the 
PRM scale (two rounds using student samples and two using MTurk samples, including the 
previously reported PRM scale pre-test; see Appendix B).  
The presence of two factors rather than three could be the result of a combination of a 
couple issues. For one, the previous PRM scale pre-tests were run using stimuli that included 
issue positions, whereas the stimuli used in the current study did not include issue positions. I 
used stimuli with issue positions in the pre-tests because I was interested in how the presence of 
congenial and uncongenial positions might affect PRM scores; however, that was not the 
objective of the current study. This difference could have attenuated the variability of the CON 
subscale items, making the factor less distinct. By the current stimuli not conveying an issue 
position, respondents could perceive the issues presented as less controversial. (This omission 
could also potentially lower one’s perception of persuasive intent; however, these items still 
appear to load on a factor.) Additionally, the selection of objects portrayed in the stimuli could 
affect perceptions of controversy. The previous PRM scale pre-tests have included abortion, 
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immigration, and gun control (for the student samples) or the environment and LGBTQ/religious 
discrimination (for the MTurk samples) as issues alongside the cost of healthcare and marijuana; 
however, the current study instead uses stimuli depicting politicians and legislative voting 
processes alongside these two recurring issues. Respondents might perceive stimuli describing 
politicians in the absence of the discussion of some specific issue or policy as less controversial. 
Nevertheless, although the various subscales could be employed individually, I envisioned the 
PRM scale being administered as a whole; therefore, the number of factors is less important in 
the immediate sense. In the next study I explore whether controversy truly constitutes a distinct 
factor. 
My next step was to compute ICCs for each of the items. I used Huang’s (2017) 
mcfa.input() function to estimate the ICCs; these are also presented in Table 2.2. These 
ICC estimates indicate that with few exceptions, a sizable share of the items’ variance is due to 
between-groups variance rather than within-groups variance. For example, an ICC of .47 would 
indicate that nearly half of the variance in the item’s scores is due to differences between 
individual respondents than due to differences between the show descriptions themselves. As a 
whole, these ICC estimates point toward a need to conduct multilevel factor analysis (Reise et 
al., 2005). 
Having established a need to conduct multilevel factor analysis, the next step is to 
partition the correlation matrix typically used in exploratory factor analysis into a matrix 
accounting for pooled within-groups (observation level) variance and a matrix accounting for 
between-groups (respondent level) variance (D'Haenens, Van Damme, & Onghena, 2010; Kim, 
Dedrick, Cao, & Ferron, 2016; Reise et al., 2005; van de Vijver & Poortinga, 2002). Then 
exploratory factor analysis is conducted on these matrices. An exploratory factor analysis 
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conducted using the pooled within-groups covariance matrix reveals the factor structure at the 
observation level, with any between-groups variance partitioned out (Reise et al., 2005). Because 
I am uninterested at the respondent-level factor structure and my future analyses will use 
multilevel modeling with random effects to account for between-groups effects, an exploratory 
factor analysis conducted using the pooled within-groups covariance matrix is sufficient to 
uncover the factor structure of the PRM scale for my purposes (Reise et al., 2005). I used 
Huang’s (2017) mcfa.input() function to generate this matrix, then submitted it to the same 
exploratory factor analysis steps as the original data. 
Generation and analysis of a scree plot (see Figure 2.2) reveal two components lying 
above the “elbow,” once again indicating the presence of two factors. I ran an exploratory factor 
analysis extracting two factors using oblimin rotation; see Table 2.3 for the factor loadings and 
eigenvalues for each factor. Examination of the components’ eigenvalues once again indicated a 
distinct leveling off between the second component (eigenvalue of 2.48) and third component 
(eigenvalue of 1.50), with a difference in eigenvalues of .98. Thus, I concluded that a two-factor 
solution was appropriate. A comparison of the factor loadings in tables 2.2 and 2.3 reveals much  
 
Figure 2.2. Scree plot based on the pooled within-groups covariance matrix.  
 50 
Table 2.3. Factor loadings for PRM scale, based on the pooled within-groups covariance matrix. 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
pe_propcare .68 -.02 
pe_topaff .82 -.05 
pe_topavg .80 -.03 
pe_docare .73 -.01 
pe_affectnum .72 -.03 
pe_affectavg .78 -.05 
pe_influence .48 -.05 
pe_possible .52 .03 
pe_persuade .09 .71 
pe_entertain -.65 -.01 
pe_change .09 .73 
pe_dismiss -.60 -.04 
pe_serious .40 .47 
pe_think -.01 .78 
pe_point -.03 .80 
pe_message .20 .66 
pe_attention .41 .45 
pe_stand -.07 .80 
pe_reflect .41 .34 
pe_express -.15 .82 
pe_controversy .22 .38 
pe_argue .64 .07 
pe_minds .24 .16 
pe_opinions .65 .17 
pe_divided .53 .12 
pe_agree -.03 -.07 
Eigenvalue 11.15 2.48 
Note: Items with high factor loadings in bold. 
 
commonality, with only a few differences. First, the factor loadings for pe_influence and 
pe_serious are lower based on the pooled within-groups covariance matrix, loading at .48 and 
.47, respectively. These items already exhibited the weakest loadings out of the other items for 
their respective dimensions. Second, pe_entertain and pe_dismiss, two reverse-scored items for 
the PPI dimension that didn’t load on any factor in the original analysis now load negatively at -
.65 and -.60, respectively. Examining the results of a three-factor solution, I once again find that 
pe_entertain and pe_dismiss are the only items that load on a third dimension, rather than on the 
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first factor if only two factors are extracted. As before, the third factor explains a relatively small 
proportion of variance, .09, rendering it of little value. 
Item Reduction 
The next phase of scale development is to reduce the number of items. I use the results of 
the exploratory factor analysis, analyses of internal consistency (assessed using Cronbach’s α), 
and the congruence analyses from the PRM scale pre-test (see Appendix B) to accomplish this. I 
first turn to factor 2, since the only items that loaded high were items intended to assess the PPI 
dimension. None of the seven items that loaded high on this factor exhibited congruence or 
incongruence effects during the pre-test. Cronbach’s α for all seven items, across all show 
evaluations, was .93.1 By eliminating items based on which had the lowest factor loadings and 
which would maintain the highest Cronbach’s α among the surviving items, I settled on four 
items for the PPI subscale: pe_change, pe_think, pe_stand, and pe_express (M = 3.22, SD = 1.06, 
α = .90). The subscale exhibits negative skewness (-0.32, SE = .07, p < .001). Using the PRM 
scale pre-test data, a PPI subscale composite item created by averaging these four items does not 
exhibit any congruence or incongruence effects. 
Next I attend to the items that loaded high on the first factor, including the two items 
intended to measure perception of persuasive intent that loaded negatively (< -.5) on this factor. 
These two items, pe_entertain and pe_dismiss, are reverse-coded items for which higher scores 
indicate the perceptions that the show’s purpose is to entertain and can be dismissed as simply a 
form of entertainment. The other items on the factor tap into the CDC and CON dimensions; 
thus, high negative loadings for pe_entertain and pe_dismiss indicate that the more individuals 
 
1 Because of the repeated-measured design of this study, I also examined Cronbach’s α for just the first show 
respondents evaluated, just the second show, and so on. All analyses of internal consistency were similar, so I opted 
to present the results for all observations. 
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perceive that the show depicts controversial matters for which there are collective concern, 
decisions, and consequences, the less they perceive the show as simply a form of entertainment. 
One course of action might be to reverse-code and retain these items; however, these two items 
also capture an attribute of the show rather than an attribute of the topics presented on the show 
or of how people in general think and feel about those topics. Also considering that reverse-
coded items often lower the internal consistency of scales as captured by Cronbach’s α, I decided 
to eliminate these two items. 
Next I examined the remaining 10 items together, as well as separating them out into 
their intended dimensions (pe_argue, pe_opinions, and pe_divided for CON, the others for 
CDC). I do this for two reasons. One, it may be the case that perception of controversy is 
inherently higher for issues that are seen as collective concerns, with the potential for collective 
decisions and collective consequences. In other words, CON and CDC may be two distinct 
dimensions that are so highly correlated as to load on one factor. Secondly, Cronbach’s α will 
typically be higher the more items are analyzed together for internal consistency; thus, including 
all 10 items together may artificially inflate the α if the two subscales are combined, making it 
more difficult to identify items for elimination.  
I first turn to the three items intended to measure controversy. None of these items 
exhibited congruence or incongruence effects on the PRM scale pre-test. The three items 
together also demonstrate good internal consistency (α = .78). Thus, I averaged pe_argue, 
pe_opinions, and pe_divided to create a composite item for CON (M = 3.40, SD = 0.88). The 
composite item exhibits negative skewness (-0.38, SE = .07, p < .001), and a composite item 
constructed using the pre-test data showed no evidence of a congruence or incongruence effect.  
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Three of the seven items measuring collective concerns/decisions/consequences did 
evidence congruence effects on the pre-test: pe_affectnum, pe_topaff, and pe_topavg. This alone 
is not grounds for elimination. The seven items together demonstrate excellent internal 
consistency (α = .92). By eliminating items based on content validity (that is, capturing 
perceptions of concerns, decisions, and consequences), which had the lowest factor loadings, 
which would maintain the highest Cronbach’s α among the surviving items, and whether the 
resultant subscale would exhibit congruence effects, I settled on four items for the CDC 
subscale: pe_propcare, pe_topavg, pe_affectavg, and pe_possible (M = 3.24, SD = 0.88, α = .85). 
The composite item exhibits negative skewness (-0.30, SE = . 07, p < .001), and a composite 
item constructed using the pre-test data showed no evidence of a congruence or incongruence 
effect. The seven items of the CDC and CON subscales combined demonstrate excellent internal 
consistency (α = .89; M = 3.31, SD = 0.83), although the resultant composite item does exhibit 
negative skewness (-.40, SE = .07, p < .001). Still, the composite item constructed using the pre-
test data showed no congruence or incongruence effects. 
Most importantly, the CDC dimension still retains items addressing all three aspects of 
the political: collective concerns (pe_propcare, pe_topavg), decisions (pe_possible), and 
consequences (pe_affectavg). Thus, this dimension of the PRM scale assesses the degree to 
which viewers identify the objects depicted in media as being of concern to people within a 
society, potentially subject to collective decision-making that could address those concerns, with 
those decisions having ramifications for individuals within a society. In short, the CDC 
dimension taps into how relevant to the political realm and government the viewer evaluates the 
objects depicted in media to be. 
The PRM Scale 
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I averaged the 11 items of the PPI, CON, and CDC subscales to create a single PRM 
scale item (M = 3.27, SD = 0.81, α = .91). The single item constructed using the pre-test data 
showed no congruence or incongruence effects, but the item does exhibit negative skewness (-
.40, SE = .07, p < .001). This indicates that, at least for the stimuli used in the current study, 
respondents tended to give higher PRM scores rather than lower ones. The three subscale items 
are moderately to strongly correlated with each other (CDC and PPI r = .52, CDC and CON r = 
.75, PPI and CON r = .57; ps < .001) and are very strongly correlated with the single PRM scale 
item (rs = .85-.87, ps < .001); see Table 2.4. Table 2.5 displays descriptive statistics for the 
individual items, subscale composite items, and PRM scale composite item. 
Table 2.4. Correlation matrix for the PRM scale and subscale items. 
 CDC PPI CON 
PPI .52***   
CON .75*** .57***  
PRM .87*** .85*** .86*** 
Note: ***p < .001. 
 
Table 2.5. Descriptive statistics for the PRM scale. 
 M SD Skew Skew SE α 
CDC 3.24 0.88 -0.30*** .07 .85 
pe_propcare 3.30 0.93 -0.14* .07 - 
pe_topavg 3.07 1.14 -0.08 .07 - 
pe_affectavg 3.21 1.13 -0.15* .07 - 
pe_possible 3.39 1.04 -0.31*** .07 - 
PPI 3.22 1.06 -0.32*** .07 .90 
pe_change 3.39 1.20 -0.54*** .07 - 
pe_think 3.10 1.24 -0.13 .07 - 
pe_stand 3.11 1.22 -0.12 .07 - 
pe_express 3.28 1.18 -0.27*** .07 - 
CON 3.40 0.88 -0.38*** .07 .78 
pe_argue 3.26 1.01 -0.10 .07 - 
pe_opinions 3.79 1.09 -0.89*** .07 - 
pe_divided 3.15 1.07 -0.03 .07 - 
PRM 3.27 0.81 -.40*** .07 .91 
Note: *p < .05, ***p < .001. 
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Having now completed exploratory factor analysis and item reduction, I turn to the 
validation of the PRM scale, including confirmatory factor analysis and tests of discriminant, 
nomological, and convergent validity. 
Study 2 Overview 
The purpose of Study 2 is to validate the refined PRM scale using a different sample 
(Churchill, 1979; DeVellis, 2017; Netemeyer et al., 2003). There are a number of considerations 
regarding internal consistency, reliability, and validity that I address in this study. Having 
conducted exploratory factor analysis and item reduction in Study 1, using a unique data set I 
conduct a confirmatory factor analysis of the scale items to check for internal consistency, and I 
assess reliability again by computing Cronbach’s α for the individual factors and for the scale as 
a whole. I also conduct tests of nomological, convergent, and discriminant validity. As such, I 
demonstrate that the PRM scale is correlated with theoretically related constructs and with 
existing measures of identification of media texts as politically relevant, whereas it is not 
correlated with distinct constructs that capture different phenomena.  
Specifically regarding nomological validity, the PRM scale should be positively 
correlated with the strength of political identities and with political interest (Settle, 2018). 
Because the PRM scale is a novel measure, convergent validity will be difficult to determine. To 
date, the only way researchers have quantitatively assessed media consumers’ perception that a 
media text is political is to ask respondents directly if the text in question is about politics (Settle, 
2018) or to gauge agreement regarding the purpose of the post between researchers and 
respondents (Vraga et al., 2016). Consistent with the pre-test of the PRM scale, I will ask 
respondents how political they think the television show in question is using a Likert-type item 
measured from 1 (Not at all political) to 5 (Extremely political). In terms of discriminant 
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validity, the scale should not be correlated with moral progressivism (Long & Eveland, 2018). 
We would also not expect political ideology (e.g., liberalism/conservatism) or partisanship to be 
correlated with the scale, in that liberals and Democrats shouldn’t find media to be more 
politically relevant than conservatives and Republicans or vice versa.  
The end state was to have a validated scale that can be used to test the relationships 
proposed in studies 3 and 4. 
Method 
Participants 
A convenience sample of U.S. adults was recruited via MTurk to participate in an online 
study on March 9, 2020, with quotas for partisanship set to evenly split the sample between 
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents/Others. Two participants were eliminated because of 
a technical issue, bringing the final sample size to N = 328. Slightly more than half (n = 173) of 
the sample identified as men, 154 identified as women, and one participant identified as non-
binary. The mean age was 41.36 (SD = 12.86). Most (76.22%) of the sample reported their race 
as White, non-Hispanic; 7.93% as Black, non-Hispanic; 6.71% as Hispanic/Latino; 3.96% as 
Asian; and 5.18% as multiracial or some other race. The sample comprised a mix of self-
identified Democrats (n = 110), Republicans (n = 107), and Independents or members of some 
other political party (n = 111). The mean reporting for political conservatism on a 1-to-7 scale 
was 3.82 (SD = 1.76). 
Stimuli 
Participants were presented with the same textual descriptions of real television shows 
used in Study 1. 
Procedure 
 57 
Participants first answered questions regarding political interest, political identity 
strength, and demographics. Then participants completed the moral foundations scale, which also 
served as a distractor task to prevent the measurement of pre-exposure variables, in particular 
issue public membership, from priming individuals regarding the show descriptions or the study 
purpose. Next, participants were told they were participating in a study on television preferences 
and given instructions that they would be asked to evaluate four television shows. Each show 
description was randomly presented, followed by the PRM scale and the prior exposure and 
familiarity items. 
Measures 
See Table 2.6 for descriptive statistics. 
PRM scale. The reduced and refined 11-item PRM scale was used.  
Moral progressivism. I administered 20-item Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; 
Graham et al., 2011) and used it to generate a measure of moral progressivism (Long & Eveland, 
2018). I do this because the MFQ measures the salience of five different moral domains and is 
thus not suitable to be employed as a single scale. Moral progressivism draws on previous 
research (e.g., Graham et al., 2009) that finds differences for the salience of moral domains 
between conservatives and liberals. Typically, the individualizing (harm/care and fairness) 
domains are more salient for liberals, and the binding (authority, ingroup loyalty, and purity) 
domains are more salient for conservatives. Moral progressivism is a measure of how salient the 
individualizing domains are for an individual over and above how salient the binding domains 
are for that individual. I first generated scores for salience of the individualizing and binding  
domains (Graham et al., 2009; 2011). I then subtracted the binding score from the 
individualizing score to create a single-item measure of moral progressivism (Long & Eveland,
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Table 2.6. Zero-order correlations and descriptive statistics for Study 2 variables. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. PRM Scale -         
2. Moral Progressivism -.04 -        
3. Partisanship (Republican) .09** -.50*** -       
4. Ideology (Conservatism) .09** -.59*** .79*** -      
5. Partisan Strength .07** -.18*** -.02 .01 -     
6. Ideological Strength .06* .08** -.06* -.10*** .50*** -    
7. Issue Public Membership .19*** .14*** -.12** -.16*** .11** .18*** -   
8. Political Interest .10*** .06* .02 .02 .25*** .29*** .26*** -  
9. Single-Item “Political” .50*** -.09** .12*** .13*** .02 .03 .04 .04 - 
M 3.15 1.19 0.47 0.47 1.88 1.44 1.75 3.63 3.11 
SD 0.80 1.27 0.35 0.29 0.99 1.03 0.77 1.01 1.25 
Skew -.30*** .29*** 0.13 0.11 -.44*** -.06 -.28** -.46*** -.03 
Skew SE .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .07 .10 .07 .07 
α .91 - - - - - .85 - - 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. For partisanship, 0 = Strong Democrat, and 1 = Strong Republican. For ideology, 0 = 
extremely liberal, and 1 = extremely conservative. 
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2018), with higher (>0) scores indicating greater salience of the individualizing domains and 
lower (<0) scores indicating greater salience of the binding domains. I can then demonstrate that 
the PRM scale is not correlated with moral progressivism. 
Political identity. Political identity was assessed in three ways: partisanship and strength 
thereof, political ideology and strength thereof, and membership in the relevant issue publics and 
strength thereof. 
Partisanship. Partisan identification was measured using three items from the ANES 
asking if participants consider themselves Democrats, Republicans, Independents, or something 
else. Self-identified Democrats and Republicans were then asked if they are strongly or not very 
strongly identified with their party, whereas Independents and Others were asked if they think of 
themselves as being closer to the Republican or Democratic party (referred to as leaners). 
Partisanship strength was computed as follows: Independent/Other non-leaners (0), 
Independents/Others who lean toward the Democrat or Republican party (1), not strongly self-
identified Republicans/Democrats (2), and strongly self-identified Republicans/Democrats (3). 
 Political ideology. Ideology was measured using a single item taken from the ANES 
asking respondents to identify their ideology on a 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely 
conservative) scale. Ideological strength was computed as follows: Moderate (0), slightly  
liberal/conservative (1), liberal/conservative (2), extremely liberal/conservative (3).Issue 
Public Membership. Issue public membership was assessed using five items. I asked 
respondents the following for each of eight political issues (see Appendix D): how important the 
issue is to them on a scale of 0 (not at all important) to 3 (extremely important); how strongly 
held their views are on the issue from 0 (not at all strongly) to 3 (extremely strongly); how 
frequently they seek information on the issue from 0 (never) to 3 (daily); and how frequently 
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they discuss the issue with others from 0 (never) to 3 (daily). A semantic differential item 
assessed how strongly respondents believe one of two divergent positions on the issue on a -3 
(strongly believe position A) to 3 (strongly believe position B) scale, with a 0 meaning that they 
believe or disbelieve in both positions to the same degree. The absolute value of this item was to 
be averaged with the previous four items for a score of strength of issue public membership; 
however, doing so lowered the internal consistency of the issue public membership measure. 
Therefore, this item was discarded and issue public membership was measured as the average of 
the first four items. 
Political interest. Political interest was measured using a single item from the ANES 
asking respondents to report how often they pay attention to what’s going on in government and 
politics from 1 (never) to 5 (always). Previous research has found that a single item is sufficient 
for measuring political interest (Prior, 2019). 
Analysis Plan 
I conduct confirmatory factor analysis of the scale items to check for internal consistency 
(Carpenter, 2018; DeVellis, 2017; Netemeyer et al., 2003). I assess reliability by computing 
Cronbach’s α for the individual factors and for the scale as a whole. I also conduct tests of 
nomological, convergent, and discriminant validity (Netemeyer et al., 2003). These validity tests 
will consist of assessing the correlation between the PRM scale and each of several measures: 
political identity strength, political interest, the single-item measure of how political participants 
think the shows are, moral progressivism, political ideology, and partisanship. 
Results 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
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The steps for performing multilevel confirmatory factor analysis are similar to those I 
used in the previous study for performing multilevel exploratory factor analysis (Dyer, Hanges, 
& Hall, 2005). First, I conduct confirmatory factor analysis on the original data set, ignoring the 
hierarchical structure of the data; then I estimate ICCs for my scale items. Next, if the ICCs 
indicate substantial between-groups variance, I conduct confirmatory factor analysis using the 
pooled within-groups covariance matrix, which partials out the between-groups variance. 
I specified the model with the individual items retained from Study 1 estimating the three 
latent variables for their respective factors, as well as correlations between the three latent 
variables. I used the cfa() function in the lavaan package in R to fit the model and the 
semPaths() function in the semPlot package to visualize it; see Figure 2.3. Acceptable model 
fit was achieved, χ2(41) = 281.77, p < .001; CFI = .974; RMSEA = .067; SRMR = .035; 
providing support for a three-factor structure with each item loading strongly on its expected 
factor; see Table 2.7 and Figure 2.3. The covariances between the latent variables were all 
statistically significant at the p < .001 level. 
Next I used Huang’s (2017) mcfa.input() function to generate the ICC estimates, 
which are also reported in Table 2.7. These ICCs still indicate substantial between-groups 
variance; thus, my next step was to use the between-groups covariance matrix also generated by 
Huang’s function to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis with the between-groups variance 
partialed out. Once again, acceptable model fit was achieved, χ2(41) = 267.10, p < .001; CFI = 
.973; RMSEA = .065; SRMR = .037; providing support for the same three-factor structure with 
each item loading strongly on its expected factor and statistically significant covariances between 
the latent variables at the p < .001 level; see Figure 2.4. Therefore, the factor structure of the 11-
item PRM scale is confirmed.  
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Figure 2.3. Confirmatory factor analysis for original data, not accounting for the hierarchical 
structure of the data. 
 
One might wonder why a confirmatory factor analysis indicates a three-factor structure whereas 
the exploratory factor analysis indicated a two-factor structure. There are three points of 
explanation that address this issue. First, the CDC and CON factors are very strongly correlated 
in both Study 1 (r = .75, p < .001) and in Study 2 (r = .85, p < .001 for the two latent variables in 
the confirmatory factor analysis; r = .75, p < .001 for the two subscale items). Therefore, it’s 
unsurprising that their items might load on a single factor in an exploratory factor analysis. As  
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Table 2.7. ICCs and factor loadings for PRM scale, not accounting for the hierarchical data. 
 CDC PPI CON ICC 
CDC     
pe_propcare 0.71   .09 
pe_topavg 0.95   .07 
pe_affectavg 0.99   .10 
pe_possible 0.69   .18 
PPI     
pe_change  0.93  .25 
pe_think  1.09  .29 
pe_stand  1.02  .24 
pe_express  1.02  .27 
CON     
pe_argue   0.82 .10 
pe_opinions   0.88 .14 
pe_divided   0.81 .09 
 
stated in Study 1, my reason for keeping these two dimensions distinct is because they are 
conceptually different, even if they are strongly correlated. By opting for separate factors, we 
will be able to detect when the two subscales move independently of one another. Second, a 
confirmatory factor analysis conducted with a two-factor model specified achieves tolerable fit, 
χ2(43) = 517.83, p < .001; CFI = .944; RMSEA = .092; SRMR = .042. Still, some of the fit 
indices fall just outside of established cutoff criteria, namely CFI (≥ .95) and RMSEA (< .08) 
(Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow, & King, 2006). Not only were the fit indices better, but the 
factor loadings were generally the same or higher for a three-factor model. Thus, a three-factor 
model fits the observed data better than a two-factor model.  
Finally, one should attend to the differences between exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analyses as analytical tools. The former is, as its name suggests, an exploratory tool. One can 
approach it with no expectations of the underlying factor structure or which items will load on 
which factor. The latter, on the other hand, is a theory-centric analytical technique to determine 
how well a particular model specification fits the data. As such, the factor structure suggested by 
an exploratory factor analysis may not match what theory would indicate, nor may a model 
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Figure 2.4. Confirmatory factor analysis based on the within-groups covariance matrix. 
specified by that factor structure be the best fit for the data. This is exactly what we observe in 
this case: despite an exploratory factor analysis suggesting two factors, theory indicates the 
existence of three factors, and a three-factor model fits the data better than a two-factor model 
does. Altogether, we must keep in mind that scale development is an iterative, theory-driven 
process that requires decision-making on the part of the researcher, not a formulaic procedure in 
which the research takes a back seat to the numbers.  
Testing Internal Consistency 
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Cronbach’s α for the full scale is .91; see Table 2.6 The high α indicates excellent internal 
consistency among the 11 items. The subscales also exhibit internal consistency ranging from 
very good to excellent (CDC: α = .86, PPI: α = .91, CON: α = .83). 
Validity Checks 
Nomological validity. Per Settle (2018), we would expect the PRM scale to be correlated 
with political identity strength and with political interest. Indeed, I find that PRM scale scores 
are statistically significantly correlated, albeit weakly, with ideological strength (r = .06, p = 
.041), partisanship strength (r = .07, p = .009), issue public membership (r = .19, p < .001), and 
political interest (r = .10, p < .001); see Table 2.6. Further, we should find that PPI subscale 
scores in particular are not lower for individuals with stronger political identities; in other words, 
PPI should not be negatively correlated with ideological strength, partisan strength, and issue 
public membership. Such a finding would be concerning because individuals with stronger 
political identities should be more, not less, attuned to perceiving persuasive intent from media 
content than individuals with weaker political identities. I find that PPI is positively correlated (r 
= .08, p = .004) with partisanship strength, not correlated (r = .04, p = .174) with ideological 
strength, and positively correlated (r = .11, p = .004) with issue public membership. In general, 
individuals with stronger political identities perceive greater persuasive intent from television 
shows than do individuals with weaker political identities. 
Discriminant validity. I tested the discriminant validity of the PRM scale by examining 
whether the scores correlated with respondents’ moral progressivism and with political ideology 
and partisanship.  
Moral progressivism. Previous research (e.g., Long & Eveland, 2018; Tamborini et al., 
2013) has applied Tamborini’s (Tamborini, 2011; 2013) model of intuitive morality and 
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exemplars (MIME) to predict attraction to media based on people’s reliance on different moral 
domains. For example, Tamborini et al. (2013) investigated whether salience of the five 
individual moral domains (harm/care, fairness, ingroup loyalty, authority, and purity) would 
predict appeal for media in which a character violated the relevant moral domain. I borrow the 
approach of Long and Eveland (2018), who explored whether moral progressivism, the salience 
of individualizing moral foundations over binding moral foundations, would predict preferences 
for music with morally progressive lyrics. It’s important to note that the MFQ and the salience of 
moral domains are themselves not measures of media appeal or of perception of a media text as 
political. Moral progressivism, or the salience of the various moral domains, is independent of 
what media a person may be exposed to. Thus, the way that moral foundations theory has been 
applied to the study of media appeal is to determine whether individuals find media to be more 
appealing when that media is aligned with, rather than violates, the moral domain(s) that are 
more salient to them.  
Still, I aim to demonstrate that the PRM scale is not merely tapping into the salience of 
one moral domain over the other. Therefore, I examine the correlation between the PRM scale 
and moral progressivism to demonstrate that PRM scale scores are not higher for individuals 
who rely on certain moral domains over others. I find no correlation between PRM scale scores 
and moral progressivism, r = -.04, p = .201; see Table 2.6. In other words, the PRM scale isn’t 
related to the salience of particular moral domains over others. 
Political ideology and partisanship. Just as I determined that the salience of different 
moral domains isn’t related to PRM scale scores, I want to ensure that political ideology and 
partisanship aren’t predictive of PRM scale scores. I measured political ideology on a 1 
(Extremely liberal) to 7 (Extremely conservative) scale, with “moderate/middle of the road” as 
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the center point. I then transformed this measure to a 0-to-1 scale of conservatism, with the same 
anchors. I find a weak but statistically significant correlation between PRM scores and 
conservatism (r = .09, p = .001), evidencing that more conservative individuals tend to report 
higher scores on the PRM scale. In terms of partisanship, an ANOVA test indicated no 
difference in PRM scores between Democrats (M = 3.12, SD = 0.76), Republicans (M = 3.26, SD 
= 0.83), and Independents/Others (M = 3.09, SD = 0.80), F(1, 1308) = 0.50, p = .479. However, a 
t-test comparing PRM scores among just Democrats to those among just Republicans revealed 
that PRM scores among Republicans were statistically significantly higher than among 
Democrats, t(852.42) = -2.44, p = .015. Using partisanship as a scale with strongly self-identified 
Democrats at one end (0), strongly self-identified Republicans at the other end (1), and 
Independent/Other non-leaners at the mid-point (0.5), I also find a weak albeit statistically 
significant correlation between partisanship and the PRM scale, r = .09, p = .001. 
Convergent validity. To test the convergent validity of the PRM scale, we asked 
respondents how political they thought each show was from 1 (Not at all political) to 5 
(Extremely political); see descriptive statistics in Table 2.6. This single-item measure is 
moderately correlated with the PRM scale, r = .50, p < .001; see Table 2.6. Thus, there is a 
moderate level of agreement between the single-item measure and the PRM scale measure.  
Comparing the PRM Scale to a Single-Item Measure 
The development of a new scale must serve a purpose: To measure some phenomenon 
more fully and accurately than is currently possible. Current measures of the degree to which 
people perceive media texts as relevant to politics use single-item measures (Settle, 2018; Vraga 
et al., 2016). Why ask 11 questions when one might suffice? My reasoning behind the 
construction of the PRM scale is that simply asking someone whether a media text, be it a 
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Facebook post or a television show, is “political” is bound to be flawed due to how people 
employ the word “political” (Eliasoph, 1998; Fitzgerald, 2013; Walsh, 2004). I argue that my 
novel measure is a better indicator of whether someone thinks of a media text as political. I 
demonstrate this by submitting the single-item measure to the same validity checks I have 
performed on the PRM scale thus far.  
Nomological validity. In terms of nomological validity, we would expect a measure of 
the political relevance of media to be correlated with political interest and political identity 
strength (Settle, 2018). However, although the PRM scale is correlated with both political 
identity strength and political interest, the single-item measure isn’t correlated with any of these 
partisan strength: r = .02, p = .566; ideological strength: r = .03, p = .293; issue public 
membership: r = .04, p = .335; political interest: r = .04, p = .160); see Table 2.6.  
Discriminant validity. As with the PRM scale, I tested the discriminant validity of the 
single-item measure by examining whether the scores correlated with respondents’ reliance on 
various moral domains and with political ideology and partisanship.  
Moral progressivism. The single-item measure is negatively correlated with moral 
progressivism (r = -.09, p = .002), meaning that less morally progressive individuals (those for 
whom the binding domains of authority, ingroup loyalty, and purity are more salient) indicate 
that television shows are more “political”; see Table 2.6. In contrast, the PRM scale is not 
correlated with moral progressivism. 
Political ideology and partisanship. Finally, I examine the relationship between the 
single-item measure and both political ideology and partisanship. Like with the PRM scale, I find 
a weak yet statistically significant correlation between the single item and political ideology (r = 
.13, p < .001), with conservatives reporting higher levels of a show being “political.” There is no 
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statistically significant difference between the correlations between political ideology and the 
PRM score and the single-item measure, Z = 1.04, p = .298. For partisanship employed as a 0-to-
1 scale, there is a weak yet statistically significant correlation with the single-item measure, r = 
.12, p < .001. There is no statistically significant difference between the correlations between 
partisanship and the PRM score and the single-item measure, Z = -0.78, p = .435.  
An ANOVA test indicated no difference in scores for the single-item measure between 
Democrats (M = 2.98, SD = 1.16), Republicans (M = 3.26, SD = 1.25), and Independents/Others 
(M = 3.09, SD = 1.30), F(1, 1310) = 1.87, p = .172. A t-test comparing single-item scores for 
Democrats to those for Republicans revealed that the single-item scores among Republicans 
were statistically significantly higher than among Democrats, t(857.09) = -3.52, p < .001. To test 
whether the PRM scale or the single-item measure performed better in this regard, I generated 
the mean differences between the Democrat and Republican scores for both the PRM scale and 
the single-item measure for 5,000 bootstrapped samples of the data set to determine if the 
partisan gap in scores is larger for the PRM scale or the single-item measure. Across these 
bootstrapped samples, the mean partisan gap for PRM scale scores (M = 0.13, SD = 0.05) is 
smaller than the mean partisan gap for single-item measure scores (M = 0.29, SD = 0.08), 
t(8622.9) = 113.33, p < .001. Thus, although both the PRM scale and the single-item measure 
exhibit a partisan gap in which Republicans report higher scores than Democrats, the gap is more 
than half the size for the PRM scale. 
A Validated Scale of the Political Relevance of Media 
In this chapter I have presented two studies in which I test, refine, and validate a measure 
of the political relevance of media. In Study 1, I used multilevel exploratory factor analysis to 
uncover the factor structure of the PRM scale and reduce the number of items from 26 to 11. In 
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Study 2, I employed confirmatory factor analysis to confirm the factor structure and the internal 
consistency of the scale and its three subscales, then I submitted the scale to several tests of 
validity. I demonstrated that, as expected, the PRM scale is correlated with political identity 
strength, measured as partisanship strength, ideological strength, and issue public membership 
strength. I further demonstrated that overall, PRM scale scores are not correlated with the 
salience of certain moral domains over others. I also demonstrated that the PRM scale is 
moderately correlated with existing single-item measures of the political nature of media, yet it is 
more robust to validity checks than is a single-item measure. Although both the PRM scale and 
the single-item measure were correlated with political ideology and partisanship, with 
conservatives and Republicans reporting higher scores, the partisan score gap was smaller for the 
PRM scale than for the single-item measure. Overall, evidence indicates that the PRM scale is a 
superior measure of how people think of media texts as being politically relevant. 
My reason for creating the PRM scale goes beyond merely finding a better way to 
measure how politically relevant people think certain media texts are. The PRM scale is also 
useful for the generation of new theories. As I demonstrate in the next two chapters, identifying 
media as politically relevant is a function of media content and political identity strength, and 
such evaluations also influence politically motivated selective exposure to fictional entertainment 
media. This carries implications regarding related theories regarding media selection and 
narrative persuasion. Furthermore, as I demonstrate regarding the similarities and differences 
between the PRM scale and single-item “political” measures, the PRM scale may help build 
other theories related to individuals’ evaluations of media as politically relevant as opposed to 
“political.” I discuss the broader implications for the creation of the PRM scale in the Conclusion 
chapter. 
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The PRM scale is not without its flaws, however. Specifically, although I sought to create 
a scale that would perform uniformly across partisan and ideological lines, the PRM scale is still 
correlated with political ideology, and Republicans still reported higher scores than Democrats. 
Interpreting this finding is difficult. One explanation would be that conservatives and 
Republicans are more politically interested than liberals and Democrats, leading to higher PRM 
scores; however, t-tests and correlation tests between political interest and partisanship and 
ideology, respectively, do not bear this out. Another explanation could be that conservatives and 
Republicans are more primed to think about politics and political relevance in the media than are 
liberals and Democrats. The majority of Americans believe that Hollywood is a liberal-leaning 
institution (Piacenza, 2018); that perception alone could prompt Republicans and conservatives 
to think of media in general as politically relevant more so than their Democratic and liberal 
counterparts. In fact, attention to the subscales reveals that the partisan and ideological gap in 
PRM scores is driven solely by Republicans and conservatives reporting higher perception of 
persuasive intent than Democrats and liberals. PPI scores are correlated with conservatism, r = 
.20, p < .001, and Republicans report higher (M = 3.34, SD = 1.04) PPI scores than do Democrats 
(M = 2.89, SD = 0.99), t(860.99) = -6.46, p < .001. Using partisanship as a scale from strongly 
self-identified Democrats to strongly self-identified Republicans, there is also a correlation 
between partisanship and PPI score, r = .20, p < .001. There were no partisan or ideological 
effects for the collective concerns/decisions/consequences or for the controversy dimensions. 
These findings indicate that conservatives and Republicans think of media, at least television 
shows, as being created for the purpose of changing people’s minds more so than liberals and 
Democrats. 
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Although I attempted to design a scale that would work uniformly across political 
identities, perhaps there is no way of assessing perceptions of media’s political relevance that 
doesn’t somehow suffer from a partisan and ideological effect—especially since certain people 
are predisposed to think of media as being a tool of persuasion. More importantly, the above 
finding further demonstrates the power and necessity of the PRM scale and its multidimensional 
nature. A single item asking “how political do you think [media text] is?” simply cannot capture 
the complexity of the concept it’s trying to measure. Through careful construction of a 
multidimensional scale, we are able to see that differences in responses along fissures of political 
identity are due to one particular dimension (perception of persuasive intent) but not others. The 
ability of the dimensions to vary freely from one another should be noted for future study. If 
attributes of the viewer can affect some scale dimensions and not others, then certainly attributes 
of the media texts themselves may be able to do the same. In the next chapter, I conduct an 
experiment, following the same format as the previous two studies, in which I examine how 
viewer attributes, in the form of political identity strength, and television show attributes, in the 
form of genre and the objects depicted on the show, interact to influence how politically relevant 
people consider television shows to be. 
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Chapter 3: Testing the Evaluation Hypothesis 
The current study tests the evaluation hypothesis, examining the relationship between the 
types of objects depicted on the television shows, along with its interaction with respondents’ 
political identity strength, on evaluation of those media texts as politically relevant. This study 
aims to accomplish two theoretically important goals. First, it will demonstrate that people’s 
political identity strength affects how politically relevant they evaluate television shows to be. 
Such a finding would question the utility of typologies of political entertainment media relying 
on researchers’ definitions and instead confirm the need for a viewer-centric approach to 
determining which media individual viewers think of as politically relevant. Second, it will 
demonstrate that how strong an effect political identity strength has on PRM evaluations is itself 
a function of the objects depicted in media. In other words, the strength of a person’s political 
identities will exert a stronger or weaker effect on how that person evaluates a television 
program as politically relevant, depending on what objects are depicted in the show. Thus, not 
only must we consider how attributes of an individual viewer affect their evaluation of media as 
politically relevant, but we must also take into account how attributes of media content are 
involved in this process. The end state is confirmation of the relationship between media content, 
respondent political identity strength, and the evaluation of media texts as politically relevant. 
The ability of media content, interacted with political identity strength, to predict scores on the 
PRM scale also serves as evidence supporting the concurrent validity of the scale. Additionally, I 
use Study 3 to pre-test a measure of motivations for consuming various genres of television 
content and to explore the relationships between PRM and tolerance for ambiguity.
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Tolerance for ambiguity (TA) is a dimension of a broader psychological predisposition 
known as need for closure (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). Specifically, TA is the degree to which 
individuals are comfortable with uncertainty, novelty, and ambiguity. Ambiguity intolerant 
people prefer clearly delineated boundaries and definitions, as well as certainty regarding the 
meaning of events and the actions and intentions of others (Young, 2019). TA has been 
associated with support for transgender rights, with those less tolerant of ambiguity being less 
supportive of transgender rights (Jones, Brewer, Young, Lambe, & Hoffman, 2018), as well as 
with conservatism and artistic preferences (Young, 2019). These latter two associations are of 
particular interest, given our earlier finding that evaluations of television programs as politically 
relevant and “political” are also associated with conservatism. Thus, I will investigate if TA has 
an additional effect on these outcome variables once conservatism is controlled for. Additionally, 
TA may be important in the evaluation of television shows across genres. Ambiguity intolerant 
individuals are likely to experience discomfort with hybrid forms of media, such as political 
satire as compared to news (Young, 2019). If the prototypical “political” television show is a 
news program, how might an individual who is intolerant of ambiguity process an entertainment 
show in which they identify politically relevant objects? To assess this, I will also explore the 
interaction of TA and show genre on evaluations of television shows as politically relevant and 
as “political.” 
Specific hypotheses and research questions are as follows: 
RQ1: Do participants evaluate news programs as more politically relevant than 
entertainment programs?  
H1: Participants will evaluate shows depicting politicians/parties/polls as more politically 
relevant than shows depicting social issues. 
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H2: There will be greater consensus in the evaluation-as-politically-relevant of shows 
depicting politicians/parties/polls than there will be in the evaluation-as-politically-relevant of 
shows depicting social issues. 
H3: Respondents with stronger political identities will evaluate shows as more politically 
relevant than respondents with weaker political identities. 
H4: The effect of respondents’ political identity strength on evaluating a show as 
politically relevant will be stronger when the show depicts social issues than when the show 
depicts politicians/parties/polls. 
RQ2: Will the relationship between political identity strength and evaluation of shows as 
politically relevant be different for news shows than for entertainment shows? 
Study 3 Method 
As with the previous study, participants were presented with descriptions of television 
shows and were asked to provide their evaluations of the shows. 
Participants 
A convenience sample of U.S. adults was recruited via Qualtrics to participate in an 
online study from March 24-28, 2020, with quotas for partisanship set to evenly split the sample 
between Democrats, Republicans, and Independents/Others. Five participants were eliminated 
because of a technical issue, bringing the final sample size to N = 667. Additional quotas were 
set to ensure the sample was reflective of the U.S. population along gender, age, and income 
lines. About half (n = 330) of the sample identified as men, 336 identified as women, and one 
participant reported their gender as “human.” The mean age was 45.88 (SD = 16.86). Most 
(74.66%) of the sample reported their race as White, non-Hispanic; 7.50% as Black, non-
Hispanic; 8.40% as Hispanic/Latino; 6.00% as Asian; and 3.45% as multiracial or some other 
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race. The sample comprised a mix of self-identified Democrats (n = 222), Republicans (n = 223), 
and Independents or members of some other political party (n = 222). The mean reporting for 
political conservatism on a 1-to-7 scale was 4.11 (SD = 1.72). 
Stimuli 
Participants were presented with the same textual descriptions of real television shows 
used in studies 1 and 2. 
Procedure 
Participants were told they were participating in a study on television preferences and 
given instructions that they would be asked to evaluate four television shows. Participants first 
answered questions regarding political interest, political identity strength, and demographics. 
Then participants completed a short tolerance for ambiguity questionnaire and questions 
regarding motivations for watching various television genres. Besides acting as a pre-test of 
these measures for Study 4, these items served as a distractor task to prevent the measurement of 
pre-exposure variables, in particular issue public membership, from priming individuals 
regarding the show descriptions or the study purpose. Next, each show description was randomly 
presented, followed by the PRM scale and the prior exposure and familiarity items. 
Measures 
The validated PRM scale was used, along with political identity, political interest, and 
show familiarity and exposure measures carried over from Study 2. See Table 3.1 for descriptive 
statistics. 
 Tolerance for ambiguity (TA). I first pre-tested TA in the PRM scale pre-test (see 
Appendix B) and in another round of data collection by administering all nine items from the TA 
subscale of the need for closure scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). Across both samples, the  
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Table 3.1. Zero-order correlations and descriptive statistics for Study 3 variables. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. PRM Scale -         
2. Tolerance for Ambiguity .18*** -        
3. Partisanship (Republican) .04* .07*** -       
4. Ideology (Conservatism) .06** .07*** .67*** -      
5. Partisan Strength .15*** .04* -.01 .06** -     
6. Ideological Strength .19*** .06** .06** .06** .51*** -    
7. Issue Public Membership .31*** .14*** -.13*** -.16*** .15*** .17*** -   
8. Political Interest .16*** .05* -.08*** -.08*** .20*** .25*** .30*** -  
9. Single-Item “Political” .56*** .10*** .14*** .16*** .09*** .16*** .13*** .09*** - 
M 3.15 3.73 0.5 0.52 1.98 1.3 1.64 3.71 3.09 
SD 0.81 0.79 0.38 0.29 1.09 1.13 0.86 1.11 1.22 
Skew -0.17*** -0.65*** -0.01 -0.05 -0.59*** 0.19*** -0.21** -0.52*** -0.08 
Skew SE 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 
α .91 .73 - - - - .86 - - 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. For partisanship, 0 = Strong Democrat, and 1 = Strong Republican. For ideology, 0 = 
extremely liberal, and 1 = extremely conservative. 
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highest internal consistency (α = .82-.83) was found for a three-item measure comprising the 
following: “I don’t like when situations are uncertain,” “I dislike it when a person’s statement 
could mean many different things,” and “I feel uncomfortable when someone’s meaning or 
intention is unclear to me.” Thus, I measure TA in this study using these three items measured 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), with higher scores reflecting greater intolerance 
for ambiguity. Three- or four-item measures for TA have been used in previous research (e.g., 
Jones et al., 2018; Young, 2019; Young, Bagozzi, Goldring, Poulsen, & Drouin, 2019). 
Motivations for television use. Participants were first asked if they watched each of the 
following genres of television shows: news shows, fictional sitcoms, fictional dramas, sports 
(including commentary and reporting), and reality TV shows. If they responded affirmatively, 
after each genre participants were further asked how important on a 1 (not at all important) to 5 
(extremely important) scale the following reasons for watching that particular genre were: “to 
learn or stay informed,” “for escape, entertainment, or relaxation,” “so I can talk about it with 
others,” and “because it shares my values.” 
Analysis Plan 
Because respondents will evaluate four shows, I employ linear mixed models using 
random effects to account for multiple observations for each respondent (with the exception of 
H2, which uses an F-test). Show order, conservatism, and political interest will be used as 
additional control variables. When the presence/absence of politicians is used as a variable, I use 
a recoded version of the object variable, such that shows depicting politicians/parties/polls (n = 
1,334) are in the affirmative category and shows depicting healthcare and marijuana (n = 667 
each, for a total n of 1,334) are in the negative category. As in Study 2, I continue to report 
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predictions for the single-item “political” measure as a comparison to the PRM scale to detect 
when and in which ways the two measures differ. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Familiarity. I used the prior exposure and familiarity items to determine if participants’ 
previous experiences and knowledge of the programs affected the outcome variables. 
Participants who reported having watched the programs reported being much more familiar (M = 
3.27, SD = 1.11) with the shows than people who reported not having watched the programs (M 
= 1.62, SD = 0.98), t(2647.5) = 40.70, p < .001. Show watchers evaluated the shows as more 
politically relevant (M = 3.36, SD = 0.74) and “political” (M = 3.19, SD = 1.24) than non-
watchers (M = 2.89, SD = 0.81,  and M = 2.97, SD = 1.17, respectively), t(2461.2) = 15.31, p < 
.001, and t(2604.5) = 4.73, p < .001, respectively. Self-reported familiarity with the programs is 
moderately correlated (r = .42, p < .001) with PRM scores and weakly yet statistically 
significantly correlated (r = .15, p < .001) with “political” scores. At this point, one might 
consider including familiarity as a control variable in further analyses; however, the fact that 
familiarity was measured post-treatment presents some analytical challenges (Montgomery, 
Nyhan, & Torres, 2018). Nevertheless, I conducted all analyses with and without familiarity 
included as a covariate. The inclusion of familiarity as a control variable doesn’t substantively 
change the interpretation of most of the analyses below nor the conclusions I would draw from 
the current study. Therefore, I do not include familiarity as a control in the analyses I report 
below, but I do note where and how analyses differ if familiarity is included as a control. 
Tolerance for ambiguity. As found in previous literature (e.g., Young, 2019; Young et 
al., 2019), TA is correlated with political ideology, in that conservatives are less tolerant of 
 80 
ambiguity than are liberals; see Table 3.1. TA is also correlated with PRM, in that individuals 
who are less tolerant of ambiguity evaluate television programs as more politically relevant than 
do individuals who are more tolerant of ambiguity. I ran linear mixed models to predict PRM 
and its subscale (collective choices/decisions/consequences, or CDC; perception of persuasive 
intent, or PPI; and controversy, or CON) scores, along with scores for the single-item “political” 
measure, based on TA, controlling for conservatism, political interest, genre, object, and show 
order. I find a statistically significant relationship between TA and the PRM scale, its subscales, 
and the single-item “political” measure, accounting for conservatism and the other control 
variables; see Table 3.2. 
It’s also conceivable that TA would have a different effect on the outcome variables 
depending on the genre (Young, 2019). Table 3.3 displays the previous models with an 
additional interaction term for TA x genre. This interaction term is statistically significant for 
predictions of CON, in that the effect of TA on CON scores is weaker for entertainment shows 
than for news shows; see Figure 3.1. I also further probed the interactions for all models by 
plotting them to determine if there was a statistically significant difference in outcome scores 
between news and entertainment shows at some level of TA but not for other levels (Brambor, 
Clark, & Golder, 2006), as indicated by overlapping confidence intervals. Although the 
confidence intervals for TA predictions for news and entertainment programs did overlap for 
some models, they only did so at the very lowest levels of TA (typically scores less than 1.50 on 
a 1-to-5 scale). Considering the very small number of participants with TA scores that low (a 
dozen at best), it’s safe to say that notwithstanding the previously mentioned interaction for the 
CON subscale, the effect of TA on the outcome variables was generally not conditional on genre. 
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Table 3.2. Linear mixed models predicting PRM, its subscales, and “Political” based on TA. 
 PRM CDC PPI CON “Political” 
Fixed Effects b (SE)      
Genre: Entertainment -0.42*** (.02) -0.52*** (.02) -0.24*** (.03) -0.54*** (.02) -0.53*** (.04) 
Object: Healthcare 0.13*** (.03) 0.27*** (.03) 0.10** (.03) -0.02 (.03) -0.51*** (.04) 
Object: Marijuana 0.04 (.03) 0.01 (.03) 0.08* (.03) 0.02 (.03) -0.45*** (.04) 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 0.17*** (.03) 0.16*** (.03) 0.17*** (.04) 0.19*** (.03) 0.13** (.04) 
Conservatism 0.18* (.08) -0.14 (.09) 0.57*** (.10) 0.08 (.08) 0.71*** (.11) 
Political Interest 0.11*** (.02) 0.14*** (.02) 0.09*** (.03) 0.12*** (.02) 0.10*** (.03) 
Order -0.01 (.01) 0.004 (.01) -0.02 (.01) -0.02 (.01) -0.02 (.02) 
Constant 2.17*** (.14) 2.18*** (.15) 2.03*** (.17) 2.37*** (.14) 2.43*** (.19) 
      
Random Effects var (SD)      
Respondent 0.28 (0.53) 0.32 (0.57) 0.41 (0.64) 0.25 (0.5) 0.39 (0.62) 
Residual 0.29 (0.54) 0.37 (0.61) 0.52 (0.72) 0.40 (0.63) 0.90 (0.95) 
Log likelihood -2668.28 -2987.32 -3406.87 -3004.1 -3994.44 
AIC 5356.56 5994.64 6833.75 6028.19 8008.88 
BIC 5415.45 6053.53 6892.64 6087.09 8067.77 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Nrespondents = 667 and Nobservations = 2,668 for all models. The reference group for genre is news, 
and the reference group for object is politicians/parties/polls. 
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Table 3.3. Linear mixed models predicting PRM, its subscales, and “Political” based on the TA x genre interaction. 
 PRM CDC PPI CON “Political” 
Fixed Effects b (SE)      
Genre: Entertainment -0.32** (.10) -0.39*** (.11) -0.31* (.13) -0.24* (.12) -0.39* (.18) 
Object: Healthcare 0.13*** (.03) 0.27*** (.03) 0.10** (.03) -0.02 (.03) -0.51*** (.04) 
Object: Marijuana 0.04 (.03) 0.01 (.03) 0.08* (.03) 0.02 (.03) -0.45*** (.05) 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 0.19*** (.03) 0.18*** (.03) 0.16*** (.04) 0.23*** (.03) 0.14** (.04) 
TA x Entertainment -0.03 (.03) -0.03 (.03) 0.02 (.04) -0.08** (.03) -0.04 (.05) 
Conservatism 0.18* (.08) -0.14 (.09) 0.57*** (.10) 0.08 (.08) 0.71*** (.11) 
Political Interest 0.11*** (.02) 0.14*** (.02) 0.09*** (.03) 0.12*** (.02) 0.10*** (.03) 
Order -0.01 (.01) 0.003 (.01) -0.02 (.01) -0.02 (.01) -0.02 (.02) 
Constant 2.12*** (.15) 2.11*** (.16) 2.06*** (.19) 2.22*** (.15) 2.36*** (.21) 
      
Random Effects var (SD)      
Respondent 0.28 (0.53) 0.32 (0.57) 0.41 (0.64) 0.25 (0.5) 0.39 (0.62) 
Residual 0.29 (0.54) 0.37 (0.61) 0.52 (0.72) 0.40 (0.63) 0.90 (0.95) 
Log likelihood -2670.45 -2989.23 -3409.14 -3003.2 -3996.26 
AIC 5362.9 6000.45 6840.27 6028.41 8014.52 
BIC 5427.68 6065.23 6905.05 6093.19 8079.3 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Nrespondents = 667 and Nobservations = 2,668 for all models. The reference group for genre is news, 
and the reference group for object is politicians/parties/polls. 
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Figure 3.1. Interaction of tolerance for ambiguity and genre on controversy scores. 
Because of the effect that TA exhibits on PRM and the other outcome variables 
independent of controls, I include TA as an additional control variable in all analyses going 
forward. 
Main Analyses 
RQ1. My first research question asked whether participants would evaluate news 
programs as more politically relevant than entertainment programs. Table 3.2 displays models 
predicting PRM and the single-item “political” measure predicted by genre (first and last 
columns), and Table 3.4 displays models predicting PRM and the single-item “political” measure 
predicted by the presence of politicians/parties/polls. Regardless of the model, genre has a 
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statistically significant effect on PRM and “political” scores, with entertainment shows being 
evaluated as less politically relevant and less “political,” respectively, than news shows. 
Table 3.4. Linear mixed models predicting PRM and “Political” based on presence of 
politicians. 
 PRM “Political” 
Fixed Effects b (SE)   
Genre: Entertainment -0.42*** (.02) -0.53*** (.04) 
Politicians: Yes -0.08*** (.02) 0.48*** (.04) 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 0.17*** (.03) 0.13** (.04) 
Conservatism 0.18* (.08) 0.71*** (.11) 
Political Interest 0.11*** (.02) 0.10*** (.03) 
Order -0.01 (.01) -0.02 (.02) 
Constant 2.25*** (.14) 1.95*** (.19) 
   
Random Effects var (SD)   
Respondent 0.28 (0.53) 0.39 (0.62) 
Residual 0.29 (0.54) 0.90 (0.95) 
Log likelihood -2,670.36 -3,993.19 
AIC 5,358.72 8,004.39 
BIC 5,411.72 8,057.39 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Nrespondents = 667 and Nobservations = 2,668 for all models. 
The reference group for genre is news, and the reference group for object is 
politicians/parties/polls. 
 
H1. My first hypothesis posits that participants will evaluate shows depicting 
politicians/parties/polls as more politically relevant than shows depicting social issues. Although 
shows depicting politicians were evaluated as more “political” than shows depicting social 
issues, such shows were evaluated as less politically relevant than the shows depicting social 
issues; see Table 3.4.2 H1 was unsupported. 
H2. My second hypothesis predicts that there will be less variance in the PRM scores for 
shows depicting politicians/parties/polls than there will be for shows depicting social issues. A 
one-tailed F-test comparing the variances of PRM scores for shows depicting social issues (0.59) 
 
2 When familiarity is included as a control, there is no difference in PRM scores for shows depicting social issues 
and shows depicting politicians. 
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to the variance of PRM scores for shows depicting politicians (0.71) indicated that the variance 
of the former is not greater than the variance of the latter, F(1333) = 0.84, p = .99. Rather, the 
variance of the latter was greater than the former, p = .001. H2 was unsupported. A similar 
analysis conducted on the single-item “political” scores showed the opposite: The variance of 
“political” scores for shows depicting social issues (1.51) was greater than the variance of 
“political” scores for shows depicting politicians (1.33); F(1333) = 1.14, p = .009. Thus, the 
pattern hypothesized by H2 is found for the single-item “political” measure, whereas the opposite 
pattern was found for PRM. 
Two things are clear based on the analyses conducted to this point. First, PRM and the 
single-item “political” measure, although moderately correlated (see Table 3.1), are measuring 
something different. This is an expected—and welcoming—development that I will return to at 
the end of this chapter and in the conclusion chapter. Second, although shows depicting the cost 
of healthcare and marijuana as a public safety issue are both evaluated as less “political” than 
shows depicting politicians, it’s shows depicting the cost of healthcare that stand out as more 
politically relevant than the other shows; see tables 3.2 and 3.5. This could be because the cost of 
healthcare is a much more politically salient social issue than marijuana as a public safety issue, 
even if politicians/parties/polls or associated policies are not mentioned. Even though the cost of 
healthcare hasn’t played a major part in the discourse surrounding the ongoing coronavirus 
pandemic, these current events (including the loss of health insurance due to job loss) may be 
doing even more to highlight the cost of healthcare as a social issue. Whether because of 
situational factors driven by current events or because of varying levels of political salience, 
perhaps the distinction between “social issues” and “politicians/parties/polls” is meaningful 
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when it comes to evaluations of what is “political” but is too vague a distinction when it comes 
to political relevance. This could have consequences for H3. 
Table 3.5. Linear mixed models predicting PRM and “Political” based on whether marijuana or 
politicians are depicted. 
 PRM “Political” 
Fixed Effects b (SE)   
Genre: Entertainment -0.42*** (.02) -0.53*** (.04) 
Object: Marijuana -0.09** (.03) 0.07 (.05) 
Object: Politicians -0.13*** (.03) 0.51*** (.04) 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 0.17*** (.03) 0.13** (.04) 
Conservatism 0.18* (.08) 0.71*** (.11) 
Political Interest 0.11*** (.02) 0.10*** (.03) 
Order -0.01 (.01) -0.02 (.02) 
Constant 2.30*** (.14) 1.91*** (.19) 
   
Random Effects var (SD)   
Respondent 0.28 (0.53) 0.39 (0.62) 
Residual 0.29 (0.54) 0.90 (0.95) 
Log likelihood -2668.28 -3994.44 
AIC 5356.56 8008.88 
BIC 5415.45 8067.77 
Note: **p < .01, ***p < .001. Nrespondents = 667 and Nobservations = 2,668 for all models. The 
reference group for genre is news, and the reference group for object is healthcare. 
 
Therefore, when I proceed to my fourth hypothesis examining the interaction of the 
objects depicted and participants’ political identity strength, I will examine all objects 
(healthcare vs. marijuana vs. politicians/parties/polls) separately in addition to collapsing across 
social issues (healthcare/marijuana vs. politicians/parties/polls). Likewise, because of the drastic 
effect of genre (news vs. entertainment) on PRM and single-item “political” scores, I examine 
the objects x political identity strength interaction for news and entertainment shows 
separately—essentially a three-way interaction between objects x political identity strength x 
genre. For analyses involving all objects, I present tables displaying two sets of models: one set 
with politicians/parties/polls as the reference category for objects, and one set with healthcare as 
the reference category for objects. I do this to convey whether there are statistically significant 
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differences between any pair of the three objects. Before I explore this interaction between the 
objects depicted and participants’ political identity strength, I first assess the independent effect 
of political identity strength on PRM evaluations. 
H3. My third hypothesis predicts that participants with stronger political identities will 
evaluate shows as more politically relevant than participants with weaker political identities. 
When issue public membership is the political identity, the objects are limited to healthcare and 
marijuana, since issue public membership is irrelevant for shows depicting politicians. Table 3.6 
displays models predicting the outcome variables based on the three measures of political 
identity strength. In all models, political identity strength has a statistically significant positive 
effect on both PRM scores and the single-item “political” measure. H3 is confirmed. 
H4. My fourth hypothesis predicts that the effect of respondents’ political identity 
strength on evaluating a show as politically relevant will be stronger when the show depicts 
social issues than when the show depicts politicians/parties/polls. As stated above, I examine this 
two-way interaction among news and entertainment shows separately. Because issue public 
membership is irrelevant in the politicians/parties/polls object condition, I only use partisanship 
and ideological strength as measures of political identity strength. I report these results using 
ideological strength and partisanship strength as separate measures of political identity strength. I 
find no statistically significant interactions of whether politicians are depicted and either 
ideological strength (Table 3.7) or partisan strength (Table 3.8) for either news or entertainment 
programs.  
Further probing revealed an interaction between partisan strength and the presence of 
politicians on evaluations of entertainment shows as “political”; see Figure 3.2.3 A simple slopes  
  
 
3 This interaction doesn’t occur when familiarity is included as a control. 
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Table 3.6. Linear mixed models predicting PRM and “Political” based on political identity strength. 
 Ideological Strength Partisan Strength Issue Public Membership 
 PRM “Political” PRM “Political” PRM “Political” 
Fixed Effects b (SE)       
Ideological Strength 0.10*** (.02) 0.14*** (.03)     
Partisan Strength   0.08*** (.02) 0.07* (.03)   
Issue Public Membership     0.21*** (.02) 0.19*** (.04) 
Genre: Entertainment -0.42*** (.02) -0.53*** (.04) -0.42*** (.02) -0.53*** (.04) -0.29*** (.03) -0.83*** (.05) 
Object: Healthcare 0.13*** (.03) -0.51*** (.04) 0.13*** (.03) -0.51*** (.04)   
Object: Marijuana 0.04 (.03) -0.45*** (.04) 0.04 (.03) -0.45*** (.04)   
Object: Marijuana     0.17*** (.03) 0.12** (.04) 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 0.17*** (.03) 0.12** (.04) 0.17*** (.03) 0.12** (.04) 0.16*** (.03) 0.11** (.04) 
Conservatism 0.15 (.08) 0.66*** (.11) 0.16* (.08) 0.69*** (.11) 0.24** (.08) 0.74*** (.12) 
Political Interest 0.09*** (.02) 0.07* (.03) 0.10*** (.02) 0.09** (.03) 0.06** (.02) 0.05 (.03) 
Order -0.01 (.01) -0.02 (.02) -0.01 (.01) -0.02 (.02) -0.02 (.01) -0.02 (.03) 
Constant 2.18*** (.14) 2.43*** (.19) 2.10*** (.14) 2.36*** (.19) 2.09*** (.14) 1.95*** (.22) 
       
Random Effects var (SD)       
Respondent 0.27 (0.52) 0.37 (0.61) 0.27 (0.52) 0.39 (0.62) 0.20 (0.45) 0.28 (0.53) 
Residual 0.29 (0.54) 0.90 (0.95) 0.29 (0.54) 0.90 (0.95) 0.29 (0.54) 0.97 (0.98) 
Nobservations 2,668 2,668 2,668 2,668 1,334 1,334 
Log likelihood -2659.48 -3984.88 -2664.34 -3994.33 -1375.6 -2039.96 
AIC 5340.96 7991.76 5350.69 8010.67 2771.2 4099.92 
BIC 5405.74 8056.54 5415.47 8075.45 2823.16 4151.87 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Nrespondents = 667 for all models. The reference group for genre is news. The reference group for 
object is politicians/parties/polls for ideological and partisan strength models and healthcare for issue public membership models. 
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Table 3.7. Linear mixed models predicting PRM and “Political” based on ideological strength 
and the depiction of politicians. 
 PRM “Political” 
 News Entertainment News Entertainment 
Fixed Effects b (SE)     
Politicians: Yes 0.00 (.03) -0.26*** (.05) 0.16** (.06) 0.78*** (.08) 
Ideological Strength 0.08*** (.02) 0.09** (.03) 0.17*** (.04) 0.10** (.04) 
Ideo. Str. x Politicians 0.03 (.02) 0.03 (.03) 0.00 (.04) 0.00 (.05) 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 0.18*** (.03) 0.16*** (.03) 0.13** (.05) 0.10* (.04) 
Conservatism 0.30*** (.08) 0.02 (.09) 0.95*** (.14) 0.40*** (.12) 
Political Interest 0.09*** (.02) 0.09*** (.03) 0.01 (.04) 0.13*** (.03) 
Order 0.04** (.01) -0.07*** (.02) 0.04 (.02) -0.08** (.02) 
Constant 2.00*** (.14) 2.20*** (.17) 1.94*** (.24) 1.43*** (.21) 
     
Random Effects var (SD)     
Respondent 0.28 (0.53) 0.32 (0.56) 0.72 (0.85) 0.28 (0.53) 
Residual 0.17 (0.41) 0.33 (0.58) 0.56 (0.75) 0.90 (0.95) 
Log likelihood -1204.57 -1529.85 -1942.64 -1998.62 
AIC 2429.14 3079.71 3905.29 4017.25 
BIC 2481.1 3131.67 3957.25 4069.21 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Nrespondents = 667 and Nobservations = 1,334 for all models. 
 
Table 3.8. Linear mixed models predicting PRM and “Political” based on partisan strength and 
the depiction of politicians. 
 PRM “Political” 
 News Entertainment News Entertainment 
Fixed Effects b (SE)     
Politicians: Yes 0.00 (.05) -0.25*** (.07) 0.08 (.08) 0.93*** (.11) 
Partisan Strength 0.03 (.02) 0.10*** (.03) 0.04 (.04) 0.11** (.04) 
Part. Str. x Politicians 0.02 (.02) 0.02 (.03) 0.04 (.04) -0.07 (.05) 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 0.18*** (.03) 0.16*** (.03) 0.14** (.05) 0.10* (.04) 
Conservatism 0.31*** (.08) 0.02 (.09) 0.98*** (.14) 0.41*** (.12) 
Political Interest 0.10*** (.02) 0.09*** (.02) 0.04 (.04) 0.14*** (.03) 
Order 0.04** (.01) -0.07*** (.02) 0.04 (.02) -0.08** (.02) 
Constant 1.96*** (.15) 2.09*** (.17) 1.92*** (.25) 1.29*** (.22) 
     
Random Effects var (SD)     
Respondent 0.29 (0.54) 0.31 (0.56) 0.75 (0.87) 0.29 (0.54) 
Residual 0.17 (0.41) 0.33 (0.58) 0.55 (0.74) 0.90 (0.95) 
Log likelihood -1213.02 -1529.52 -1951.8 -2000.43 
AIC 2446.05 3079.05 3923.61 4020.85 
BIC 2498 3131.01 3975.57 4072.81 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Nrespondents = 667 and Nobservations = 1,334 for all models. 
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Figure 3.2. Interaction of partisan strength and the presence of politicians/parties/polls on 
“political” scores. 
 
analysis showed that the effect of partisan strength on “political” evaluations for entertainment 
shows depicting politicians was nonsignificant, b = 0.03, SE = .04, p = .203; however, the effect 
of partisan strength on “political” evaluations for entertainment shows depicting social issues 
was statistically significant, b = 0.11, SE = .04, p = .004. This moderation effect is convergent-
positive and contingent (Holbert & Park, 2019): 1) shows depicting politicians/parties/polls are 
evaluated as more “political” than shows depicting social issues, 2) there is no effect of partisan 
strength for shows depicting politicians/parties/polls, but 3) there is a positive effect of partisan 
strength for shows depicting social issues. H4 was unsupported; however, the hypothesized 
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interaction occurred for “political” evaluations rather than PRM, and for partisan strength but not 
for other measures of political identity strength. What is evident, though, is that the presence of 
politicians on entertainment shows has a strong, positive effect on whether those shows are 
evaluated as “political”; however, the presence of politicians has a weaker, negative effect on 
evaluations of entertainment shows as politically relevant. 
Now I turn to the same analysis, using the objects depicted (healthcare vs. marijuana vs. 
politicians/parties/polls) rather than the presence/absence of politicians (social issues vs. 
politicians/parties/polls). For ideological strength as the measure of political identity strength 
(tables 3.9 and 3.10 and Figure 3.3), I find statistically significant interactions with marijuana, 
for news shows: The effect of ideological strength on PRM scores is weaker for news shows 
depicting marijuana than it is for news shows depicting politicians and for news shows depicting  
Table 3.9. Linear mixed models predicting PRM and “Political” based on ideological strength. 
 PRM “Political” 
 News Entertainment News Entertainment 
Fixed Effects b (SE)     
Object: Healthcare 0.05 (.05) 0.34*** (.06) -0.15 (.09) -0.91*** (.10) 
Object: Marijuana -0.06 (.04) 0.17* (.07) -0.17* (.08) -0.64*** (.10) 
Ideological Strength 0.11*** (.02) 0.12*** (.03) 0.17*** (.04) 0.10** (.04) 
Ideo. Str. x Healthcare 0.01 (.03) -0.06 (.04) 0.04 (.05) 0.05 (.06) 
Ideo. Str. x Marijuana -0.06* (.03) 0.00 (.04) -0.04 (.05) -0.06 (.06) 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 0.18*** (.03) 0.16*** (.03) 0.13** (.05) 0.10* (.04) 
Conservatism 0.29*** (.08) 0.02 (.09) 0.95*** (.14) 0.40*** (.12) 
Political Interest 0.09*** (.02) 0.09*** (.03) 0.01 (.04) 0.13*** (.03) 
Order 0.03** (.01) -0.08*** (.02) 0.04 (.02) -0.08** (.02) 
Constant 2.00*** (.14) 1.95*** (.17) 2.11*** (.24) 2.20*** (.21) 
     
Random Effects var (SD)     
Respondent 0.29 (0.54) 0.32 (0.56) 0.73 (0.86) 0.28 (0.53) 
Residual 0.16 (0.40) 0.33 (0.58) 0.55 (0.74) 0.90 (0.95) 
Log likelihood -1,193.22 -1,531.74 -1,943.97 -1,999.52 
AIC 2,410.44 3,087.47 3,911.94 4,023.04 
BIC 2,472.79 3,149.83 3,974.29 4,085.39 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Nrespondents = 667 and Nobservations = 1,334 for all models. 
The reference group for object is politicians/parties/polls. 
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Table 3.10. Linear mixed models predicting PRM and “Political” based on ideological strength. 
 PRM “Political” 
 News Entertainment News Entertainment 
Fixed Effects b (SE)     
Object: Marijuana -0.11 (.06) -0.17* (.08) -0.03 (.11) 0.27* (.13) 
Object: Politicians -0.05 (.05) -0.34*** (.06) 0.15 (.09) 0.91*** (.10) 
Ideological Strength 0.13*** (.03) 0.06 (.04) 0.21*** (.05) 0.15** (.05) 
Ideo. Str. x Marijuana -0.08* (.04) 0.07 (.05) -0.08 (.06) -0.11 (.07) 
Ideo. Str. x Politicians -0.01 (.03) 0.06 (.04) -0.04 (.05) -0.05 (.06) 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 0.18*** (.03) 0.16*** (.03) 0.13** (.05) 0.10* (.04) 
Conservatism 0.29*** (.08) 0.02 (.09) 0.95*** (.14) 0.40*** (.12) 
Political Interest 0.09*** (.02) 0.09*** (.03) 0.01 (.04) 0.13*** (.03) 
Order 0.03** (.01) -0.08*** (.02) 0.04 (.02) -0.08** (.02) 
Constant 2.06*** (.15) 2.29*** (.17) 1.96*** (.25) 1.29*** (.22) 
     
Random Effects var (SD)     
Respondent 0.29 (0.54) 0.32 (0.56) 0.73 (0.86) 0.28 (0.53) 
Residual 0.16 (0.40) 0.33 (0.58) 0.55 (0.74) 0.90 (0.95) 
Log likelihood -1,193.22 -1,531.74 -1,943.97 -1,999.52 
AIC 2,410.44 3,087.47 3,911.94 4,023.04 
BIC 2,472.79 3,149.83 3,974.29 4,085.39 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Nrespondents = 667 and Nobservations = 1,334 for all models. 
The reference group for object is healthcare. 
 
healthcare. No significant interactions were found for the single-item “political” measure. For 
partisan strength as the measure of political identity strength (Figure 3.4 and tables 3.11 and 
3.12), no significant interactions were found for PRM scores; however, two were found for the 
single-item “political” measure. First, the effect of partisan strength on “political” scores is 
weaker for news shows depicting marijuana than for news shows depicting politicians. Second, 
the effect of partisan strength on “political” scores is stronger for entertainment shows depicting 
healthcare than for entertainment shows depicting politicians. 
Interpreting such interactions is difficult, considering that the moderator is a nominal 
variable—that is, it’s hard to understand what it means that one interaction term or another is 
statistically significant or not. To gain some understanding of when political identity strength has 
an effect on the outcome variables depending on the objects depicted, I further probed all  
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Figure 3.3. Interaction of objects, ideological strength, and genre. 
 
interactions by examining their interaction plots; see Figure 3.3 for plots for ideological strength 
and Figure 3.4 for plots for partisan strength. At a glance, it’s evident that the effect of the 
political identity strength measures is not uniform across the objects depicted, indicating that 
PRM and “political” evaluations are a function of both media content and political identity 
strength. Still, some patterns emerge. For example, although ideological strength has an effect on 
both PRM and “political” scores for news shows across almost all objects (see Figure 3.3, panels 
A and C), partisan strength has little effect on either outcome variable for news shows regardless 
of the object depicted (see Figure 3.4, panels A and C).  
The patterns for both ideological and partisan strength are similar for entertainment 
shows as well. For both measures of political identity strength, evaluation of entertainment  
(A)
(C)
(B)
(D)
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Figure 3.4. Interaction of objects, partisan strength, and genre. 
 
shows as “political” seems mostly driven by the presence/absence of politicians. Programs 
depicting politicians/parties/polls were evaluated as more “political” than shows depicting 
healthcare or marijuana, regardless of participants’ political identity strength. On the other hand, 
PRM scores for entertainment programs seem to be much more influenced by both measures of 
political identity strength in addition to the objects depicted, with no object standing out as more 
politically relevant than other objects across the range of political identity strength. This is 
another indicator that when it comes to entertainment programs, political identity strength is 
more related to evaluations of a show as politically relevant, whereas the presence/absence of 
politicians is more related to evaluations of a show as “political.” In sum, PRM and the single-
(A)
(C)
(B)
(D)
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item “political” measure are telling us something different, and the former is more related to the 
political identities of viewers, while the latter is more related to what objects appear on screen. 
Table 3.11. Linear mixed models predicting PRM and “Political” based on partisan strength. 
 PRM “Political” 
 News Entertainment News Entertainment 
Fixed Effects b (SE)     
Object: Healthcare 0.10 (.06) 0.31*** (.08) -0.15 (.12) -1.10*** (.13) 
Object: Marijuana -0.08 (.06) 0.17 (.09) -0.02 (.11) -0.72*** (.14) 
Partisan Strength 0.06* (.02) 0.12*** (.03) 0.08* (.04) 0.03 (.04) 
Part. Str. x Healthcare -0.02 (.03) -0.02 (.04) 0.02 (.05) 0.13* (.06) 
Part. Str. x Marijuana -0.03 (.03) 0.00 (.04) -0.10* (.05) 0.00 (.06) 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 0.18*** (.03) 0.16*** (.03) 0.14** (.05) 0.11* (.04) 
Conservatism 0.31*** (.08) 0.02 (.09) 0.98*** (.14) 0.41*** (.12) 
Political Interest 0.10*** (.02) 0.09*** (.02) 0.04 (.04) 0.14*** (.03) 
Order 0.04** (.01) -0.07*** (.02) 0.04 (.02) -0.08** (.02) 
Constant 1.95*** (.15) 1.84*** (.17) 2.00*** (.25) 2.22*** (.22) 
     
Random Effects var (SD)     
Respondent 0.30 (0.55) 0.31 (0.56) 0.76 (0.87) 0.29 (0.54) 
Residual 0.16 (0.40) 0.33 (0.58) 0.55 (0.74) 0.90 (0.95) 
Log likelihood -1203.96 -1532.05 -1952.02 -2001.17 
AIC 2431.91 3088.10 3928.04 4026.34 
BIC 2494.26 3150.45 3990.39 4088.69 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Nrespondents = 667 and Nobservations = 1,334 for all models. 
The reference group for object is politicians/parties/polls. 
 
RQ2. My second research question asks if the effect of political identity strength on PRM 
scores will be different between news and entertainment programming. Table 3.13 displays 
models to which the interaction between political identity strength and genre were added. Only 
one interaction term was statistically significant: The effect of partisan strength on PRM scores is 
stronger for entertainment shows than for news shows.4 Specifically, although partisan strength 
has a significant effect on PRM for news shows (b = 0.05, SE = .02, p = .017), its effect on PRM 
for entertainment shows is stronger (b = 0.11, SE = .02, p < .001); see Figure 3.5. Further  
 
 
4 When familiarity is included as a control, there is no statistically significant effect of partisan strength on PRM for 
news shows. 
 96 
Table 3.12. Linear mixed models predicting PRM and “Political” based on partisan strength. 
 PRM “Political” 
 News Entertainment News Entertainment 
Fixed Effects b (SE)     
Object: Marijuana -0.18* (.08) -0.14 (.11) 0.13 (.15) 0.37* (.17) 
Object: Politicians -0.10 (.06) -0.31*** (.08) 0.15 (.12) 1.10*** (.13) 
Partisan Strength 0.04 (.03) 0.10* (.04) 0.11* (.05) 0.16** (.05) 
Part. Str. x Marijuana -0.02 (.04) 0.02 (.05) -0.13 (.07) -0.13 (.08) 
Part. Str. x Politicians 0.02 (.03) 0.02 (.04) -0.02 (.05) -0.13* (.06) 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 0.18*** (.03) 0.16*** (.03) 0.14** (.05) 0.11* (.04) 
Conservatism 0.31*** (.08) 0.02 (.09) 0.98*** (.14) 0.41*** (.12) 
Political Interest 0.10*** (.02) 0.09*** (.02) 0.04 (.04) 0.14*** (.03) 
Order 0.04** (.01) -0.07*** (.02) 0.04 (.02) -0.08** (.02) 
Constant 2.05*** (.15) 2.15*** (.18) 1.86*** (.26) 1.12*** (.23) 
     
Random Effects var (SD)     
Respondent 0.30 (0.55) 0.31 (0.56) 0.76 (0.87) 0.29 (0.54) 
Residual 0.16 (0.40) 0.33 (0.58) 0.55 (0.74) 0.90 (0.95) 
Log likelihood -1203.96 -1532.05 -1952.02 -2001.17 
AIC 2431.91 3088.10 3928.04 4026.34 
BIC 2494.26 3150.45 3990.39 4088.69 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Nrespondents = 667 and Nobservations = 1,334 for all models. 
The reference group for object is healthcare. 
 
probing of all interactions by plotting them and conducting simple slopes analysis to see if there 
is some effect of political identity strength for one genre but not the other did not reveal any 
additional interactions.  
Still, there are fascinating findings regarding the effect of ideological strength and issue 
public membership across genres. Although I find that participants in general evaluate news 
shows as being more politically relevant and more “political” than entertainment shows, these 
evaluations are very much dependent on individuals’ ideological strength and issue public 
membership. In some cases, I find that individuals with stronger political identities evaluate 
entertainment programming as just as politically relevant or “political,” if not more politically 
relevant, than individuals with weaker political identities evaluate news shows. Notably, strong 
ideologues (extreme liberals and conservatives, who score a 3 on a 0-to-3 scale of ideological  
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Table 3.13. Linear mixed models predicting PRM and “Political” based on the political identity strength x genre interaction. 
 Ideological Strength Partisan Strength Issue Public Membership 
 PRM “Political” PRM “Political” PRM “Political” 
Fixed Effects b (SE)       
Ideological Strength 0.10*** (.02) 0.16*** (.03)     
Partisan Strength   0.05* (.02) 0.06 (.03)   
Issue Public Membership     0.18*** (.03) 0.22*** (.05) 
Genre: Entertainment -0.43*** (.03) -0.46*** (.06) -0.54*** (.04) -0.56*** (.08) -0.37*** (.07) -0.73*** (.12) 
Entertainment x Ideo. Str. 0.00 (.02) -0.05 (.03)     
Entertainment x Part. Str.   0.06** (.02) 0.02 (.03)   
Entertainment x IPM     0.05 (.04) -0.06 (.07) 
Object: Healthcare 0.13*** (.03) -0.51*** (.04) 0.13*** (.03) -0.51*** (.04)   
Object: Marijuana 0.04 (.03) -0.45*** (.04) 0.04 (.03) -0.45*** (.05)   
Object: Marijuana     0.03 (.03) 0.15** (.06) 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 0.17*** (.03) 0.12** (.04) 0.17*** (.03) 0.12** (.04) 0.16*** (.03) 0.11** (.04) 
Conservatism 0.15 (.08) 0.66*** (.11) 0.16* (.08) 0.69*** (.11) 0.23** (.08) 0.75*** (.12) 
Political Interest 0.09*** (.02) 0.07* (.03) 0.10*** (.02) 0.09** (.03) 0.06** (.02) 0.05 (.03) 
Order -0.01 (.01) -0.02 (.02) -0.01 (.01) -0.02 (.02) -0.02 (.01) -0.03 (.03) 
Constant 2.18*** (.14) 2.40*** (.19) 2.16*** (.14) 2.38*** (.19) 2.13*** (.15) 1.90*** (.23) 
       
Random Effects var (SD)       
Respondent 0.27 (0.52) 0.37 (0.61) 0.27 (0.52) 0.39 (0.62) 0.21 (0.45) 0.28 (0.53) 
Residual 0.29 (0.54) 0.90 (0.95) 0.29 (0.53) 0.90 (0.95) 0.29 (0.54) 0.97 (0.99) 
Nobservations 2,668 2,668 2,668 2,668 1,334 1,334 
Log likelihood -2662.54 -3986.27 -2662.37 -3996.67 -1376.97 -2041.37 
AIC 5349.09 7996.54 5348.75 8017.34 2775.95 4104.75 
BIC 5419.76 8067.21 5419.42 8088.01 2833.11 4161.9 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Nrespondents = 667 for all models. The reference group for genre is news. The reference group for 
object is politicians/parties/polls for ideological and partisan strength models and healthcare for issue public membership models. 
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Figure 3.5. Interaction of partisan strength and genre on PRM scores. 
 
strength) evaluate entertainment programs as just as politically relevant as weak ideologues 
(moderates, who score a 0 on a 0-to-3 scale of ideological strength) evaluate news programs; see 
Table 3.14 and Figure 3.6. This same non-difference was also found for evaluations of shows as 
“political”: strong ideologues evaluate entertainment programs as just as “political” as weak 
ideologues evaluate news programs; see Figure 3.7.  
Likewise, strong issue public members (those who score a 3 on a 0-to-3 scale of issue 
public membership) evaluate entertainment programs as just as “political” as issue public non-
members (those who score a 0 on a 0-to-3 scale of issue public membership) evaluate news 
programs; see Figure 3.8. Even more importantly, strong issue public members evaluate  
 99 
Table 3.14. Predictions and means comparisons by genre and political identity strength. 
 Weak Ideologues  
for News Shows 
 Strong Ideologues for 
Entertainment Shows 
    
 M SE 95% CI  M SE 95% CI  t df p 
PRM 3.21 .04 [3.13, 3.29]  3.09 .05 [3.00, 3.18]  1.87 5334 .061 
“Political” 3.40 .06 [3.29, 3.52]  3.27 .07 [3.15, 3.40]  1.41 5334 .159 
 Issue Public Non-Members for 
News Shows 
 Strong Issue Public Members for 
Entertainment Shows 
    
 M SE 95% CI  M SE 95% CI  t df p 
PRM 3.04 .07 [2.91, 3.17]  3.37 .05 [3.28, 3.47]  2.73 2666 .006 
“Political” 2.85 .11 [2.63, 3.06]  2.61 .08 [2.45, 2.77]  1.76 2666 .078 
Note: N for ideological strength comparisons is 2,668, and N for issue public membership comparisons is 1,334. 
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Figure 3.6. Interaction of ideological strength and genre on PRM scores. 
 
entertainment programs as being more politically relevant than issue public non-members 
evaluate news programs; see Figure 3.9. In other words, depending on one’s political identity 
strength and despite the fact that news shows are evaluated as more politically relevant and more 
“political” than entertainment programming overall, a person may evaluate entertainment 
programming as just as “political” and politically relevant, if not more politically relevant, as 
another person evaluates news programming. This finding further underscores the limitations of 
an arbitrary boundary between news and entertainment programming in terms of political 
relevance, as well as the need to take viewers’ identities into account in determining what 
particular programs any given viewer might evaluate as politically relevant. 
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Figure 3.7. Interaction of ideological strength and genre on “political” scores. 
 
Discussion 
The primary objective of the current study was to provide evidence of the evaluation 
hypothesis: That evaluations of media as politically relevant are co-determined by media content 
acting as a moderator for the strength of media consumers’ political identities. Specifically, I 
predicted that the effect of political identity strength will be weakest when the show depicts 
politicians/parties/polls and strongest when the show depicts social issues. I find no support for 
this prediction. Instead, I find that the effect of political identity strength on PRM and “political” 
scores varies between genres, different measures of political identity strength, and types of 
objects depicted in a way that cannot be as easily delineated as politicians vs. social issues.  
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Figure 3.8. Interaction of issue public membership and genre on “political” scores. 
 
Although these results do not support the ability to easily determine under which circumstances 
(i.e., based on what class of objects is depicted) political identity strength will have a greater or 
weaker effect on evaluations of television shows as politically relevant, they do support the 
notion that the object depicted will determine the effect of political identity strength. 
The difficulty in classifying the objects depicted as politicians/parties/polls as opposed to 
social issues could stem from a number of issues. First, in order to achieve the cleanest 
manipulation of the objects depicted, I chose stimuli that depicted politicians/parties/polls absent 
any reference to any sort of policy or social issue. It could be the case that a show depicting 
politicians/parties/polls absent any particular issue is evaluated differently than a show depicting  
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Figure 3.9. Interaction of issue public membership and genre on PRM scores. 
 
politicians debating some policy related to a social issue. Likewise, I sometimes find that the 
effects of political identities on the outcome variables is stronger for shows depicting healthcare 
than for shows depicting marijuana, indicating that there is variability in how different social 
issues might moderate the effect of political identity strength. In the next study, I add two 
additional social issues to the list of objects that respondents will be exposed to in the show 
description stimuli. This will provide the opportunity to test the selection hypothesis across a 
greater range of social issues. 
In terms of my second hypothesis regarding consensus around evaluations of political 
relevance for shows depicting politicians/parties/polls as compared to social issues, I do not find 
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support for this prediction for PRM scores. In fact, there was greater variance in PRM scores for 
shows depicting politicians than there was for shows depicting social issues. In other words, 
participants were less in agreement that the shows depicting politicians were politically relevant 
than they were in agreement that the shows depicting social issues were politically relevant. As I 
noted above regarding the circumstances under which politicians were depicted in my stimuli, 
this finding could be because participants find depictions of politicians absent the discussion of 
any sort of social issue or policy to be less politically relevant—not very “close to home,” as 
Eliasoph’s (1997) subjects would say. That seems to be the clearest distinction between the PRM 
scale and the single-item “political” measure: the former captures sentiments of objects one 
might call “close to home” but not “political,” whereas the latter captures sentiments of objects 
that are distant and perhaps less meaningful to viewers. The inner workings of Congress and 
political campaigns may seem too far an abstraction absent some clear connection to the 
everyday lives of citizens. On the other hand, “political” scores did follow the expected 
consensus pattern, with lesser variance in “political” scores for shows depicting politicians than 
for shows depicting social issues. My respondents were in greater agreement that show depicting 
politicians are “political” than they were in agreement that shows depicting social issues are 
“political.” 
Likewise, I found no support for my prediction that respondents would evaluate shows 
depicting politicians as more politically relevant than shows depicting social issues; in fact, 
shows depicting politicians were evaluated as less politically relevant than shows depicting 
social issues. This, despite the fact that respondents evaluated shows depicting politicians as 
more “political” than shows depicting social issues. In retrospect, it makes sense that shows 
depicting politicians would be evaluated as more “political” and for there to be greater consensus 
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around such evaluations, even if the same was not found for evaluations of such shows as 
politically relevant. This is also where we begin to get the sense that PRM and “political” are 
measuring something different. As we also see in the results to H3 for the evaluation of 
entertainment shows as “political,” the presence of politicians seems to be a strong predictor of 
whether a show will be rated as “political.” The entire point of the PRM scale was to develop a 
measure of political relevance that would not fall victim to this narrow definition of the political. 
There is clear evidence that I have succeeded on that front.  
Furthermore, it appears as if entertainment shows are especially susceptible to being 
evaluated as more “political” due to the presence of politicians. Considering that my primary 
interest is in the perceived political relevance of entertainment programming, this is clear 
evidence for the need for the PRM scale as opposed to simply asking viewers if an entertainment 
show is “political.” Based on the results of the current study, asking if an entertainment show is 
“political” isn’t much different from asking if the entertainment show depicted politicians. In 
contrast, both the objects depicted and the viewer’s political identity strength are determining 
factors in PRM scores for entertainment shows. On that front, my results also demonstrate a 
positive relationship between political identity strength and evaluations of shows as politically 
relevant and as “political.” Thus, it’s not that political identity strength has no bearing on 
evaluations of shows as “political”; instead, my findings overall indicate that despite this effect, 
the presence/absence of politicians is the primary determining factor. 
I also find that news programs are evaluated as more politically relevant and as more 
“political” than entertainment programs. This is unsurprising, considering how news programs 
are presented by the media industry and how they’ve been treated by media scholars. Still, this 
study points to the need to consider the effect of political identity strength across genres. I find 
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that partisan strength has a stronger effect on the evaluations of entertainment programs as 
politically relevant than it does on such evaluations for news programs. This is further evidence 
of the need to attend to political identity strength as a determinant of evaluations of 
entertainment programming in particular. Additionally, my findings regarding the differences 
between how strong vs. weak ideologues and strong issue public members vs. issue public non-
members evaluate news vs. entertainment programs illuminate just how important it is to 
consider how political identity strength influences the evaluations of entertainment 
programming. I found that strong ideologues evaluated entertainment programming as just as 
politically relevant and “political” as weak ideologues evaluated news shows, and strong issue 
public members evaluated entertainment shows as just as “political” as issue public non-
members evaluated news shows. Most importantly, strong issue public members evaluated 
entertainment shows as more politically relevant than issue public non-members evaluated news 
shows.  
This, more than any other finding, evidences why we need to take a viewer-centric 
approach to the identification of politically relevant media. Although viewers in general seem to 
consider news shows to be more politically relevant and “political” than entertainment shows, 
careful attention to the strength of individual viewers’ political identities may reveal when they 
think of entertainment shows as just as politically relevant and “political,” and possibly more 
politically relevant, than news shows. My findings here show that there’s no clear way to 
delineate between media that is more or less politically relevant based on attributes of the media 
alone, be it genre or content. The viewer is the final arbiter of how politically relevant any 
particular media text is, and media attributes are merely co-determinants in that evaluation. 
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Why does it matter how politically relevant viewers think any particular television show is? I 
contend that such evaluations affect politically motivated selective exposure to entertainment 
media. Having now demonstrated 1) the ability of political identity strength and the objects 
depicted in media to determine PRM scores, 2) the strengths of the PRM scale over single-item 
measures of how “political” media content is, and 3) the need to consider political identity 
strength and PRM evaluations specifically in the context of entertainment media, I proceed to the 
final study in this project. In the next chapter, I test whether PRM scores mediate the effect of 
political identity strength on the selective exposure of entertainment media.
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Chapter 4: Testing the Selection Hypothesis 
Having validated the PRM scale and evidenced the relationship between show content, 
political identity strength, and evaluating a show as politically relevant, Study 4 examines 
politically motivated selective exposure of fictional entertainment television programming 
depicting social issues.  
It is necessary to start with an overview of what selective exposure is from a conceptual 
and methodological standpoint. Selective exposure is defined as any bias in exposure to media 
content, such that the media one consumes diverges in composition from the available media 
content (Knobloch-Westerwick, 2015). Although this divergence could be toward any attribute 
of media content and based on any bias of the media consumer (e.g., sports fans who primarily 
choose to watch sports programming), here and in the political communication literature the term 
is used to indicate the selection of media congruent with political attitudes or identities. Thus, 
politically motivated selective exposure comprises two features: selection of some media content 
over other media content, under the condition that the selected content is politically congenial to 
one’s views. 
Selection can take the form of discrete media choices (e.g., selecting to watch a given 
television show over another show at a particular point in time) or of media preferences, 
typically identified as the abstraction of choice tendencies in the aggregate (Knobloch-
Westerwick, 2015). In other words, an individual who frequently chooses some media content 
over others could be said to have a preference for the frequently chosen media content. The 
operative words here are “over others”—selection takes place in an environment in which the 
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media consumer has various options for media consumption and can make a decision to consume 
some media content out of a pool of potential choices. I will return to this below in the 
discussion of methodology and measuring selective exposure.  
Closely related to selection, either in terms of choice or preference, is avoidance. The 
selection of some media content over others could be a result of a desire to consume the chosen 
media or a desire to avoid unchosen media (Knobloch-Westerwick, 2015). In other words, media 
selection may either be due to a genuine desire to consume particular media content, or it could 
be due to a desire to consume media that is not the other available options (rather than consume 
no media at all).  The reverse of this is also true: not choosing some particular media content and 
choosing some other media content could be the result of avoidance of the unchosen content or 
merely of a stronger desire to consume the chosen content. In short, selective avoidance can only 
be inferred from selection behaviors; it cannot be measured directly through experimental 
methods, which are the most common and most desirable ways of examining selective exposure 
(Knobloch-Westerwick, 2015). One would have to explicitly ask people whether they were 
avoiding exposure to particular media content, which would require a level of awareness over 
one’s media choices that is greater than what is assumed under the selective exposure paradigm 
(Knobloch-Westerwick, 2015). 
This has implications for what conclusions can be drawn from any study of selective 
exposure/avoidance. Of note, this is not a question of whether selective approach or avoidance 
are two equally strong tendencies (e.g., Garrett & Stroud, 2014), but rather what insight can be 
drawn from observing individuals select some media content and not select other media content. 
Whereas selection definitely indicates a desire for some content over others, it’s not necessarily 
the case that non-selection indicates avoidance of certain content; it could also simply mean less 
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desire for the unchosen content. Methodologically, we can infer that avoidance (and its inverse, 
approach) has occurred based on attributes that differentiate chosen vs. unchosen content over 
the course of multiple selections. In the case of politically motivated selective exposure, selective 
exposure is often measured as the degree to which pro-attitudinal content is selected, and 
selective avoidance is measured as the degree to which counter-attitudinal content is not selected 
(e.g., Garrett & Stroud, 2014), accounting for other attributes of the media selection choices. 
This brings us to a methodological discussion of how to measure selective exposure. My 
descriptions above discuss selective exposure measurement in the context of the observation of 
choices between media content. Although other measures (e.g., self-reported introspection of 
past media use, rating of interest in or desire for individual media choices separately) have been 
employed, the observational approach employed in experimental designs is the preferred method 
(Knobloch-Westerwick, 2015). Ideally selective exposure is measured by giving survey or 
experiment participants the opportunity to choose between media stimuli and observing which 
choices they make. There is another methodological consideration: whether participants’ media 
choices are recorded unobtrusively or not. Unobtrusive observation is the preferred method since 
it mimics real-world selection behaviors best and is less prone to participant reactivity 
(Knobloch-Westerwick, 2015). Of course, unobtrusive observation is difficult if there are no 
actual media for respondents to consume. Unlike in other studies such as those done using 
articles on mock news websites (e.g., Garrett & Stroud, 2014), my participants won’t be able to 
actually watch the mock television shows for which they see descriptions. As such, I cannot give 
them the opportunity to watch a show or shows and then observe which ones they choose to 
watch. Instead, I ask participants to rank shows in terms of which they’d most like to watch 
(Coppini et al., 2017). Thus, participants must still choose only one show to be ranked first, 
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second, and so forth. I go into further detail of how I recorded program selection in the Method 
section below. 
The purpose of Study 4 is to test the selection hypothesis: that evaluating media texts as 
politically relevant will be positively related to selective exposure. The end state is the 
confirmation of the relationship between identification of the show as politically relevant and 
selective exposure to the show. The ability of the PRM scale to predict selective exposure would 
also serve as additional evidence supporting the concurrent validity of the scale. The 
fundamental prediction of the selection hypothesis is that:  
H1: Participants will engage in selective exposure to a greater degree when they evaluate 
shows as more politically relevant than when they evaluate shows as less politically relevant. 
Additionally, because evaluation of the political relevance of media is a function of 
political identity strength, I predict that PRM will mediate the relationship between political 
identity strength and selective exposure, such that the way that viewers with stronger (as opposed 
to weaker) political identities come to engage in selective exposure is through the degree to 
which they evaluate media as politically relevant. In this mediation relationship, I would expect 
stronger political identities to lead to higher PRM scores, which should lead to greater selective 
exposure. Thus, I hypothesize that: 
H2: PRM will mediate the relationship between political identity strength and selective 
exposure. 
Study 4 Method 
Participants 
A convenience sample of U.S. adults was recruited via Qualtrics to participate in an 
online study from April 20-21, 2020, with quotas for partisanship set to evenly split the sample 
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between Democrats, Republicans, and Independents/Others. Six participants were eliminated 
because of a technical issue, bringing the final sample size to N = 666. Additional quotas were 
set to ensure the sample was reflective of the U.S. population in terms of gender, age, and 
income. About half (n = 330) of the sample identified as men, 334 identified as women, and two 
participants reported their gender as something else. The mean age was 44.91 (SD = 16.63). 
Most (68.77%) of the sample reported their race as White, non-Hispanic; 8.41% as Black, non-
Hispanic; 11.56% as Hispanic/Latino; 6.16% as Asian; and 5.11% as multiracial or some other 
race. The sample comprised a mix of self-identified Democrats (n = 225), Republicans (n = 223), 
and Independents or members of some other political party (n = 218). The mean reporting for 
political conservatism on a 1-to-7 scale was 4.00 (SD = 1.72). 
The study employed a 2 (show position: Republican/conservative vs. Democratic/liberal) 
x 2 (genre: sitcom vs. drama) x 4 (issue: healthcare, marijuana, the environment, or LGBTQ 
discrimination) design, with participants evaluating the descriptions of four shows; see Table 4.1. 
Half the show descriptions conveyed support for a position that aligns with Republican and 
ideologically conservative (RC) views, and the other half conveyed support for a position that 
aligns with Democrat and ideologically liberal (DL) views. Of these two RC position shows and 
two DL position shows, one was described as a sitcom and the other as a drama. Finally, both to 
ensure the expected effects are robust across issues and so participants aren’t presented shows 
with the same issues, each show description featured one of the four randomly assigned issues. 
Table 4.1. Study 4 Factorial Design 
 Republican/Conservative (RC) Position Democratic/Liberal (DL) Position 
Sitcom RC Position, Issue A DL Position, Issue B 
Drama RC Position, Issue C DL Position, Issue D 
 
Stimuli 
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Stimuli for Study 4 match the structure of the stimuli for the first three studies; however, 
I created descriptions of mock television shows rather than use existing shows. I chose to use 
mock shows rather than real shows for this study for two reasons. First, using mock shows 
allows me to maximize control over the manipulation of social issues and issue positions. 
Second, it eliminates the possibility that familiarity or prior attitudes toward the show will 
interfere with selection by leading people to select shows with which they’re more familiar. 
Since all of the show descriptions were created specifically for this project, there is no possibility 
that any participants had any familiarity with or prior attitudes about the shows that would affect 
their selection choices in any way. Although all descriptions were of mock fictional 
entertainment sitcom or drama programs rather than a wider selection of television programming 
as in the first three studies, the issue position factor (RC or DL) was added. I generated an RC 
and a DL stem for each television show description; see Appendix A. One of the stems was 
randomly added to the end of the show description, such that half of the show (one sitcom and 
one drama) descriptions had DL stems and half of the show (the other sitcom and the other 
drama) descriptions had RC stems. For example, in the case of the Hawkins Point episode 
regarding health care, half of respondents viewed a show description ending with a character 
questioning why anyone should have to go into massive debt to receive health care (the DL 
position), and the other half viewed a show description ending with a character advocating for 
people taking personal responsibility for saving more for health costs rather than relying on 
others (the RC position). 
Four show overviews were created, such that participants read descriptions for four 
ostensibly separate shows. The overviews varied so that two of the shows were described as 
sitcoms and two were described as dramas. Episode synopses depicting the four social issues 
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were written for each show, such that each of the four shows depicted a randomly selected social 
issue. Finally, I created the DL and RC stems for each issue for each show. I pre-tested the show 
descriptions to ensure that the Democratic/liberal and Republican/conservative stems as well as 
the issues were interpreted as intended; see Appendix B. In addition to the textual descriptions of 
the shows, I created various versions of title graphics for each show based on the style of title 
graphics typically seen for real sitcom and drama shows. These graphics were presented along 
with the show descriptions and during the ranking task as a way to further indicate the genre of 
the show. 
Procedure 
Participants were told they were participating in a study on television preferences and 
given instructions that they would be asked to evaluate four television shows in development. 
Participants first answered questions regarding political interest, political identity strength, and 
demographics. Then participants completed a short tolerance for ambiguity questionnaire and 
questions regarding motivations for watching various television genres. These items additionally 
served as a distractor task to prevent the measurement of pre-exposure variables, in particular 
issue public membership, from priming individuals regarding the show descriptions or the study 
purpose. Next, each show description was randomly presented, followed by the PRM scale and 
single-item “political” measure. After all shows were evaluated, participants were told to rank 
the shows based on which they’d most like to watch. Participants had the opportunity to review 
the show descriptions during this selection task. 
Measures 
The PRM scale, TA scale, motivations for television use, political partisanship, ideology, 
and interest measures were carried over from Study 3. See Table 4.2 for descriptive statistics. 
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Table 4.2. Zero-order Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Study 4 Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. PRM Scale -           
2. Tolerance for Ambiguity .12*** -          
3. Partisanship (Republican) -.01 -.03 -         
4. Ideology (Conservatism) -.03 .01 .50*** -        
5. Partisan Strength .13*** -.01 .00 -.02 -       
6. Ideological Strength .12*** .08*** .08*** .01 .42*** -      
7. Issue Public Membership .29*** .06** -.09*** -.22*** .13*** .12*** -     
8. Political Interest .15*** .01 .03 -.04 .18*** .17*** .27*** -    
9. Single-Item “Political” .59*** .04* .05** .07*** .05* .10*** .14*** .13*** -   
10. Congeniality .04* .00 .00 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 .02 -  
11. Selective Exposure .06** .01 -.01 -.01 .00 .00 .01 -.02 .02 .03 - 
M 3.30 3.80 0.50 0.50 1.97 1.33 1.58 3.60 2.95 3.95 0.16 
SD 0.76 0.79 0.37 0.29 1.08 1.10 0.86 1.10 1.11 2.39 10.17 
Skew -0.29*** -0.66*** 0.01 0.02 -0.58*** 0.12* -0.15*** -0.38*** 0.00 0.03 0.05 
Skew SE 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 .05 
α .91 .73 - - - - .86 - - - - 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. For partisanship, 0 = Strong Democrat, and 1 = Strong Republican. For ideology, 0 = 
extremely liberal, and 1 = extremely conservative. 
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A common way to measure selective exposure is the degree to which the congeniality of 
media content affects whether a participant chooses that content over other content. In this 
fashion, selective exposure is measured as the effect of media congeniality as a predictor on 
selection as an outcome variable. Although this method allows the researcher to assess the 
degree to which pro-attitudinal content is selected, it is not the only way to assess selective 
exposure. Because I am interested in the effect of PRM on selective exposure, using this method 
would essentially make PRM a moderator in the congeniality-selection relationship: if selective 
exposure is operationalized as the effect of congeniality on selection, then predicting that higher 
PRM scores lead to greater selective exposure would mean predicting that the effect of 
congeniality on selection would be stronger when PRM scores are higher than when PRM scores 
are lower. This poses analytical issues regarding the use of post-treatment variables as 
moderators in experimental designs (Montgomery et al., 2018). Therefore, I cannot test my 
hypotheses by examining PRM as a moderator of the effect of congeniality on selection. I 
overcome this challenge by computing a measure of selective exposure derived from how 
congenial each show was to the respondent’s issue beliefs and the respondent’s preference for 
the show. As such, I am able to examine the effect of PRM on this selective exposure measure. 
I computed a measure of selective exposure based on how congenial each show was to 
the respondent’s beliefs and the ranking the respondent gave the show. Congeniality was 
measured as how well the show’s issue position matched the participant’s self-reported 
agreement with the issue positions based on the pre-exposure questionnaire items, which ranged 
from 1 (strongly believe the DL position) to 7 (strongly believe the RC position). If a participant 
was exposed to the DL position for an issue and had reported they strongly believed that 
position, their congeniality score for that show was 7. If they were exposed to the DL position 
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and had reported they moderately believed the RC position, their congeniality score for that 
show was a 2. Thus, congeniality was coded from 1 (least congenial) to 7 (most congenial). For 
show ranking, participants were asked to rank the four shows they were presented with in terms 
of which ones they’d most like to watch, with a rank of 1 for the show they’d most like to watch, 
followed by 2, 3, then a rank of 4 for the show they’d least like to watch. Thus, show ranking is a 
measure of how much a respondent preferred one program over another.  
My next step was to multiply the congeniality score by the show ranking to generate a 
single-item measure reflecting preference for congenial content. (I use “preference” here in the 
general sense, not in the sense of the abstraction of choice tendencies in the aggregate, as 
described at the beginning of this chapter.) Before doing so, I recoded the show ranking scores as 
3, 1, -1, -3, respectively, so a higher number indicated greater preference for the show and a 
lower number indicated lesser preference for the show. I executed this recode for two reasons. 
First, so that the selective exposure measure would have a true mid-point: a positive score 
indicates that the show was ranked as one of the top two shows, and a negative score indicates 
that the show was ranked as one of the bottom two shows. Second, so that the scores above and 
below the mid-point would be at the same interval from the mid-point, since the recoded ranking 
item values maintain the same interval. Finally, I multiplied the show congeniality variable and 
the recoded ranking variable to generate a measure of selective exposure, ranging from -21 (least 
selective exposure) to 21 (most selective exposure). Greatest preference (3) for a most-congenial 
(7) show would be maximum (21) selective exposure; least preference (1) for a most-congenial 
(7) show would be minimum (-21) selective exposure. See Table 4.3 for a tabular depiction of 
the selective exposure scoring values. Thus, for each show evaluated and ranked by each 
participant, I have a measure of how much selective exposure they engaged in. I will now be able  
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to determine how PRM evaluations for each show observation affects selective exposure to that 
show. 
Table 4.3. Tabular depiction of selective exposure scoring values. 
 Congeniality 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Preference  
for content 
3 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-1 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 
-3 -3 -6 -9 -12 -15 -18 -21 
 
I should note that because the show ranking and greater/lesser preference for a show 
doesn’t necessarily indicate a desire to avoid such programming, one cannot measure selective 
avoidance through these means. Likewise, selective exposure scores for less congenial shows 
end up toward the middle of the scale (e.g., a show with a congeniality score of 1 would receive 
a selective exposure score between 3 and -3). This is fitting, since selective exposure is defined 
as the act of choosing congenial content, irrelevant of whether one would choose uncongenial 
content. As such, my measure of selective exposure can detect when respondents have a greater 
or lesser preference for congenial television shows. Furthermore, I found the same pattern of the 
effect of PRM on selective exposure that I report below across alternate ways of calculating a 
selective exposure measure (i.e., multiplying the congeniality variable by a reverse-coded 
ranking variable with 4 representing greatest preference and 1 representing least preference). 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Congeniality. I’ve developed the PRM scale items in an attempt to eliminate the 
potential influence of message congeniality. As I discussed earlier regarding evaluations of 
perception of bias, I would not like respondents to indicate that they perceive greater persuasive 
intent from shows containing messages that are uncongenial to their views than from shows with 
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congenial messages. Ideally, respondents would indicate the same level of persuasive intent from 
a show conveying either congenial or uncongenial messages. Most importantly, we should also 
not find that message congeniality affects the PRM scale, in that shows with uncongenial 
messages are rated as more politically relevant than shows with congenial messages. The 
objective of the PRM scale is to capture the perception of collective 
concerns/decisions/consequences, controversy, and—most relevant here—persuasive intent, not 
perception of bias. I do find a weak yet statistically significant correlation between congeniality 
scores and PRM scores, r = .04, p = .030; however, further testing of this relationship using 
congeniality to predict PRM, its subscales, and the single-item “political” measure, controlling 
for other factors, revealed only a very small effect on the CON subscale (b = 0.01, SE = .01, p = 
.041) and no statistically significant effects on the other subscales or the PRM scale as a whole; 
see Table 4.4. 
Main Analyses 
I answer my first and second hypotheses using a mediation analysis; see Figure 4.1. Such 
an analysis allows me to address H1, which predicts that PRM will be positively related to 
selective exposure, and H2, which predicts that PRM will mediate the relationship between 
political identity strength. The additional benefit of using the mediation analysis to answer H1 is 
that I can determine if the effect of PRM on selective exposure is robust to controlling for 
political identity strength, since both the effects of PRM (the b path) and political identity 
strength (the c' path) are included in the model predicting selective exposure. To be clear, 
although Figure 4.1 depicts a c' path between political identity strength and selective exposure 
indicating a direct relationship between the two, I am not interested in whether such a   
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Table 4.4. Linear mixed models predicting PRM, its subscales, and “Political” based on congeniality. 
 PRM CDC PPI CON “Political” 
Fixed Effects b (SE)      
Congeniality 0.01 (.00) 0.01 (.01) 0.00 (.01) 0.01* (.01) 0.00 (.01) 
Genre: Drama 0.01 (.02) 0.01 (.02) 0.03 (.02) -0.01 (.02) 0.01 (.03) 
Object: Healthcare 0.21*** (.02) 0.31*** (.03) 0.12*** (.03) 0.21*** (.03) 0.19*** (.04) 
Object: LGBTQ 0.21*** (.02) 0.11*** (.03) 0.24*** (.03) 0.32*** (.03) 0.34*** (.04) 
Object: Marijuana 0.05* (.02) 0.04 (.03) 0.02 (.03) 0.12*** (.03) 0.02 (.04) 
Position: RC -0.07*** (.02) -0.06* (.02) -0.12*** (.02) 0.00 (.02) -0.07* (.03) 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 0.11*** (.03) 0.13*** (.03) 0.08* (.04) 0.13*** (.03) 0.06 (.04) 
Conservatism -0.08 (.09) -0.24** (.09) 0.13 (.10) -0.12 (.09) 0.27* (.12) 
Political Interest 0.10*** (.02) 0.09*** (.02) 0.12*** (.03) 0.08** (.02) 0.14*** (.03) 
Order 0.04*** (.01) 0.04*** (.01) 0.05*** (.01) 0.02 (.01) 0.03* (.01) 
Constant 2.34*** (.15) 2.19*** (.17) 2.45*** (.18) 2.41*** (.16) 1.93*** (.21) 
      
Random Effects var (SD)      
Respondent 0.35 (0.59) 0.38 (0.62) 0.48 (0.69) 0.37 (0.60) 0.61 (0.78) 
Residual 0.19 (0.44) 0.30 (0.55) 0.32 (0.56) 0.30 (0.55) 0.57 (0.76) 
Log likelihood -2327.68 -2816.82 -2931.91 -2805.07 -3613.54 
AIC 4681.36 5659.65 5889.82 5636.14 7253.08 
BIC 4757.90 5736.19 5966.36 5712.68 7329.62 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Nrespondents = 666 and Nobservations = 2,664 for all models. The reference group for genre is 
comedy, the reference group for object is the environment, and the reference group for position is DL. 
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Figure 4.1. Mediation model for H1 and H2. 
relationship exists. Nor is it necessary to demonstrate a change in the statistical significance 
between the c path (the total effect of the predictor) and the c' path (the direct effect of the 
predictor when the a * b path is accounted for); the only requirement for evidencing a mediation 
effect is a statistically significant a * b path (Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). 
I conducted the mediation analyses by running two linear mixed models on 5,000 
bootstrapped samples of the original dataset. The first model regresses the mediator (PRM or 
“political”) on political identity strength (ideological strength, partisan strength, and issue public 
membership), controlling for show genre, issue, issue position, respondents’ TA, conservatism, 
political interest, and show order effects. The estimate for the political identity strength term 
represents the a path. The second model regresses the dependent variable (selective exposure) on 
the mediator, controlling for show genre, issue, issue position, respondents’ political identity 
strength, TA, conservatism, political interest, and show order effects. The estimate for the 
mediator represents the b path, and the estimate for the political identity strength term represents 
the c' path. The mediated indirect effect of political identity strength on selective exposure is the 
product of the a and b paths. The c path, representing the total effect of political identity strength 
on selective exposure, is the sum of the direct (c') and indirect (a * b) effects. This is 
Stronger (vs. 
weaker) political 
identity
+
Selective exposure+
+a b
c'
Evaluation of the 
show as politically 
relevant
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conceptually equivalent to the effect of political identity strength on selective exposure when the 
mediator is not controlled for. The estimates reported below are the means of the estimates from 
the 5,000 bootstrapped samples. Finally, I computed 95% confidence intervals (CIs) based on the 
estimates from the 5,000 bootstrapped samples. I ran these two models a total of six times, 
corresponding to the combination of the three measures of political identity strength as the 
predictor and for both PRM and the single-item “political” measure as the mediator. 
These calculations are the same as would be done using the PROCESS macro in SPSS 
(Hayes, 2017); however, PROCESS cannot handle linear mixed models used to account for my 
nested data structure. Likewise, R’s mediation package’s mediate() function (Tingley, 
Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014), which can handle linear mixed models and will report 
the mediated indirect effect, doesn’t report the individual path estimates and 95% CIs. Thus, I 
conducted all analyses “by hand” in RStudio, while using the mediate() function when 
possible to double-check the estimates and 95% CIs for the mediated indirect effects. Although 
mediate() uses a different method for simulating samples of the data, the results were very 
close to those generated through bootstrap sampling and of the same level of statistical 
significance. Code is available upon request. 
H1. My first hypothesis predicts that PRM will have a positive effect on selective 
exposure, corresponding to the b path in Figure 4.1. Table 4.5 presents the estimates and 95% 
CIs for the a, b, a * b, c', and c paths for all six mediation models. PRM has a statistically 
significant effect on selective exposure, regardless of which measure of political identity strength 
I controlled for. The more politically relevant respondents evaluated the shows as being, the 
more they engaged in selective exposure, as measured by expressing greater interest in watching  
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Table 4.5. Estimates and 95% confidence intervals for all paths for all mediation models 
predicting selective exposure. 
  Effect Through PRM  Effect Through “Political” 
  Path Estimate LLCI ULCI  Path Estimate LLCI ULCI 
Ideological 
Strength 
a 0.06 0.03 0.10  a 0.08 0.03 0.12 
b 0.88 0.48 1.29  b 0.22 -0.06 0.51 
a * b 0.06 0.02 0.10  a * b 0.02 0.00a 0.05 
c' 0.01 -0.22 0.22  c' 0.04 -0.17 0.26 
c 0.06 -0.16 0.27  c 0.06 -0.15 0.27 
Partisan 
Strength 
a 0.07 0.04 0.11  a 0.03 -0.02 0.07 
b 0.88 0.47 1.28  b 0.22 -0.06 0.51 
a * b 0.06 0.03 0.11  a * b 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
c' 0.02 -0.19 0.23  c' 0.08 -0.13 0.28 
c 0.08 -0.12 0.29  c 0.08 -0.12 0.29 
Issue Public 
Membership 
a 0.10 0.06 0.13  a 0.08 0.04 0.13 
b 0.85 0.44 1.26  b 0.19 -0.10 0.49 
a * b 0.08 0.04 0.14  a * b 0.02 -0.01 0.05 
c' 0.12 -0.36 0.59  c' 0.30 -0.19 0.78 
c 0.20 -0.28 0.68  c 0.32 -0.16 0.79 
Note: aCI rounds to, but crosses, zero. Nobservations = 2,664 for all models. 95% confidence 
intervals are based on 5,000 bootstrap samples. All models control for show genre, issue, issue 
position, respondents’ TA, conservatism, political interest, and show order effects. Additionally, 
the models from which the  b and c' paths are drawn include both the effect of the mediator and 
the effect of political identity strength, such that the b path indicates the effect of the mediator on 
selective exposure controlling for political identity strength, and the c' path indicates the direct 
effect of political identity strength on selective exposure, controlling for the mediator. The c path 
indicates the total effect of political identity strength on selective exposure. 
 
more-congenial shows. In contrast, the single-item “political” measure did not predict selective 
exposure. H1 was supported. 
H2. My second hypothesis predicts that PRM will mediate the relationship between 
political identity strength and selective exposure, corresponding to the a * b path in Figure 4.1. 
As we see in Table 4.5, all three measures of political identity strength have a statistically 
significant effect on PRM as the mediator, and in each of these models, PRM has a statistically 
significant effect on selective exposure as the outcome. In short, both the a and b paths are 
statistically significant when PRM is the mediator, regardless of the measure of political identity 
strength. In contrast, although ideological strength and issue public membership have a 
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statistically significant effect on the single-item “political” measure as the mediator, partisan 
strength does not. Additionally, none of the b paths are statistically significant when “political” is 
the mediator. The a * b path representing the mediated effect of political identity strength on 
selective exposure through the mediator is statistically significant when PRM is the mediator, but 
not when “political” is the mediator. This indicates that PRM acts as a mediator between all three 
measures of political identity strength and selective exposure, but the single-item “political” 
measure does not. The c' paths, representing the direct effect of the political identity strength 
measure on selective exposure once the mediator is controlled for, are not statistically significant 
for any of the models. The c paths, representing the total effect of political identity strength on 
selective exposure, are also not statistically significant for any of the models. Nonsignificant c 
paths indicate that selective exposure cannot be predicted using political identity strength without 
accounting for any role of the mediator. More importantly, the lack of a statistically significant 
direct effect of political identity strength on selective exposure (the c' paths) indicates that 
stronger political identities also did not lead to greater selective exposure once PRM scores were 
controlled for. Greater selective exposure occurred not directly because of political identity 
strength, but because of the mediating effect of PRM evaluations: stronger political identities 
lead to higher PRM scores, which lead to higher levels of selective exposure. 
As a robustness check, I also conducted a parallel mediation analysis, with both PRM and 
“political” in the same model mediating the effect of the political identity strength predictors on 
selective exposure; see Figure 4.2. This analysis is instructive because it controls for both 
mediators simultaneously, meaning we can determine the mediating effect of either PRM or 
“political” when the other is controlled for. In this parallel mediation model, a1 and b1 represent 
the a and b paths when PRM is the mediator and a2 and b2 represent the a and b paths when  
 125 
 
Figure 4.2. Parallel mediation model for H2. 
“political” is the mediator. As before, the indirect effect of the predictor through each mediator is 
the product of the a and b paths for that mediator. For example, the indirect effect of the 
predictor through PRM is a1 * b1. The total indirect effect (TIE) of the predictor is the sum of the 
indirect effects through both mediators: (a1 * b1) + (a2 * b2). The c' path remains the direct effect 
of the political identity strength predictor on selective exposure once both mediators are 
controlled for. I also report the c path, which is the total effect of the political identity strength 
predictor on selective exposure. The c path equals the sum of the direct effect and the total 
indirect effect: c' + (a1 * b1) + (a2 * b2). The total effect is conceptually equal to the effect of the 
predictor on the dependent variable, not controlling for any mediators.  
I used the aforementioned 5,000 bootstrapped samples to compute the estimates and 95% 
CIs for the parallel mediation analysis; see Table 4.6. There is a statistically significant indirect 
effect of all three political identity strength predictors on selective exposure through PRM, 
Stronger (vs. 
weaker) political 
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+
Selective exposure+
+
a1 b1
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Table 4.6. Estimates and 95% confidence intervals for all paths for all parallel mediation models predicting selective exposure. 
  Effect Through PRM  Effect Through “Political”  Total, Direct, & Total Indirect Effects 
  Path Est. LLCI ULCI  Path Est. LLCI ULCI  Path Est. LLCI ULCI 
Ideological 
Strength 
a1 0.06 0.03 0.10  a2 0.08 0.03 0.12  c 0.06 -0.16 0.27 
b1 1.04 0.50 1.57  b2 -0.18 -0.56 0.20  c' 0.01 -0.22 0.23 
a1 * b1 0.07 0.02 0.12  a2 * b2 -0.01 -0.05 0.02  TIE 0.05 0.01 0.10 
Partisan 
Strength 
a1 0.07 0.04 0.11  a2 0.03 -0.02 0.07  c 0.08 -0.12 0.29 
b1 1.03 0.49 1.57  b2 -0.18 -0.56 0.20  c' 0.01 -0.20 0.23 
a1 * b1 0.08 0.03 0.13  a2 * b2 0.00 -0.02 0.01  TIE 0.07 0.03 0.12 
Issue Public 
Membership 
a1 0.10 0.06 0.13  a2 0.08 0.04 0.13  c 0.20 -0.28 0.68 
b1 1.03 0.45 1.54  b2 -0.18 -0.55 0.20  c' 0.11 -0.36 0.59 
a1 * b1 0.10 0.04 0.16  a2 * b2 -0.01 -0.05 0.02  TIE 0.08 0.03 0.14 
Note: Nobservations = 2,664 for all models. 95% confidence intervals are based on 5,000 bootstrap samples. TIE denotes the total indirect 
effect, which is the sum of the indirect effects through both mediators. All models control for show genre, issue, issue position, 
respondents’ TA, conservatism, political interest, and show order effects. Additionally, the a, b, and c' models predicting selective 
exposure include both the effect of the mediators and the effect of political identity strength, such that the b paths indicate the effect of 
the respective mediators on selective exposure controlling for political identity strength, and the c' path indicates the effect of political 
identity strength on selective exposure controlling for the mediators. The c path, denoting the total effect of political identity strength 
on selective exposure, does not control for the mediators. 
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controlling for the mediating effect of the “political” measure and for the direct effect of the 
political identity strength measure. No such mediation occurred for the “political” mediator. 
Further, as before, there was no direct effect, c', of any of the political identity strength measures 
on selective exposure. The total effect, c, of the political identity strength measures on selective 
exposure was also nonsignificant. In other words, political identity strength does not itself 
predict selective exposure regardless of whether the mediators are controlled for. Only through 
PRM does political identity strength have any effect on selective exposure, with stronger 
political identities predicting higher PRM scores, then higher PRM scores predicting greater 
selective exposure. H2 is confirmed. 
Discussion 
The current study set out to explore the relationship between the evaluation of television 
programs as politically relevant and selective exposure to those programs. I find that individuals 
engage in greater levels of selective exposure for programs they evaluated as more politically 
relevant than for programs they evaluated as less politically relevant. In contrast, evaluating a 
show as “political” had no effect on selective exposure. Even more importantly, I found that 
PRM served as a mediator between political identity strength and selective exposure: The way 
that individuals with stronger political identities (stronger ideologues, stronger partisans, and 
members of issue publics) come to engage in the selective exposure of fictional entertainment 
media is because they see such programming as politically relevant. In other words, it’s not 
simply that individuals with stronger political identities engage in greater levels of selective 
exposure to fictional television programs; rather, individuals with stronger political identities 
engage in greater levels of selective exposure because of how they evaluate programming as 
politically relevant. 
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This is where we must draw a finer distinction between what we mean by “selective 
exposure” in general” and “politically motivated selective exposure” in particular. Most selective 
exposure research in the political communication literature is conducted on news content, for 
which the political relevance is taken as a given. Thus, when these studies find that individuals 
selectively expose themselves to congenial news content, the assumption is that they engaged in 
politically motivated selective exposure because they understood the political context of the 
stimuli—and that may very well be true, even though respondents’ evaluation of the political 
relevance of the content was never measured. Yet as Knobloch-Westerwick (2015) indicated, 
selective exposure is any bias in exposure to media content; therefore, we can only confirm that 
politically motivated selective exposure has occurred if we evidence that selective exposure 
occurred with the political realm in mind. 
This might seem like a distinction without a difference until one considers the findings of 
the previous chapter, in which I show that media content and viewers’ political identity strength 
work together to influence how political relevant media content is. To recap, political identity 
strength affected PRM evaluations for news and entertainment shows alike, meaning that 
participants didn’t necessarily evaluate all news programming as equally politically relevant. 
And even though entertainment shows were evaluated as less politically relevant in general, 
individuals with stronger political identities sometimes evaluated entertainment shows as just as, 
if not more, politically relevant than news shows. Thus, when one considers whether people 
select media content (particularly entertainment content for which political relevance is not 
assumed) that conforms to their political viewpoints, we may know that selective exposure has 
occurred, but we can only assume political motivations behind those choices unless we actually 
measure how politically relevant people think the media in question is.  
 129 
As I find in the current study, political identity strength alone didn’t predict greater 
selective exposure, regardless of whether PRM and the single-item “political” mediators were 
controlled for. If we merely examined the effect of political identity strength on selective 
exposure without accounting for the mediating potential of PRM, we would incorrectly infer that 
political identity strength is unrelated to selective exposure behavior. Further, the mean selective 
exposure score was 0.16 (SD = 10.17) on a scale whose mid-point was zero. In other words, if 
we simply examined show preference based on congeniality, there wouldn’t appear to be any 
selective exposure behavior. Based on these two findings, one would erroneously conclude that 
people show no preference for fictional entertainment shows that are more congenial to their 
views and that political identity strength has no bearing on selective exposure to entertainment 
programming. Instead, evaluating fictional shows as politically relevant was the causal 
mechanism between political identity strength and selective exposure. By considering how 
political identity strength drives how shows are evaluated as politically relevant and how those 
evaluations predict selective exposure, we see that individuals with stronger political identities 
evaluate fictional entertainment shows as more politically relevant, and when they do, they show 
a stronger preference for shows with congenial content. That is politically motivated selective 
exposure. 
The above point bears underscoring. One critique of the PRM concept is that because 
PRM scores are driven by political identity strength in that people with stronger political 
identities generally evaluate shows as more politically relevant, the measure is merely a proxy 
for political identity strength. By this logic, we should be able to dispense with PRM altogether 
and predict selective exposure with political identity strength alone. The results of the current 
study indicate that this simply isn’t the case. The way political identity strength predicts selective 
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exposure is through PRM, the a1 * b1 mediation path in the parallel mediation model. Without 
PRM as a mediator, political identity strength was not able to predict selective exposure, whether 
considering its total (c) or direct (c') effect on selective exposure. The effect of PRM on political 
was also robust to accounting for political identity strength and “political” evaluations as 
controls. Thus, it’s not simply that viewers with stronger political identities engage in greater 
selective exposure; rather, viewers with stronger political identities engage in greater selective 
exposure by way of how they evaluate fictional programming as politically relevant. 
Evaluating shows as “political,” on the other hand, did not predict selective exposure and 
did not serve as a mediator in a similar fashion in either the individual or the parallel mediation 
models. Thus, I have evidenced the value of PRM rather than merely assessing how “political” 
people think a television show might be. I will return to this discussion in the concluding chapter 
of this dissertation. I should also note that I found no indication that Republicans/conservatives 
or Democrats/liberals engaged in selective exposure any more than the other, or that the effects 
were different for programs depending on the show’s issue position. 
The finding of selective exposure of entertainment television programs due to political 
identity strength and evaluation of such programs as politically relevant has tremendous 
implications for viewers’ media selection habits, as well as the cultivation of different media 
ecosystems for those who hold conservative views. Future research should also explore selective 
avoidance of media based on political identity strength and PRM; however, we will need to more 
carefully consider how avoidance of media is measured, since a preference for some content 
doesn’t necessarily indicate a desire to avoid other content. Thus, although conventional wisdom 
might dictate that Republicans/conservatives avoid shows they evaluate as too liberal or as 
“pushing a liberal agenda,” what I evidence here is that viewers of either stripe may prefer shows 
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that are congenial to their views over shows that are uncongenial when they think of such shows 
as political. I discuss this and the findings of the previous chapters more broadly in the next and 
final chapter of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
I begin this chapter by briefly summarizing the aims of this dissertation, followed by a 
review of the objective and findings of each study. Next, I discuss the implications of this 
research. Finally, I conclude by pointing toward future directions in entertainment media and 
politically motivated selective exposure research. 
In Chapter 1, I define the core problem that this dissertation seeks to address: the dearth 
of literature regarding how media consumers themselves evaluate media as politically relevant, 
as opposed to how researchers define which media are politically relevant, especially television 
entertainment programming. This, despite the fact that viewers are divided in their entertainment 
watching practices along political lines (e.g., Blakley et al., 2019; Holbert et al., 2003), 
suggesting that political identities may play a role in entertainment media selection. Although 
scholars have created typologies of political entertainment media (e.g., Eilders & Nitsch, 2015; 
Haas et al., 2015; Holbert, 2005), distinctions between news, entertainment, and other genres are 
arbitrary and don’t necessarily reflect how any individual viewer may evaluate media as 
politically relevant. I argue for a viewer-centric approach to the evaluation of media as politically 
relevant, with media content and viewers’ political identities being the driving force behind such 
evaluations.  
Drawing on political science literature, I divide potentially political objects into three 
classes: social issues, government agencies/agents, and politicians/parties/polls, and discuss the 
varying levels of consensus regarding how people evaluate the political nature of objects within  
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those three classes. I define the political realm as anything regarding collective concerns, for 
which collective decisions can be made, that have collective consequences. Common across all 
classes of potentially political objects are two additional attributes of the political: controversy 
and perception of persuasive intent. These two attributes, along with collective 
concerns/decisions/consequences, comprise the three dimensions of politically relevant media, or 
PRM. I then discuss the shortcomings of existing ways to assess how “political” certain forms of 
media are and why we need a PRM scale, based on these three dimensions, to assess evaluations 
of politically relevant media. 
Next, I define political identity in three ways: as one’s partisan identification, one’s 
ideological identification, and one’s membership in issue publics; the strength of which will 
determine how politically relevant a viewer will evaluate television programming to be. The two 
central assertions of this dissertation lie in my evaluation hypothesis and my selection 
hypothesis. The evaluation hypothesis predicted that the object depicted in a television show 
would determine how much of an effect a viewer’s political identity strength would have on 
evaluation of a show as politically relevant. Specifically, I predicted that the effect of political 
identity strength would be weakest for shows depicting politicians/parties/polls and strongest for 
shows depicting social issues. The selection hypothesis predicted that viewers would engage in 
greater levels of selective exposure when they evaluated programs as more politically relevant 
than when they evaluated programs as less politically relevant. Further, I hypothesized that PRM 
evaluations would act as a mediator between political identity strength and selective exposure: 
individuals with stronger political identities engage in selective exposure to fictional 
entertainment media because they evaluate those media as more politically relevant. 
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In Chapter 2, I developed the PRM scale across two studies, using both exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis, respectively. I reduced the initial pool of 26 items down to 11 items 
representing three subscales that capture the three dimensions of the political: collective 
concerns/decisions/consequences, perception of persuasive intent, and controversy. I performed 
several tests of internal consistency and validity. I demonstrated that, as expected, PRM is 
correlated with political interest and with three different measures of political identity strength: 
ideological strength, partisan strength, and issue public membership. This indicates that 
individuals with greater political interest and stronger political identities are more likely to 
evaluate media as politically relevant than individuals with less political interest and weaker 
political identities. Additionally, PRM is not correlated with the salience of certain moral 
domains (i.e., binding or individualizing) over others. Thus, it is distinct from the MFQ (Graham 
et al., 2009; 2011) as a predictor of media selection (e.g., Long & Eveland, 2018; Tamborini, 
2011; Tamborini et al., 2013). Rather than predict appeal for particular types of media as moral 
domain salience, does, PRM predicts when individuals may engage in politically motivated 
selective exposure, which I will discuss below in my summary of Chapter 4.  
I also demonstrated that PRM is moderately correlated with the currently most frequently 
used measure of evaluation of media as political: explicitly asking participants how “political” a 
media text is. Still, by subjecting both the PRM scale and a single-item “political” measure to the 
same validity checks, I showed that the PRM scale is more robust to validity checks than is the 
single-item measure. And although both measures were somewhat correlated with conservatism 
and Republican identification, the partisan gap was smaller for PRM scores than for “political” 
scores. Still, by identifying sub-scales measuring the dimensions of PRM separately, I was able 
to determine that partisan and ideological differences in PRM were due specifically to 
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Republicans and conservatives perceiving greater persuasive intent from television shows. I 
concluded that, given the perception of the media industry as predominantly liberal, Republicans 
and conservatives may be predisposed to thinking of television programming as a tool of 
persuasion. 
Having developed and validated the PRM scale, I set out to test my evaluation hypothesis 
in Chapter 3. This hypothesis posits that the effects of political identities on evaluations of 
television programs as politically relevant will be greater for programs depicting social issues 
than for programs depicting politicians. Although this specific hypothesis was unsupported, this 
third study uncovered a number of important findings. First, I do find evidence that the effect of 
political identity strength on PRM varies depending on the object(s) depicted, just not in a way 
that can be simplified as politicians in one category and social issues in another. My findings 
indicate that political identity strength may play a greater or lesser role in PRM evaluations 
depending on the social issue. Although this means we cannot discount the role of political 
identity strength when it comes to programs depicting politicians, it also highlights the need for 
extra attention to how political identity strength factors into PRM evaluations for shows 
depicting different social issues. 
Secondly and relatedly, I found that when it comes to entertainment programming, the 
presence/absence of politicians in a program was a strong indicator of evaluation of a show as 
“political.” Asking a viewer if an entertainment show is “political” seems not much different 
from asking them if the show depicted politicians. That seems less than ideal if we’re trying to 
examine how politically relevant viewers think a show is. In contrast, respondents evaluated 
shows depicting politicians/parties/polls (absent any mention of social issues or policies) as less 
politically relevant than shows depicting social issues. This indicates that a single question 
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asking how “political” an entertainment show is measures whether the respondent thinks a 
politician/party/poll is depicted, whereas the PRM scale measures the degree to which the 
respondent thinks the show depicts some potentially controversial issue that affects theirs and 
others’ lives and could be solved through government action, as is the goal of the scale. This is 
another difference that sets the PRM scale apart from the single-item “political” measure: the 
latter is an indicator of people’s identification of what we might call explicitly political content in 
media, whereas the former can actually detect the degree to which people think a broader range 
of media carries political import. 
Third, I found some genre-level differences in evaluations of programs as both “political” 
and politically relevant, with news shows receiving higher scores than did entertainment shows 
for both PRM and for the single-item “political” measure, controlling for the types of objects 
depicted (social issues vs. politicians, and also healthcare vs. marijuana vs. politicians). But 
what’s remarkable is the effect that political identity strength has on these evaluations across 
genres. Partisan strength has a stronger effect on PRM evaluations for entertainment shows than 
it does for news shows. Additionally, strong ideologues evaluated entertainment programs to be 
just as politically relevant and “political” as weak ideologues evaluated news programs. Strong 
issue public members evaluated entertainment shows to be just as “political” as issue public non-
members evaluated news shows, and they evaluated entertainment shows as more politically 
relevant than issue public non-members evaluated news shows.  
These findings are important for two reasons. First, they call into question the implicit 
assumption that people think of news media as more politically relevant than entertainment 
media. Second, based on the findings of my fourth study, they suggest that individuals with 
stronger political identities may be just as likely, if not more likely, to engage in selective 
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exposure to entertainment media as individuals with weaker political identities would to news 
media. All of this underlines the strong role of political identity strength in the evaluations of 
entertainment media as both “political” and as politically relevant. It also underlines why it’s 
unhelpful for researchers to attempt to draw distinctions between media in terms of its political 
relevance, especially when it comes to news vs. entertainment media. To some person, any 
media, even fictional entertainment media, could be evaluated as politically relevant. In fact, our 
hypothetical viewer may find an entertainment show to be more politically relevant than a news 
broadcast. In this way, there’s no such thing as media that isn’t politically relevant. It’s all 
political. 
With that in mind, my final study, reported in Chapter 4, aimed to determine if evaluation 
of entertainment programs depicting social issues as politically relevant affects selective 
exposure to those programs. I found that the more politically relevant individuals thought a show 
was, the more they engaged in selective exposure to that show. This effect was not found for the 
single-item “political” measure: evaluating a show as “political” did not affect whether one 
engaged in selective exposure to the show. Moreover, I found that PRM evaluations mediated the 
link between political identity strength and selective exposure. The stronger an individual’s 
political identities, measured three separate ways, the more politically relevant they thought 
entertainment shows were, and the more they engaged in selective exposure to those shows. My 
findings suggest that evaluating media as politically relevant is how political identity strength 
leads to selective exposure to fictional entertainment television. Although ideological strength 
and issue public membership predicted evaluation of entertainment shows as “political,” such 
evaluations did not serve as a mediator between any measure of political identity strength and 
selective exposure.  
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This is yet another area in which the PRM scale outperforms asking individuals if some 
piece of media content is “political”: the PRM scale explains how people with stronger political 
identities come to engage in selective exposure to entertainment media, whereas the single-item 
“political” measure does not. In fact, not only is the “political” measure not a mediator between 
political identity strength and selective exposure, but the measure does not predict selective 
exposure to entertainment programs on its own. In the context of the finding from Study 3 that 
the single-item “political” measure was strongly affected by the presence/absence of politicians 
in a show, perhaps its weaknesses here are unsurprising. If the “political” measure is so strongly 
affected by the mere presence/absence of politicians in entertainment shows, then perhaps it’s 
not really as useful for determining the degree to which viewers consider programs depicting 
social issues to be politically relevant. In this case, the congeniality of the content might be of 
little concern when it comes to selection, since what the “political” item is telling us is whether 
the viewer identifies politicians/parties/polls in the show.  
In any event, my findings indicate the superiority of the PRM scale, as opposed to a 
single-item “political” measure, across the scale development studies and the studies testing the 
identification and selection hypotheses. Although the two are correlated, the PRM scale holds up 
better to validity checks and is less affected by partisan bias than the “political” measure. The 
PRM scale is a better indicator of which entertainment programs are evaluated as politically 
relevant, not just which shows are identified as depicting politicians/parties/polls. PRM can 
predict selective exposure, whereas the “political” measure cannot. Finally, the PRM scale acts 
as a mediator between political identity strength and selective exposure; the “political” measure 
does not. I discuss the implications of the differences between these measures as well as other 
findings in the next section. 
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Implications 
My findings present numerous implications regarding how political media are defined 
and how evaluations of the political relevance of media are measured, and how those matters 
translate into politically motivated selective exposure, particularly to entertainment television 
media. Likewise, viewers’ selective exposure to entertainment programs has downstream 
implications concerning political fragmentation of the entertainment media ecosystem and the 
persuasive capabilities (and limitations) of fictional entertainment media. 
Defining Political Media and Measuring Viewer Evaluations 
Although scholars have developed various typologies of political entertainment media 
(Eilders & Nitsch, 2015; Haas et al., 2015; Holbert, 2005) and there has been some study into 
what types of social media posts are evaluated as “political” (e.g., Settle, 2018; Vraga et al., 
2016), no quantitative social science research to date has explored viewer perceptions of the 
political relevance of fictional entertainment television. As I have demonstrated, individual 
viewers may have very different ideas of what television shows are politically relevant, 
particularly fictional entertainment programs. These findings demonstrate the futility of drawing 
an arbitrary distinction between entertainment media and other genres such as news, the political 
of relevance of which is taken as a given (Delli Carpini, 2014). Instead, whether media are 
evaluated as politically relevant is determined by both its content and the experiences, identities, 
and social factors of viewers (Holbert & Young, 2013). Thus, the entire media landscape—news, 
fictional entertainment, reality shows, documentaries, and so forth—may be evaluated as 
politically relevant to someone.  
One might say that this calls for political communication scholars to pay greater attention 
to entertainment media not just as media with potentially politically relevant effects, but as 
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political media itself. But as I have shown, and as others (Delli Carpini, 2014; Holbert & Young, 
2013) have suggested, defining any media as political media becomes irrelevant if any media is 
politically relevant. It’s all political—or at least all politically relevant—to someone. What 
matters in that determination is whose perspectives we choose to value. This is the case for any 
given type of media (e.g., music, movies, video games, magazines, etc.), but can be no clearer 
than in another area in which classifications of content as political or not has weighty 
ramifications: advertising, particularly on social media (McGregor, 2019). As social media 
platforms work to regulate political advertising, they have the task of defining what ads are 
political or not. Such decisions may privilege the speech of some individuals and groups over 
others, depending on the platform’s restrictions on political speech. Beyond the decisions of 
social media companies regarding political advertising, researchers should also take a closer look 
at what social media content is considered politically relevant by users (Guess et al., 2019; Settle, 
2018). Settle (2018) and Vraga et al. (2016) have done groundbreaking work in this area; 
however, their methods rely on explicitly asking whether content was “political” or for the 
purposes of “political information or opinion.” 
As I have demonstrated, asking a respondent how “political” media content is draws on a 
different evaluation of that content than do the items on the PRM scale. My findings point to a 
need to adopt the PRM scale or other more sophisticated measures of determining respondents’ 
evaluations of the political relevance of media content—if the goal is capturing more than 
whether those individuals identify that content as depicting politicians/parties/polls. As Guess et 
al. (2019) noted, it’s difficult for researchers to quantify exposure to or engagement with political 
content on social media if individual users hold different ideas about what content they are 
exposed to or they engaged with was about politics or was politically relevant. One of their 
 141 
recommendations is to provide examples of what the researchers mean by political content—
typically, social media content regarding politicians/parties/polls. Again, that’s all well and good 
if that’s what the researcher is attempting to assess; however, if the researcher is interested in the 
amount of media content a respondent comes across or engages with that the respondent 
evaluates as politically relevant, then using a simple “political” measure may not do. 
Still, the PRM scale is designed for the purpose of a single individual evaluating the 
political relevance of a single specific media text, e.g., a single show description or tweet, etc., 
not for evaluating the political relevance of a wide swath of content. A new variant of the scale 
would have to be created for this purpose. Likewise, the number of scale items has implications 
for questionnaire length. A researcher looking to use the scale would need to make room for 11 
items rather than just one. Since survey space is typically at a premium, researchers employing 
the scale would have to make tough choices regarding which and how many media stimuli are 
being used. Nevertheless, the superiority of the PRM scale over simply asking respondents how 
“political” media content is, including its ability to predict selective exposure, might make these 
other trade-offs worth it. 
Politically Motivated Selective Exposure 
To my knowledge, this dissertation is the first study to evidence that individuals select 
fictional entertainment media based on evaluations of media content as politically relevant. In the 
past, scholars have found associations between political identities and viewing behaviors 
regarding entertainment television (e.g., Blakley et al., 2019; Holbert et al., 2003); however, 
there was no indication that individuals thought of such programming as relevant to politics. 
Selective exposure to news media is already well established, the political relevance of which 
being taken as a given. I demonstrate here that individuals may think of entertainment media as 
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politically relevant—and the more they do so, the more they engage in selective exposure. 
Furthermore, evaluating entertainment media as more politically relevant is how individuals with 
stronger political identities come to engage in selective exposure.  
My findings call for a dramatic reimagining of political communication research 
regarding politically motivated selective exposure. First, attention must be paid to how people 
think of news media as politically relevant and how that affects selective exposure to news. This 
would involve researchers incorporating the PRM scale into surveys and experiments examining 
selective exposure. Although this would mean collecting PRM evaluations for each stimuli each 
participant is exposed to, doing so would greatly enhance our understanding of politically 
motivated selective exposure to news. We might find that selective exposure to news is more 
likely for news media evaluated as politically relevant, such that individuals don’t engage in 
selective exposure as much for news media they evaluate as less politically relevant.  
Second, the PRM concept illuminates the need to conduct politically motivated selective 
exposure research on entertainment media in addition to news media, including what that means 
for the fragmentation of the entertainment media ecosystem along political lines. In the 
preceding chapters I show that PRM evaluations affect selective exposure behaviors, and people 
sometimes evaluate entertainment media as just as, if not more, politically relevant as news 
media. Thus, political communication researchers need to look at entertainment media as another 
domain in which to find content that people evaluate as politically relevant and in which 
politically motivated selective exposure might occur. As I noted at the end of Chapter 4, PRM 
evaluations are central to whether selective exposure occurred for fictional entertainment shows, 
since participants in general didn’t seem to report greater preference for more-congenial 
programs than for less-congenial ones. Rather, my participants only seemed to report greater 
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preference for more-congenial shows when they thought of shows as more politically relevant. I 
discuss the possibility for future directions in politically motivated selective exposure research 
later in this chapter, but first we should ponder what this means for the development of different 
political enclaves within the entertainment media ecosystem. 
Political Fragmentation of the Entertainment Media Ecosystem 
The practice of politically motivated selective exposure to entertainment television could 
explain why conservatives and liberals watch different types of television entertainment 
programs (Blakley et al., 2019). If individuals with stronger political identities evaluate 
entertainment programs as more politically relevant and then in turn select more congenial shows 
over less congenial shows, then eventually these individuals will come to mostly watch shows 
that align with their current political viewpoints. In line with the reinforcing spirals model 
(Slater, 2007; 2015), this could lead to the reinforcing of political identities and the further 
selection of media that confirms one’s political beliefs. Conservatives and liberals, for example, 
will each watch programs that confirm their conservative or liberal beliefs, respectively, 
reinforcing their opinions on those issues and their ideological strength, leading to greater 
evaluation of future content as politically relevant, in turn leading to greater levels of selective 
exposure. Individuals with weaker political identities may continue to watch content conveying a 
broader range of issue positions, while those with stronger political identities are left 
unchallenged on their views by the entertainment content they consume. Not only could this lead 
to less commonality in what programs are watched by various groups of people at a time of 
unprecedented media choice, but it also shows a potential weak spot regarding the possibilities of 
narrative persuasion that have implications for political polarization and the formation and 
reinforcement of politically relevant attitudes.  
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Limitations on Narrative Persuasion 
There is considerable evidence that fictional narratives can influence politically relevant 
beliefs and attitudes (e.g., Donovan & Klahm, 2015; Gierzynski, 2018; Holbert et al., 2003); 
however, one must be exposed to a narrative for it to have an effect. If individuals engage in 
politically motivated selective exposure to fictional entertainment media, then they may be less 
likely to encounter information that could persuade them toward an alternative point of view. 
The only mode of narrative persuasion possible for these individuals would be the reinforcement 
of existing beliefs, leading to greater polarization. This is where attention to the dimensions 
comprising PRM is important, particularly controversy and perception of persuasive intent. 
Because perception of persuasive intent is a dimension of PRM, evaluation of media as 
politically relevant could act as a cue of forewarning of persuasive intent. The elaboration 
likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Briñol, & Priester, 2009) and reactance theory 
(J. W. Brehm, 1966; S. S. Brehm & Brehm, 1981) indicate that such perceptions, along with 
issue relevance, may determine elaboration regarding a particular message and reactance to 
counter-attitudinal messages. For viewers with stronger political identities, evaluating 
entertainment shows as politically relevant should serve as a cue forewarning them of persuasive 
intent, especially regarding personally relevant issues. This forewarning of persuasive intent 
should in turn motivate viewers to process messages centrally. Conversely, because viewers with 
weaker political identities should evaluate entertainment shows as less politically relevant, these 
viewers should be more likely to process the messages therein peripherally, notwithstanding 
other factors that affect central versus peripheral route processing. 
Like forewarning of persuasive intent (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979a), experiencing threat on 
an affective level leads to greater reactance and counter-arguing (Pfau et al., 2001). Simons and 
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Green (2018) demonstrated that being introduced to a controversial subject creates in people a 
sense of affective threat: the more dissensus regarding an issue an individual perceived, the more 
they felt under threat. This occurred regardless of whether individuals perceived to be in the 
majority or minority of opinion holders, or whether they perceived disagreement on an 
interpersonal level. Thus, when presented with divisive topics such as those present within 
politically relevant media, viewers are likely to experience feelings of threat in such a way that 
cue them toward psychological reactance, which is the phenomenon through which resistance to 
persuasion works. Previous work has demonstrated that forewarning of persuasive intent, as well 
as affective anger responses that could be elicited due to exposure to controversial topics, can 
lead to diminished effects of persuasion toward alterative viewpoints, especially when issue 
involvement is high or when the message is counter-attitudinal (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979b; 
1979a; Pfau et al., 2001; Quinn & Wood, 2004; Simons & Green, 2018). Because narrative 
related effects such as transportation and character identification are expected to reduce counter-
argumentation (Dal Cin, Zanna, & Fong, 2004; Moyer-Gusé, 2008; Slater & Rouner, 2002; 
Slater et al., 2006), the generation of counter-arguing even in the face of such effects is likely to 
be a harbinger of ineffective persuasion toward alternative points of view. 
What does this leave us with? Individuals with stronger political identities should engage 
in selective exposure to entertainment media, leading to their preexisting attitudes being 
reinforced and greater polarization. If they are forcibly or inadvertently exposed to uncongenial 
entertainment media, they are likely to engage in reactance and counter-arguing—which will 
likely also result in reinforcement of their existing beliefs. It is individuals with weaker political 
identities, who are also likely to have weaker attitudes toward one position or another anyway, 
who might experience any sort of narrative persuasion other than reinforcement of pre-existing 
 146 
strong attitudes. Thus, as promising as narrative persuasion is in terms of achieving attitude 
change, it may only be successful in this fashion for people whose minds are already open to 
change. This is one of several areas for future research related to PRM and selective exposure to 
entertainment media. 
Future Directions 
Given the implications of my findings, there are several promising directions this 
research could take in the future. The PRM scale needs to be tested more broadly in terms of 
both media stimuli and attributes of media consumers. The effects of cues about the media text 
originating from outside of the text (e.g., a real-life politician’s statements about a fictional 
television show) should also be explored. Additionally, much work could go into assessing the 
effects of PRM evaluations on selective exposure and fragmentation, as well as on narrative 
persuasion and what it means for the development of political attitudes. 
Addressing Methodological and Analytical Shortcomings 
The studies I present are not without their shortcomings that should be addressed in 
future research. For example, a closer look should be given to why conservatives and 
Republicans report higher PRM scores than do their Democrat and liberal counterparts. Although 
it may be a result of existing partisan and ideological attitudes toward the media industry in 
general and entertainment media specifically, other causes should be explored. And though I 
controlled for conservatism in all of my analyses and I found no congruence effects when it came 
to PRM evaluations, we must think carefully about the implications of these partisan and 
ideological differences in PRM scores. Likewise, the PRM scale should be tested with media 
depicting an even wider range of social issues. Although the issues I chose appeared in both 
Democratic and Republican 2016 party platforms, indicating that both parties have some concern 
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regarding those issues, it could be that one party or another still owns the issue (Petrocik, 1996). 
Thus, even if both parties seek to advance their positions regarding, say, the environment, this 
issue may still be seen as an issue owned by Democrats and liberals. 
Although I took steps to recruit a balanced proportion of Democrats, Republicans, and 
Independents/Others in my samples, and the samples used for studies 3 and 4 were reflective of 
the U.S. population along other demographic factors, this is no substitute for nationally 
representative samples. This is not to say that all social science research requires nationally 
representative samples, especially experimental work; however, employing such samples would 
expand the applicability of my findings. Likewise, future research should address the degree to 
which the PRM concept applies to international samples and media environments. There is also 
the matter of how to account for prior exposure and show familiarity. Because I measured show 
familiarity and prior exposure in Study 3 after the treatments were administered, I could not use 
them as control variables (Montgomery et al., 2018). Although performing the analyses with and 
without familiarity as a control produced similar results, future research assessing PRM 
evaluations of existing media should address this by measuring familiarity and prior exposure in 
a way that does not limit the utility of these measures as control variables, or even as moderators. 
Finally, although textual descriptions of audiovisual media such as television programs 
have been deployed successfully in previous research and viewers have access to textual 
descriptions of television media before exposure, viewers might still process a textual description 
differently than a video preview. Video stimuli are much more difficult to create and control than 
textual stimuli; however, this is still an expense that should be made in future research. 
Examining External Cues 
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In addition to expanding the stimuli to audiovisual media, future research should consider 
cues about media content that exist from outside of the content itself. In a way, a textual 
description of a television show is external to the show itself; however, what I’m referring to 
here are cues regarding the show from some other source. This could be statements by politicians 
(e.g., President Trump’s statements about the television show Roseanne; see Kelsey, 2018), 
endorsements from friends, reviews or commentary in other media, etc. All of these things could 
give clues regarding what objects are depicted in the show and what positions are advocated for 
regarding social issues. Apart from cues regarding the show content, external cues could inform 
assessments related to the three dimensions of the political (collective 
concerns/decisions/consequences, perception of persuasive intent, and controversy). Thus, future 
research should examine how cues external to the media content itself affect PRM evaluations. 
Expanding to Other Media 
Although I designed the PRM scale such that it could be used for media beyond 
television shows, its applicability to other media should be tested. As mentioned in the previous 
section regarding how political media are defined, this includes social media content, to include 
advertising. Beyond social media, I see future applicability of the PRM concept and scale to 
virtually any form of media—books, magazines, video games, music, movies, etc. All of these 
media may carry politically relevant information, and debates abound regarding their political 
relevance and the intentions of their creators (Haas et al., 2015).  
Expanding to Other Viewer Identities 
In this dissertation I examine how political identity strength affects PRM evaluations and, 
in turn, selective exposure to fictional entertainment television programming. Other social 
identities may also affect PRM evaluations, in particular identities such as race/ethnicity, gender 
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identity, sexual orientation, disability, etc. In a way, all of these identities could fall into the 
category of issue public membership; however, the two may not necessarily be the same thing. 
For example, it is perhaps the case that women think of gender discrimination as a more 
important issue than men; however, not only may some men care very deeply about gender 
equality, but they may be more deeply invested in the issue than some women. Thus, future 
research should examine whether membership in some arbitrary set group such as gender or race 
and/or being a strong member of those issue publics lead to differential PRM evaluation for 
shows depicting related issues. 
There is the additional question of how political identities are being measured as they 
pertain to moral foundations (Graham et al., 2009; 2011). Although the MIME (Tamborini, 
2011; 2013) and previous research (Long & Eveland, 2018; Tamborini et al., 2013) indicate that 
the salience of moral domains predicts media selection, previous research finds that moral 
domain salience may be an outcome of ideology as a political identity (Ciuk, 2018; Hatemi et al., 
2019). In this case, moral domain salience is merely a proxy for partisan or ideological identity, 
rather than some separate phenomenon. If so, what the MIME really predicts is selective 
exposure to entertainment media that conforms to one’s ideological identity. Future research 
should examine if the strength of moral domain salience can predict PRM evaluations and 
possibly lead to politically motivated selective exposure. In this case, PRM evaluations would 
serve as a mediator between moral domain salience and selective exposure, with the strength of 
moral domain salience predicting greater evaluations of media as politically relevant and greater 
evaluations of media as politically relevant predicting greater selective exposure to media 
content. The implications of this research could lead to the fusion of the MIME with the PRM 
concept and evaluation. 
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Examining News Selective Exposure and Entertainment Media Fragmentation 
As I alluded to in the Implications section above, future research should also employ the 
PRM scale in the study of politically motivated selective exposure to news media. This is 
important because of the current assumption that news media is politically relevant, therefore 
selective exposure to news media is politically motivated selective exposure. As Study 3 
indicated, political identity strength influences the degree to which people evaluate news media 
as being politically relevant. There’s a possibility that such evaluations affect the degree to 
which individuals engage in selective exposure to news media. Selective exposure to news media 
evaluated as more politically relevant would be clear evidence of politically motivated selective 
exposure rather than simply the assumption of it. 
In terms of entertainment media, future research should examine whether PRM 
evaluations lead to fragmentation of entertainment media audiences along political lines. 
Although previous research shows that individuals with different political identities watch 
different entertainment television shows, the role of PRM evaluations in this process must 
actually be demonstrated. The aim of such research would be to determine if individuals with 
stronger political identities over time end up primarily selecting entertainment media that aligns 
with their political beliefs, leading to increasingly politically segregated enclaves in the 
entertainment media ecosystem. Longitudinal methods might be ideal for addressing this 
question, with assessments over time regarding the political relevance of available entertainment 
shows. 
Examining Downstream Effects on Narrative Persuasion 
As I outline in the Implications section above, politically motivated selective exposure to 
entertainment media and the dimensions of PRM could pose some limits for the effectiveness of 
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narrative persuasion. This is an area ripe for exploration. For example, are higher scores on the 
CON dimension associated with greater feelings of affective threat? Do stronger perceptions of 
controversy and of persuasive intent translate to more counter-arguing? Is it at all possible for 
narrative persuasion from entertainment media to work to coax individuals with strong political 
identities toward an alternative viewpoint? Or is the potential for narrative persuasion only 
applicable for individuals with weaker political identities who might already be more prone to 
attitude development or change? If so, then entertainment media may more closely mirror news 
media in terms of the (in)ability of attitude change to occur due to the strength of individuals’ 
political identities. This, and the findings of this dissertation, is all the more reason why political 
communication scholars should focus increased attention on how people evaluate entertainment 
media as politically relevant and what the effects could be on media selection and persuasion. 
Conclusion 
The list of new ways to access fictional entertainment media seems to grow every day. 
Rather than kill the television industry, the growth of the Internet and related technologies has 
led to even more ways for people to access news, information, and especially entertainment 
content. Considering previously evidenced patterns of political divides in the consumption of 
entertainment television content and the potential for entertainment media to influence politically 
relevant attitudes and beliefs, we must wonder to what degree political polarization is occurring 
by way of entertainment media. Answering this question requires new methods of measuring 
how politically relevant individuals evaluate entertainment media as being. In this dissertation, I 
developed the Politically Relevant Media (PRM) scale to that end, then demonstrated that 
political identity strength affects PRM evaluations of media, which predict politically motivated 
selective exposure to fictional entertainment media. 
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Not only is this dissertation the first research venture to evidence politically motivated 
selective exposure to fictional entertainment media, but it also raises implications for the future 
study of politically motivated selective exposure to both news and entertainment media. 
Regardless of genre or medium, I have demonstrated the importance in considering how 
individuals’ political identities and the objects depicted in media texts affect evaluations of how 
politically relevant that media text is. I also find that we cannot assume that people will consider 
news media to be more politically relevant than entertainment media. In sum, it’s more important 
to take a viewer-centric approach to determining whether media is politically relevant rather than 
scholars drawing arbitrary distinctions that may not exist in media consumers’ minds. There 
really is no such thing as media that is political or non-political; rather, any media may be of 
greater lesser political relevance to any given media consumer. 
Because scholars have ignored the possibility of politically motivated selective exposure 
to entertainment media, this is where I believe this line of research makes the biggest impact. My 
findings offer an explanation for why there are political fractures in entertainment media 
audiences. The result of politically motivated selective exposure to entertainment media is the 
potential for greater political polarization. Individuals with stronger political identities will 
expose themselves to more politically congenial media over time, likely reinforcing their existing 
political beliefs. This also places limits on the ability of fictional narratives carrying alternate 
viewpoints to persuade them. And because of the subdomains of the PRM concept, namely 
controversy and perception of persuasive intent, such individuals are likely to reject persuasive 
appeals upon incidental or forced exposure. The individuals most likely to expose themselves to 
potentially uncongenial narratives are those with weaker political identities in the first place. 
 153 
The rate at which people consume entertainment media as compared to news media 
makes the potential for political polarization via entertainment media even more significant. 
Although people with stronger political identities (and with greater political interest) likely 
consume more news that individuals with weaker political identities, very few people completely 
avoid entertainment media. Entertainment programming makes up the bulk of television 
consumption (TiVo, 2019), meaning that political polarization could be advanced by a much 
wider range of the media that people consume. As the PRM concept is expanded to other media 
(e.g., video games, music, magazines, etc.), we might find that politically motivated selective 
exposure is occurring in even more media contexts—which means that political polarization may 
also be occurring in those contexts. This dissertation lays the groundwork for such an expansive 
examination of politically motivated selective exposure, one that dispenses with the definitions 
and boundaries imposed by researchers and instead centers the viewer’s evaluation of media as 
politically relevant.  
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Appendix A 
Television Show Descriptions 
Overviews and Synopses of Real Television Shows for Studies 1-3 
 
News Show, Politicians/Parties/Polls #1: 
 
ABC World News Tonight is a daily evening news program currently anchored by David 
Muir (on weekdays) and Tom Llamas (on weekends). Airing on ABC, the show provides in-
depth reporting on news events from the U.S. and around the world. 
In this episode, Mary Bruce reports on U.S. President Donald Trump and former Vice 
President and current Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden both campaigning in Iowa. 
Muir and Bruce discuss recent poll numbers of a match-up between the two candidates, with 
Biden beating Trump at 53 percent versus 40 percent. Muir states that the same poll shows Biden 
ahead of other Democratic candidates, including senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren. 
 
News Show, Politicians/Parties/Polls #2: 
 
CBS Evening News is a daily evening news program currently anchored by Norah 
O’Donnell (on weekdays), Reena Ninan (on Saturdays), and Elaine Quijano (on Sundays). 
Airing on CBS, the show provides in-depth news coverage on events in the U.S. and across the 
world. 
In this episode, former anchor Jeff Glor and chief congressional correspondent Nancy 
Cordes discuss U.S. Representative Nancy Pelosi being elected the new Speaker of the House of 
Representatives. Pelosi became House Speaker after Democrats gained control of a majority of 
House seats from the Republicans. Democrats in the House then voted for Pelosi to become 
Speaker. As one of her first duties, Pelosi swore in newly elected members of the House. 
 
News Show, Social Issues (Health care costs): 
 
ABC World News Tonight is a daily evening news program currently anchored by David 
Muir (on weekdays) and Tom Llamas (on weekends). Airing on ABC, the show provides in-
depth reporting on news events from the U.S. and around the world. 
In this episode, Adrienne Bankert reports on direct primary care, a new option that 
patients are using to avoid costly health care premiums. Instead of paying a higher insurance 
premium, patients pay a lower monthly membership fee for direct primary care. Bankert 
interviews a mother whose family was paying $900 a month in insurance premiums: 
“Our health insurance is almost as much as our house payment, really.” With direct primary care 
plus a catastrophic coverage plan, the family now pays about half that amount.
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News Show, Social Issues (Marijuana/Drugs): 
 
CBS Evening News is a daily evening news program currently anchored by Norah 
O’Donnell (on weekdays), Reena Ninan (on Saturdays), and Elaine Quijano (on Sundays). 
Airing on CBS, the show provides in-depth news coverage on events in the U.S. and across the 
world. 
In this episode, former anchor Jeff Glor and chief medical correspondent Dr. John 
LaPook report on and discuss an increase in the number of people treated in Colorado emergency 
rooms due to marijuana. LaPook states that cannabis-related ER visits more than quadrupled in a 
five-year period. This was partly because people may not know how to use the drug safely. Glor 
notes that there is a particular concern that young children could accidentally eat marijuana 
edibles, causing undesired effects. 
 
Entertainment Show (Sitcom), Politicians/Parties/Polls #1: 
 
Veep is a fictional comedy series that follows U.S. Vice President Selina Meyer. The 
show focuses on her career as vice president, along with the inner workings of her staff, family, 
allies, and rivals. Selina tries to balance the demands of being a vice president while connecting 
with her daughter, Catherine. Selina maintains a complicated relationship with her ex-husband, 
Andrew. 
In this episode, Selina goes to Iowa to meet with potential voters while she decides who 
will run her presidential campaign. She learns that a highly sought-after campaign manager is in 
her area attending the funeral of a congressman. Selina decides to crash the funeral for a chance 
to meet the campaign manager and offer him the job. 
 
Entertainment Show (Sitcom), Politicians/Parties/Polls #2: 
 
1600 Penn is a fictional comedy series that follows U.S. President Dale Gilchrist, his 
wife Emily, and their family. The show focuses on his career as president, along with the inner 
workings of his family, staff, allies, and rivals. Dale tries to advance his agenda while avoiding 
scandals caused by his goofball son Skip. 
In this episode, Dale and Emily fail to gain support from Senator Thoroughgood, a 
powerful rival, for a bill being voted on in Congress. At a ball held in Thoroughgood’s honor on 
the night of the vote, Skip causes a scene while trying to impress his date. When the senators are 
called to Capitol Hill for the vote, Emily gets Skip to cause a diversion to prevent Thoroughgood 
from leaving and voting against the bill. 
 
Entertainment Show (Sitcom), Social Issues (Health care costs): 
 
Friends is a fictional comedy series that follows six friends in their twenties – Chandler 
and roommate Joey, Rachel and roommate Monica, Monica’s brother Ross, and Phoebe. 
Throughout the show, the friends deal with their friendships, careers, and romantic lives while 
living in Manhattan, New York City. 
In this episode, Rachel has to go to the hospital after she falls and hurts her ankle. As 
Monica helps her fill out paperwork, Rachel reveals that she doesn’t have health insurance. 
 156 
Monica tells Rachel that the x-rays alone might cost several hundred dollars. Rachel, who works 
as a waitress, is unsure how she’ll be able to afford to pay for the hospital visit. 
 
Entertainment Show (Sitcom), Social Issues (Marijuana/Drugs): 
 
Workaholics is a fictional comedy series that follows three friends – Blake, Adam, and 
Anders – who are roommates in southern California. Blake and Adam were college roommates 
and Anders was their resident assistant before they all dropped out of school. The three work 
together at a telemarketing company, where they often bicker with their boss and coworkers due 
to their lack of work ethic and refusal to take anything seriously. 
In this episode, Blake and Adam, who smoke marijuana regularly, play a prank on 
Anders. Anders gets so upset that he also smokes marijuana. The next day they find out that 
they’ll be drug tested at work. If they fail the drug test, they’ll lose their jobs as telemarketers. 
The three try to find a way to pass the drug test. 
 
Entertainment Show (Drama), Politicians/Parties/Polls #1: 
 
Scandal is a fictional drama series that follows crisis management expert Olivia Pope. 
The show focuses on her career as head of a firm handling crises related to multiple U.S. 
presidents, congresspeople, and other powerful figures in Washington, D.C. Throughout the 
show, Olivia and her team deal with national and international crises. Meanwhile, she maintains 
a fragile relationship with her father, a well-connected yet shadowy figure with lots of secrets. 
In this episode, Olivia works to prepare a client who’s running for president for an 
upcoming debate. A friend of Olivia tries to recruit her to work for a different candidate, but she 
stands by her client. Meanwhile, Olivia learns that her father has been secretly funding the 
campaign of a rival presidential candidate. 
 
Entertainment Show (Drama), Politicians/Parties/Polls #2: 
 
Madam Secretary is a fictional drama series that follows U.S. Secretary of State 
Elizabeth McCord. The show focuses on her career as secretary of state and later as president, 
her family, her staff, and other powerful figures in Washington, D.C. The U.S. President, Conrad 
Dalton, is a long-time mentor of Elizabeth’s. Her eldest daughter, Stevie, is an intern for 
Dalton’s chief of staff. 
In this episode, Elizabeth must deal with a rival in the Senate who opposes the president’s 
agenda and is running against her for president. Meanwhile, she finds out that her youngest 
daughter, Alison, has started dating the son of another one of her rivals. Elizabeth warns her 
family that their personal lives will be scrutinized during the presidential election. 
 
Entertainment Show (Drama), Social Issues (Health care costs): 
 
Grey’s Anatomy is a fictional drama series that follows medical doctor Meredith Grey. 
She and a team of interns, residents, and attending doctors work at a Seattle hospital. Meredith 
and her coworkers struggle to balance caring for their patients while maintaining their personal 
lives. Throughout the series they become more experienced doctors while dealing with the 
demands of the medical field.   
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In this episode, Teddy, one of Meredith’s colleagues, runs into a patient who’s being 
discharged from the hospital even though he needs further care. The patient has a serious health 
issue but doesn’t have enough health insurance to pay for the critical care he needs. Teddy tries 
to see if she can find a way to get the patient’s treatments paid for. 
 
Entertainment Show (Drama), Social Issues (Marijuana/Drugs): 
 
Parenthood is a fictional drama series that follows the four siblings of the Braverman 
family – Sarah, Adam, Julia, and Crosby – as they each try to raise their children in Berkeley, 
California. Sarah and Adam both have teenage daughters, while Julia and Crosby both have 
younger children. Amber, who is Sarah’s daughter, is an intern at her aunt Julia’s law firm. 
In this episode, Amber deals with the disappointment of not getting into college. She and 
her boyfriend, who also works at the law firm, smoke marijuana in the office after work. Julia 
confronts her niece about being high at work the next day. Amber quits her internship and storms 
out of the office, embarrassing Julia in front of her coworkers. 
 
Overviews and Synopses of Mock Television Shows for Study 4 
Hawkins Point 
 
Hawkins Point is a new fictional [comedy/drama] series that follows the Hawkins family 
– father Bob, mother Judy, son Jake, and daughter Katie – in a small Midwestern town. Bob 
manages a local restaurant, and Judy is a nurse. High school junior Katie is excited about the 
prospect of going off to college, while Jake and friends contemplate the transition from middle 
school to high school. Tom, Judy’s father, is a retired firefighter who also lives in the 
neighborhood. Neighbors Larry and Linda, while a bit annoying, are a stable presence in the 
Hawkins’s lives. 
 
Health care costs: 
 
In this episode, Judy deals with an obnoxious patient at the hospital. Bob learns that Eric, 
one of his close friends, has taken on massive debt after his wife's unexpected health crisis leaves 
them with a huge medical bill. Katie tries to lay low after Linda spies her sneaking out one night 
to go to a party. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Tom tells Bob that no one should ever have to go into debt 
just to receive health care and that health care should be provided to everyone for free. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Tom tells Bob that he thinks people should take 
responsibility for their own health care costs, rather than making other people pay for it. 
 
Marijuana/Drugs: 
In this episode, Judy deals with an obnoxious patient at the hospital. Bob learns that Eric, 
one of his close friends, might lose his job after his boss finds out he uses marijuana. Katie tries 
to lay low after Linda spies her sneaking out one night to go to a party. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Tom tells Bob that anti-marijuana rules hurt people without 
protecting the community and that adults should be allowed to use it responsibly. 
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[Republican/Conservative stem]: Tom tells Bob that he thinks marijuana is a very 
dangerous drug that poses a safety threat for their community. 
 
Environment: 
 
In this episode, Judy deals with an obnoxious patient at the hospital. Bob learns that Eric, 
one of his close friends, must find a new, environmentally friendly vendor for his business, but it 
ends up costing him more money. Katie tries to lay low after Linda spies her sneaking out one 
night to go to a party. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Tom tells Bob that a clean environment is a human right and 
that businesses need to do their part to fight against increasing pollution. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Tom tells Bob that environmental extremists forcing 
rules on everyone is bad for business and that Eric should do whatever is best for him. 
 
Religion/LGBT: 
 
In this episode, Judy deals with an obnoxious patient at the hospital. Bob learns from 
Eric, one of his close friends, that a bakery in town refused to make a wedding cake for him and 
his fiancé, Adam. Katie tries to lay low after Linda spies her sneaking out one night to go to a 
party. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Tom tells Bob that everyone is entitled to equal rights and it’s 
not fair for the bakery to discriminate against Eric and Adam. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Tom tells Bob that marriage is between a man and a 
woman and the bakery owners shouldn’t be forced to violate their religious beliefs. 
 
The Beat 
 
The Beat is a new fictional [comedy/drama] series that follows four friends – Derek, 
Sarah, Amy, and Chris – trying to make it in the music industry in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
Derek, who sings and plays guitar, drummer Sarah, and bassist Chris are in a band together, and 
Amy is Sarah’s roommate who’s learning the ropes as a music promoter. Sarah’s uncle, Will, 
owns a local venue where the band sometimes plays. The band chases their dreams of a big break 
while balancing their personal lives and the excitement of living in Steel City. 
 
Health care costs: 
 
In this episode, Amy works to get the band a spot in an upcoming local music festival. 
Derek learns that Cameron, one of his close friends, has taken on massive debt after his wife's 
unexpected health crisis leaves them with a huge medical bill. Sarah and Chris start working 
together on a new song but keep it a secret from Derek. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Will tells Derek that no one should ever have to go into debt 
just to receive health care and that health care should be provided to everyone for free. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Will tells Derek that he thinks people should take 
responsibility for their own health care costs, rather than making other people pay for it. 
 
Marijuana/Drugs: 
 159 
In this episode, Amy works to get the band a spot in an upcoming local music festival. 
Derek learns that Cameron, one of his close friends, might lose his job after his boss finds out he 
uses marijuana. Sarah and Chris start working together on a new song but keep it a secret from 
Derek. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Will tells Derek that anti-marijuana rules hurt people without 
protecting the community and that adults should be allowed to use it responsibly. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Will tells Derek that he thinks marijuana is a very 
dangerous drug that poses a safety threat for their community. 
 
Environment: 
 
In this episode, Amy works to get the band a spot in an upcoming local music festival. 
Derek learns that Cameron, one of his close friends, must find a new, environmentally friendly 
vendor for his business, but it ends up costing him more money. Sarah and Chris start working 
together on a new song but keep it a secret from Derek. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Will tells Derek that a clean environment is a human right 
and that businesses need to do their part to fight against increasing pollution. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Will tells Derek that environmental extremists forcing 
rules on everyone is bad for business and that Cameron should do whatever is best for him. 
 
Religion/LGBT: 
 
In this episode, Amy works to get the band a spot in an upcoming local music festival. 
Derek learns from Cameron, one of his close friends, that a bakery in town refused to make a 
wedding cake for him and his fiancé, Adam. Sarah and Chris start working together on a new 
song but keep it a secret from Derek. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Will tells Derek that everyone is entitled to equal rights and 
it’s not fair for the bakery to discriminate against Cameron and Adam. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Will tells Derek that marriage is between a man and a 
woman and the bakery owners shouldn’t be forced to violate their religious beliefs. 
 
Savannah 
 
Savannah is a new fictional [comedy/drama] series that follows the Miller family – father 
Jason, mother Aileen, son Dan, and daughter Lizzie – living in Savannah, Georgia. Jason co-
owns a small but growing advertising agency that his father started, and Aileen teaches math at 
the local high school. Dan pursues his passion for soccer on his high school varsity team, while 
nine-year-old Lizzie dreams of following in his footsteps. Doug, Jason’s business partner, is a 
close friend of the family who started the agency with Jason’s father. 
 
Health care costs: 
 
In this episode, Aileen prepares her high school team for an upcoming math competition. 
Jason learns that Ian, one of his close friends, has taken on massive debt after his wife's 
unexpected health crisis leaves them with a huge medical bill. Dan’s failing grades put him in 
danger of being kicked off of the soccer team, but he hides it from his parents. 
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[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Doug tells Jason that no one should ever have to go into debt 
just to receive health care and that health care should be provided to everyone for free. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Doug tells Jason that he thinks people should take 
responsibility for their own health care costs, rather than making other people pay for it. 
 
Marijuana/Drugs: 
In this episode, Aileen prepares her high school team for an upcoming math competition. 
Jason learns that Ian, one of his close friends, might lose his job after his boss finds out he uses 
marijuana. Dan’s failing grades put him in danger of being kicked off of the soccer team, but he 
hides it from his parents. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Doug tells Jason that anti-marijuana rules hurt people without 
protecting the community and that adults should be allowed to use it responsibly. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Doug tells Jason that he thinks marijuana is a very 
dangerous drug that poses a safety threat for their community. 
 
Environment: 
 
In this episode, Aileen prepares her high school team for an upcoming math competition. 
Jason learns that Ian, one of his close friends, must find a new, environmentally friendly vendor 
for his business, but it ends up costing him more money. Dan’s failing grades put him in danger 
of being kicked off of the soccer team, but he hides it from his parents. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Doug tells Jason that a clean environment is a human right 
and that businesses need to do their part to fight against increasing pollution. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Doug tells Jason that environmental extremists forcing 
rules on everyone is bad for business and that Ian should do whatever is best for him. 
 
Religion/LGBT: 
 
In this episode, Aileen prepares her high school team for an upcoming math competition. 
Jason learns from Ian, one of his close friends, that a bakery in town refused to make a wedding 
cake for him and his fiancé, Kyle. Dan’s failing grades put him in danger of being kicked off of 
the soccer team, but he hides it from his parents. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Doug tells Jason that everyone is entitled to equal rights and 
it’s not fair for the bakery to discriminate against Ian and Kyle. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Doug tells Jason that marriage is between a man and a 
woman and the bakery owners shouldn’t be forced to violate their religious beliefs. 
 
The Turnaround 
 
The Turnaround is a new fictional [comedy/drama] series that follows Michael Emery, a 
recent law school graduate who moves back to his small hometown to be closer to his family. He 
finds that not much has changed, yet everything seems different. Michael’s best friend Shaun, 
who he’s known all his life, runs a gym in town. Michael’s high school girlfriend, Kimmy, works 
at the same grocery store as Michael’s younger sister, Stacy. Nick, Michael’s father, a retired 
mechanic, and his piano teacher mother, Janice, also live in the neighborhood.  
 161 
 
Health care costs: 
 
In this episode, Shaun thinks of ways to grow the membership base of the gym. Michael 
learns that Zach, one of his close friends, has taken on massive debt after his wife's unexpected 
health crisis leaves them with a huge medical bill. Stacy finds out that she got a promotion that 
she and Kimmy were both in the running for. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Nick tells Michael that no one should ever have to go into 
debt just to receive health care and that health care should be provided to everyone for free. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Nick tells Michael that he thinks people should take 
responsibility for their own health care costs, rather than making other people pay for it. 
 
Marijuana/Drugs: 
In this episode, Shaun thinks of ways to grow the membership base of the gym. Michael 
learns that Zach, one of his close friends, might lose his job after his boss finds out he uses 
marijuana. Stacy finds out that she got a promotion that she and Kimmy were both in the running 
for. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Nick tells Michael that anti-marijuana rules hurt people 
without protecting the community and that adults should be allowed to use it responsibly. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Nick tells Michael that he thinks marijuana is a very 
dangerous drug that poses a safety threat for their community. 
 
Environment: 
 
In this episode, Shaun thinks of ways to grow the membership base of the gym. Michael 
learns that Zach, one of his close friends, must find a new, environmentally friendly vendor for 
his business, but it ends up costing him more money. Stacy finds out that she got a promotion 
that she and Kimmy were both in the running for. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Nick tells Michael that a clean environment is a human right 
and that businesses need to do their part to fight against increasing pollution. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Nick tells Michael that environmental extremists 
forcing rules on everyone is bad for business and that Zach should do whatever is best for him. 
 
Religion/LGBT: 
 
In this episode, Shaun thinks of ways to grow the membership base of the gym. Michael 
learns from Zach, one of his close friends, that a bakery in town refused to make a wedding cake 
for him and his fiancé, Scott. Stacy finds out that she got a promotion that she and Kimmy were 
both in the running for. 
[Democratic/Liberal stem]: Nick tells Michael that everyone is entitled to equal rights 
and it’s not fair for the bakery to discriminate against Zach and Scott. 
[Republican/Conservative stem]: Nick tells Michael that marriage is between a man and a 
woman and the bakery owners shouldn’t be forced to violate their religious beliefs. 
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Appendix B 
Pre-Tests 
Stimuli Pre-Tests 
I recruited a total of 155 participants from MTurk from Jan. 10-16, 2020, to pre-test the 
stimuli for studies 1 through 3. In an initial round of pre-testing, 75 participants were randomly 
assigned six of the 12 show descriptions and were asked which genre (i.e., news, sitcom, drama, 
cooking, game show, reality, sports, travel) they thought best described the show. They were also 
asked what objects (i.e., politicians, the cost of health care, marijuana, terrorism, climate change, 
football, country music, fashion, or none of these) were mentioned in the show. I used a one-
sample t-test to determine if the percentage of participants who picked the intended genre or 
object statistically significantly differed from the percentage who picked the next most 
frequently guessed genre or object. Ten of the stimuli passed the first round of pre-testing. I 
revised and re-tested the other two stimuli in two additional rounds (n = 40 each) of pre-testing 
until they passed; see tables B.1 and B.2. 
I recruited a total of 321 MTurk participants for the Study 4 pre-test from Feb. 6-11, 
2020. Because not all of the manipulations were successful in the first round (n = 161), I 
modified the stimuli and ran a second round of pre-testing (n = 160), the results of which are 
reported here. Participants were randomly assigned four shows using a 2 (congeniality: congenial 
vs. uncongenial) x 2 (genre: sitcom vs. drama) x 4 (one of four social issues) design, with 
congeniality operationalized as the show expressing a Democratic/liberal issue position or a 
Republican/conservative issue position. The partisan/ideological positions were derived from the 
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Table B.1. Percentage of pre-testers who guessed the objects depicted in stimuli for studies 1-3. 
Show Object N t PPP Health Marijuana Football Country Fashion Terrorism None 
ABC World News 
Tonight 
Health 35 13.16 2.86 91.43 2.86 - - - - 2.86 
CBS Evening News Marijuana 39 10.25 2.86 5.13 87.18 2.56 - - - 2.86 
ABC World News 
Tonight 
PPP 35 16.73 97.14 - - 2.86 - - - - 
CBS Evening News PPP 38 13.10 89.47 2.63 - 2.63 2.63 - - 2.63 
Friends Health 31 6.25 - 80.65 3.23 - - 3.23 3.23 9.68 
Workaholics Marijuana 43 20.72 - - 97.67 - - - - 2.33 
Veep PPP 40 10.56 87.50 - - - 2.50 2.50 2.50 5.00 
1600 Penn PPP 40 12.09 92.50 - - 2.50 - - - 5.00 
Grey’s Anatomy Health 36 10.75 - 91.67 - 2.78 - - - 5.56 
Parenthood Marijuana 31 6.66 3.23 - 83.87 3.23 - - - 9.68 
Scandal PPP 38 14.39 92.10 - - 2.63 2.63 - - 2.63 
Madam Secretary PPP 40 9.62 90.0 - 2.50 - 7.50 - - - 
Note: PPP = Politicians/Parties/Polls. No pre-testers guessed that climate change was depicted. The ps for all t-tests were < .001. 
 
Table B.2. Percentage of pre-testers who guessed the genres depicted in stimuli for studies 1-3. 
Show Genre N t p News Sitcom Drama Cooking Game Reality Sports 
ABC World News Tonight News 34 - < .001 100 - - - - - - 
CBS Evening News News 39 10.25 < .001 87.18 - 5.13 2.56 - 2.56 2.56 
ABC World News Tonight News 35 9.68 < .001 88.57 - 2.86 - - 5.71 2.86 
CBS Evening News News 38 9.95 < .001 86.84 2.63 2.63 2.63 - 5.26 - 
Friends Sitcom 31 5.15 < .001 - 77.42 12.90 - 3.23 3.23 3.23 
Workaholics Sitcom 43 6.00 < .001 2.33 79.07 13.95 - - 4.65 - 
Veep Sitcom 40 2.11 .041 2.50 60.00 30.00 - - 5.00 2.50 
1600 Penn Sitcom 40 3.02 .004 2.50 70.00 27.50 - - - - 
Grey’s Anatomy Drama 36 17.23 < .001 - - 97.22 - - - 2.78 
Parenthood Drama 31 6.66 < .001 - 9.68 83.87 - - 3.23 3.23 
Scandal Drama 37 13.99 < .001 - - 91.89 2.70 2.70 2.70 - 
Madam Secretary Drama 40 9.92 < .001 5.00 5.00 85.00 - - 5.00 - 
Note: No pre-testers guessed that the genre was travel.  
 164 
2016 party platforms (Committee on Arrangements for the 2016 Republican National 
Convention, 2016; Democratic Platform Committee, 2016). Each participant evaluated two 
sitcoms and two dramas, with each genre conveying one Republican/conservative message and 
one Democrat/liberal message, across all four social issues (the cost of health care, marijuana as 
a public safety concern, environmental regulations, and anti-LGBTQ discrimination). As in the 
pre-test for studies 1 through 3, participants were asked to identify which genre they thought 
each show was, using the same response categories. They were also asked what objects were 
mentioned in the show, with “The environment,” “LGBTQ issues,” and “Technology” replacing 
politicians and country music as response categories. As with the previous pre-test, I used a one-
sample t-test to determine if the percentage of participants who picked the intended genre or 
object statistically significantly differed from the percentage who picked the next most 
frequently guessed genre or object. All of the stimuli passed the pre-test for genre and object; see 
tables B.3 and B.4. 
To check the manipulations of the issue positions, I asked participants how well they 
though the views presented in the show aligned with the views of four groups: liberals, 
conservatives, the Democratic party, and the Republican party, randomized. Response options 
were on a 1 to 5 scale: “Not at all well,” “A little well,” “Moderately well,” “Very well,” and 
“Extremely well.” Overall, the scores for alignment with the Democratic Party and with liberals 
were higher than the scores for alignment with the GOP and with conservatives; see tables B.5 
and B.6. Table B.7 reports the M and SD for the group alignment items for shows delivering a 
Democratic/liberal message and shows delivering a Republican/conservative message, for each 
issue. I also ran linear mixed models to predict each alignment measure based on the show’s  
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Table B.3. Percentage of pre-testers who guessed the objects depicted in stimuli for Study 4. 
Show N t Health Mari. Envir. LGBTQ Fash. F-Ball Tech. Terr. None 
All Health 160 17.22 78.75 2.50 1.25 1.88 3.75 3.75 1.25 1.88 5.00 
    In Sitcoms 77 11.61 77.92 3.90 - 2.60 2.60 3.90 2.60 1.30 5.19 
    In Dramas 83 12.74 79.52 1.20 2.41 1.20 4.82 3.61 - 2.41 4.82 
    Hawkins Point  32 4.83 65.62 9.38 - 3.12 3.12 9.38 6.25 3.12 - 
    The Beat 41 9.64 82.93 - 4.88 2.44 4.88 - - 2.44 2.44 
    Savannah 51 7.94 80.39 1.96 - - 1.96 5.88 - - 9.80 
    The Turnaround 36 8.76 83.33 - - 2.78 5.56 - - 2.78 5.56 
All Marijuana 160 18.05 1.25 82.50 2.50 - 1.88 5.62 0.62 1.88 3.75 
    In Sitcoms 73 12.39 - 86.30 1.37 - - 6.85 - 1.37 4.11 
    In Dramas 87 13.15 2.30 79.31 3.45 - 3.45 4.60 1.15 2.30 3.45 
    Hawkins Point  38 11.43 - 92.11 - - - 2.63 - - 5.26 
    The Beat 35 7.96 5.71 80.00 2.86 - - 2.86 - 2.86 5.71 
    Savannah 40 6.59 - 77.50 7.50 - 5.00 10.00 - - - 
    The Turnaround 47 9.06 - 80.85 - - 2.13 6.38 2.13 4.26 4.26 
All Environment 160 15.52 0.62 - 80.00 1.25 3.12 5.62 1.25 0.62 7.50 
    In Sitcoms 87 12.19 - - 81.61 1.15 1.15 5.75 2.30 1.15 6.90 
    In Dramas 73 9.75 1.37 - 78.08 1.37 5.48 5.48 - - 8.22 
    Hawkins Point  39 4.75 - - 76.92 - - 2.56 - 2.56 17.95 
    The Beat 41 9.64 2.44 - 82.93 - 4.88 2.44 2.44 - 4.88 
    Savannah 40 6.23 - - 80.00 - 5.00 12.50 - - 2.50 
    The Turnaround 40 8.85 - - 80.00 5.00 2.50 5.00 2.50 - 5.00 
All LGBTQ 159 10.50 1.26 - 4.40 69.81 2.52 6.29 2.52 1.26 11.95 
    In Sitcoms 83 6.74 - - 6.02 66.27 2.41 8.43 2.41 1.20 13.25 
    In Dramas 76 8.27 2.63 - 2.63 73.68 2.63 3.95 2.63 1.32 10.53 
    Hawkins Point  51 7.73 1.96 - 3.92 74.51 3.92 5.88 1.96 - 7.84 
    The Beat 43 4.40 2.33 - 2.33 62.79 4.65 6.98 4.65 2.33 13.95 
    Savannah 28 6.91 - - 3.57 82.14 - 3.57 - 3.57 7.14 
    The Turnaround 37 3.33 - - 8.11 62.16 - 8.11 2.70 - 18.92 
Note: All t-tests are statistically significant at the p < .001 level except for LGBTQ on The Turnaround, which was p = .002. 
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Table B.4. Percentage of pre-testers who guessed the genres depicted in stimuli for Study 4. 
Show N t Sitcom Drama Game News Reality Sports Travel Cooking 
All sitcoms 320 11.75 67.81 17.19 1.25 1.56 3.75 4.69 2.50 1.25 
    Hawkins Point  89 4.23 59.55 22.47 1.12 3.37 3.37 5.62 2.25 2.25 
    The Beat 80 7.30 75.00 15.00 1.25 1.25 3.75 2.50 - 1.25 
    Savannah 78 7.20 70.51 12.82 1.28 1.28 2.56 8.97 2.56 - 
    The Turnaround 73 5.41 67.12 17.81 1.37 - 5.48 1.37 5.48 1.37 
All Dramas 318 31.41 3.14 84.59 1.57 1.89 2.52 2.83 1.89 1.57 
    Hawkins Point  71 13.44 5.63 87.32 - 2.82 1.41 2.82 - - 
    The Beat 80 11.85 5.00 77.50 3.75 1.25 5.00 1.25 3.75 2.50 
    Savannah 81 16.98 2.47 85.19 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47 - 
    The Turnaround 86 16.21 - 88.37 - 1.16 1.16 4.65 1.16 3.49 
Note: All t-tests are statistically significant at the p < .001 level. 
 
Table B.5. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for alignment measures. 
Alignment Democrats Liberals Republicans Conservatives 
Liberals  .85*** -   
Republicans -.22*** -.22*** -  
Conservatives -.22*** -.26*** .87*** - 
M 3.16 3.19 2.54 2.55 
SD 1.24 1.26 1.35 1.33 
Note: ***p < .001 
 
Table B.6. Tests of statistically significant differences between alignment measures. 
Alignment Democrats Liberals Republicans 
Liberals  t(1271.5) = -0.35, p = .730 -  
Republicans t(1264.9) = 8.60, p < .001 t(1266.6) = 8.86, p < .001 - 
Conservatives t(1267.3) = 8.61, p < .001 t(1268.4) = 8.87, p < .001 t(1273.8) = -0.04, p = .967 
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Table B.7. Conditional means of alignment variables by issue and position. 
 Align with Democrats Align with Liberals Align with Republicans Align with Conservatives 
 DL RC DL RC DL RC DL RC 
Healthcare 3.60 (1.06) 2.73 (1.21) 3.61 (0.99) 2.72 (1.19) 2.14 (1.26) 3.05 (1.32) 2.14 (1.25) 3.18 (1.29) 
Marijuana 3.47 (1.06) 2.77 (1.25) 3.46 (1.05) 2.73 (1.21) 2.12 (1.19) 2.93 (1.19) 2.17 (1.24) 2.94 (1.20) 
Environment 3.47 (0.99) 2.80 (1.38) 3.55 (1.09) 2.74 (1.38) 2.43 (1.38) 2.89 (1.28) 2.21 (1.18) 2.91 (1.23) 
LGBTQ 3.67 (1.05) 2.79 (1.34) 3.88 (1.06) 2.81 (1.39) 1.89 (1.27) 2.92 (1.38) 1.89 (1.29) 2.96 (1.36) 
Note: DL = Show expressing a Democratic/liberal position; RC = show expressing a Republican/conservative position. t-tests revealed 
that the differences between the DL and RC means for each alignment variable and each issue is statistically significant at the p < .001 
level except for alignment with Republicans for Environment, which was statistically significant at p = .028. 
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issue position, controlling for pre-tester’s political conservatism, genre, the issue depicted, and 
the unique show premise. Shows delivering a Republican/conservative message were rated as 
less aligned with the views of Democrats and liberals and more aligned with the views of 
Republicans and conservatives; see Table B.8. This demonstrates that the manipulation of issue 
position was robust to any effects of the respondent’s political ideology, genre, issue, and show, 
and thus worked as intended. 
All pre-tests also asked the extent to which each show sounded the following on a scale 
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely): exciting, likable, boring, similar to my real life, interesting, 
realistic, entertaining, enjoyable, relaxing, stressful, easy to follow. All show descriptions can be 
found in Appendix A. 
PRM Scale Pre-Test 
One of the considerations for developing the PRM scale was to ensure that the scale 
items would not be affected by incongruence between the attitudes of the viewer and the 
perceived issue positions of the shows, particularly for the perception of persuasive intent 
dimension. I developed a total of 12 items to measure perception of persuasive intent; see 
Appendix C. To test whether these items would be affected by incongruence, I pre-tested these 
12 items along with the 14 items tapping into the other two scale dimensions, using the 
previously pre-tested Study 4 stimuli that included issue positions. I also used this pre-test as an 
opportunity to test items measuring issue public membership and tolerance for ambiguity (TA).  
I used CloudResearch’s Panel feature to recruit 75 MTurk participants on Feb. 26, 2020, 
divided between self-identified Democrats (n = 23), Republicans (n = 21), and 
Independents/Others (n = 31). Participants first answered eight questions regarding how strongly 
held their beliefs were regarding eight issues (the cost of healthcare, marijuana, the environment, 
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Table B.8. Linear mixed models predicting alignment measures. 
 Democrats Liberals Republicans Conservatives 
Position: Republican/Conservative  -.79*** (.08) -.89*** (.08) .82*** (.08) .90*** (.08) 
Conservatism .11*** (.03) .09** (.03) .11** (.04) .10* (.04) 
Genre: Drama -.02 (.08) -.08 (.08) -.01 (.08) .03 (.08) 
Issue: Health .03 (.11) .03 (.11) -.04 (.11) .10 (.11) 
Issue: LGBTQ .11 (.11) .20 (.11) -.25* (.11) -.13 (.11) 
Issue: Marijuana -.01 (.11) -.04 (.11) -.13 (.11) -.00 (.11) 
Show: Savannah .17 (.11) .07 (.12) -.04 (.11) .07 (.11) 
Show: The Beat .19 (.11) .21 (.11) -.16 (.11) -.11 (.11) 
Show: The Turnaround .05 (.11) .11 (.11) .04 (.11) -.08 (.11) 
Intercept 3.06*** (.17) 3.24 *** (.17) 1.92*** (.18) 1.80*** (.18) 
     
Random Effects var (SD)     
Respondent 0.37 (0.61) 0.33 (0.58) 0.6 (0.77) 0.56 (0.75) 
Residual 0.98 (0.99) 1.03 (1.02) 1.01 (1.01) 0.99 (0.99) 
Nobservations 638 636 638 638 
Log likelihood -981.69 -988.83 -1017.13 -1006.71 
AIC 1987.38 2001.66 2058.27 2037.42 
BIC 2040.88 2055.12 2111.77 2090.92 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Nrespondents = 160 for all models. Reference categories are Environment for Issue and Hawkins 
Point for Show.  
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and LGBTQ discrimination, plus four filler issues: abortion, immigration, sex education, and 
voter ID) coded from 0 (Strongly believe [the Democratic/liberal position]) to 1 (Strongly 
believe [the Republican/conservative position]) across seven response options, the middle option 
being “Believe or disbelieve both to the same degree.” As with the Study 4 stimuli pre-tests, the 
positions were derived from the 2016 party platforms, with slightly different wording used for 
the issue positions here and the ones that appear in the show descriptions.  
Participants then completed the nine TA items from the need for closure scale (Roets & 
Van Hiel, 2011). These items served the primary purpose of acting as a distractor task between 
the issue public membership items and the show descriptions and PRM scale. Next the 
participants were presented with four shows (two sitcoms, two dramas, with two 
Democratic/liberal messages and two Republican/conservative messages). After each show they 
responded to the PRM scale items, a single item asking how political they thought the show was, 
and a single item asking how well they thought the views presented by the show aligned with 
their own views. Finally, they answered a series of standard demographic questions, including 
political partisanship and ideology. 
To examine possible incongruence effects, I used linear mixed models to predict the 
score for each of the PRM scale items based on the interaction between the show position and 
how strongly held the participant’s beliefs were on that issue, controlling for the issue and the 
order in which the show was presented, along with a random effect for respondents to account 
for the repeated measure. Rather than examine the statistical significance of the interaction term 
alone, I plotted and visually inspected the interactions (Brambor et al., 2006). An incongruence 
effect would be evidenced by individuals who more strongly believe either position giving a 
higher score on the measures when presented with a show conveying the opposing position. No 
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item demonstrated a uniform incongruence effect; in fact, most items failed to demonstrate any 
sort of effect of issue position belief whatsoever. The only items demonstrating any sort of 
congruence or incongruence effects were pe_affectnum, pe_topaff, and pe_topavg from the CDC 
dimension. For pe_affectnum, respondents who strongly believe the Democratic/liberal position 
gave higher scores than respondents who strongly believe the Republican/conservative position, 
but only when presented with shows conveying the Democratic/liberal position. For pe_topaff, 
respondents who strongly believe the Democratic/liberal position gave higher scores than 
respondents who strongly believe the Republican/conservative position, but only when presented 
with shows conveying the Republican/conservative position. For pe_topavg, respondents who 
strongly believe the Democratic/liberal position gave higher scores than respondents who 
strongly believe the Republican/conservative position, but only when presented with shows 
conveying the Democratic/liberal position. 
Overall, this demonstrates that most of the PRM scale items, in particular the PPI items, 
are not prone to congruence or incongruence effects. Considering which items demonstrated any 
sort of (in)congruence effect, this information informed my item reduction strategy between 
studies 1 and 2. Moreover, because my objective is to use the scale as a whole and at most to 
examine changes on dimensions as a whole, it is unlikely that any single item, when included on 
the whole scale or on a dimension-specific subscale, would skew the scale enough to cause an 
(in)congruence effect for the scale itself. Thus, after item reduction, I used this pre-test data to 
determine if there were any (in)congruence effects for the PRM scale as a whole or for the sub-
scales. 
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Appendix C 
Politically Relevant Media (PRM) Scale 
Items retained for the final scale are marked with an asterisk. 
 
Dimension 1: Collective Concerns, Decisions, and Consequences 
 
*pe_propcare Thinking of the topics presented on [name of show], how many people would you 
say care about those topics? 
No one at all (1)  
A few people (2)  
A good number of people (3)  
Most people (4)  
Everyone (5)  
 
pe_topaff When it comes to the topics presented on [name of show], those topics affect: 
No one at all (1)  
A few people (2)  
A good number of people (3)  
Most people (4)  
Everyone (5)  
 
*pe_topavg When it comes to the topics presented on [name of show], the average person is: 
Not at all affected (1)  
Somewhat affected (2)  
Moderately affected (3)  
Very affected (4)  
Extremely affected (5)  
 
pe_docare Thinking of the topics presented on [name of show], how much do you think people 
in general care about those topics? 
Not at all (1)  
A little (2)  
A moderate amount (3)  
A lot (4)  
A great deal (5)  
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pe_affectnum Thinking of the topics presented on [name of show], when our society makes 
decisions about those topics, those decisions affect: 
No one at all (1)  
A few people (2)  
A good number of people (3)  
Most people (4)  
Everyone (5)  
 
*pe_affectavg Thinking of the topics presented on [name of show], when our society makes 
decisions about those topics, the average person is: 
Not at all affected (1)  
Somewhat affected (2)  
Moderately affected (3)  
Very affected (4)  
Extremely affected (5)  
 
pe_influence Thinking of the topics presented on [name of show], how much control do you 
think our society is able to have over those topics? 
None at all (1)  
A little (2)  
A moderate amount (3)  
A lot (4)  
A great deal (5)  
 
*pe_possible Thinking of the topics presented on [name of show], how possible do you think it is 
for our society to make choices that affect those topics? 
Not at all possible (1)  
A little possible (2)  
Somewhat possible (3)  
Very possible (4)  
Extremely possible (5)  
 
Dimension 2: Perception of Persuasive Intent 
 
pe_persuade Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: The purpose of 
[name of show] is to persuade people. 
Strongly disagree (1)  
Somewhat disagree (2)  
Neither agree nor disagree (3)  
Somewhat agree (4)  
Strongly agree (5)  
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pe_entertain Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: The purpose of 
[name of show] is to entertain. 
Strongly disagree (1)  
Somewhat disagree (2)  
Neither agree nor disagree (3)  
Somewhat agree (4)  
Strongly agree (5)  
 
*pe_change Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: [name of show] 
seems interested in changing people's opinions. 
Strongly disagree (1)  
Somewhat disagree (2)  
Neither agree nor disagree (3)  
Somewhat agree (4)  
Strongly agree (5)  
 
pe_dismiss How easy would it be to dismiss [name of show] as simply a form of entertainment? 
Extremely difficult (1)  
Somewhat difficult (2)  
Neither easy nor difficult (3)  
Somewhat easy (4)  
Extremely easy (5)  
 
pe_serious How serious do you think [name of show] is about advancing the views presented in 
the show? 
Not at all serious (1)  
A little serious (2)  
Somewhat serious (3)  
Very serious (4)  
Extremely serious (5)  
 
*pe_think How likely do you think it is that [name of show] is trying to get people to think a 
certain way? 
Not at all likely (1)  
A little likely (2)  
Somewhat likely (3)  
Very likely (4)  
Extremely likely (5)  
 
pe_point Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: [name of show] is 
trying to prove a point. 
Strongly disagree (1)  
Somewhat disagree (2)  
Neither agree nor disagree (3)  
Somewhat agree (4)  
Strongly agree (5)  
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pe_message Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: [name of show] 
is trying to get a message across. 
Strongly disagree (1)  
Somewhat disagree (2)  
Neither agree nor disagree (3)  
Somewhat agree (4)  
Strongly agree (5)  
 
pe_attention Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: [name of show] 
is trying to call attention to something. 
Strongly disagree (1)  
Somewhat disagree (2)  
Neither agree nor disagree (3)  
Somewhat agree (4)  
Strongly agree (5)  
 
*pe_stand Thinking of the topics presented on [name of show], how likely do you think it is 
that [name of show] is taking a stand on those topics? 
Not at all likely (1)  
A little likely (2)  
Somewhat likely (3)  
Very likely (4)  
Extremely likely (5)  
 
pe_reflect Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: [name of show] 
wants people to reflect on the topics on the show. 
Strongly disagree (1)  
Somewhat disagree (2)  
Neither agree nor disagree (3)  
Somewhat agree (4)  
Strongly agree (5)  
 
*pe_express Thinking of the topics presented on [name of show], how likely do you think it is 
that [name of show] expressing an opinion on those topics? 
Not at all likely (1)  
A little likely (2)  
Somewhat likely (3)  
Very likely (4)  
Extremely likely (5)  
 
Dimension 3: Perception of Controversy 
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pe_controversy How controversial do you think the topics presented on [name of show] are? 
Not at all controversial (1)  
Slightly controversial (2)  
Somewhat controversial (3)  
Very controversial (4)  
Extremely controversial (5)  
 
*pe_argue How often do you think people argue about the topics presented on [name of show]? 
Never (1)  
Rarely (2)  
Sometimes (3)  
Very often (4)  
All the time (5)  
 
pe_minds How often do you think people are willing to change their own minds about the topics 
seen on [name of show]? 
Never (1)  
Rarely (2)  
Sometimes (3)  
Very often (4)  
All the time (5)  
 
*pe_opinions Please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: People hold 
strong opinions about the topics presented on [name of show]. 
Strongly disagree (1)  
Somewhat disagree (2)  
Neither agree nor disagree (3)  
Somewhat agree (4)  
Strongly agree (5)  
 
*pe_divided Thinking of the topics presented on [name of show], how divided do you think 
people in general are on those topics? 
Not at all divided (1)  
Slightly divided (2)  
Moderately divided (3)  
Very divided (4)  
Extremely divided (5)  
 
pe_agree Thinking of the topics presented on [name of show], how in agreement do you think 
people in general are on those topics? 
Not at all in agreement (1)  
A little in agreement (2)  
Somewhat in agreement (3)  
Mostly in agreement (4)  
Totally in agreement (5)  
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Single-Item “Political” Measure 
 
pe_political How political do you think the show [name of show] is? 
Not at all political (1)  
A little political (2)  
Somewhat political (3)  
Very political (4)  
Extremely political (5)  
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Appendix D 
Issue Public Membership Items 
Item on pre-test:  
When it comes to [issue], some people believe [position A or B], whereas some people believe 
[position B or A]. How about you, which belief do you hold? 
 
Item on Study 2:  
When it comes to the issue of [issue], some people believe [position A or B], whereas other 
people believe [position B or A]. How about you, which belief do you hold? 
 
Response options: 
-Strongly believe [position A or B] 
-Moderately believe [position A or B] 
-Slightly believe [position A or B] 
-Believe or disbelieve both to the same degree 
-Slightly believe [position B or A] 
-Moderately believe [position B or A] 
-Strongly believe [position B or A] 
 
All eight issues were presented in random order. The order of presentation for positions A and B 
was randomly chosen. The list of issues and positions is presented in Table D.1 below.
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Table D.1. Issues and positions for issue public membership items. 
Issue Position A  (Democratic/Liberal) 
Position B 
(Republican/Conservative) 
the cost of healthcare healthcare should be free for 
everyone 
paying for healthcare is an 
individual responsibility 
marijuana Pre-test: marijuana 
restrictions hurt people more 
than protect communities 
 
Study 2: marijuana 
restrictions hurt people more 
than they protect 
communities 
marijuana poses a danger to public 
safety 
the environment we need to make sure 
businesses do their part to 
protect the environment 
environmental regulations 
shouldn't be forced on businesses 
Pre-test: religious 
freedom and 
discrimination 
 
Study 2: whether 
businesses can deny 
service to gay or 
transgender people on 
religious grounds  
no one should be allowed to 
discriminate against gay and 
transgender people 
business owners shouldn't be 
forced to violate their religious 
beliefs 
abortion women have the right to 
access a safe and legal 
abortion 
unborn children have a 
fundamental right to life 
immigration we should make it less 
difficult for people to 
immigrate to the U.S. 
Pre-test: we should secure our 
borders and enforce immigration 
laws 
 
Study 2: we should secure our 
borders and enforce existing 
immigration laws 
preventing unintended 
pregnancies 
family planning and 
contraception information is 
most effective 
abstinence until marriage and risk 
avoidance is most effective 
Pre-test: voting 
 
Study 2: voter ID 
voter ID laws discriminate 
against already vulnerable 
groups 
voter ID laws protect against voter 
fraud 
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